?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Adc&rft.title=A+Connectionist+Theory+of+Phenomenal+Experience&rft.creator=O'Brien%2C+Gerard&rft.creator=Opie%2C+Jon&rft.subject=Computational+Neuroscience&rft.subject=Cognitive+Psychology&rft.subject=Philosophy+of+Mind&rft.subject=Behavioral+%26+Brain+Sciences&rft.description=When+cognitive+scientists+apply+computational+theory+to+the+problem+of+phenomenal+consciousness%2C+as%0Amany+of+them+have+been+doing+recently%2C+there+are+two+fundamentally+distinct+approaches+available.+Either%0Aconsciousness+is+to+be+explained+in+terms+of+the+nature+of+the+representational+vehicles+the+brain+deploys%3B+or%0Ait+is+to+be+explained+in+terms+of+the+computational+processes+defined+over+these+vehicles.+We+call+versions+of%0Athese+two+approaches+vehicle+and+process+theories+of+consciousness%2C+respectively.+However%2C+while+there+may%0Abe+space+for+vehicle+theories+of+consciousness+in+cognitive+science%2C+they+are+relatively+rare.+This+is+because%0Aof+the+influence+exerted%2C+on+the+one+hand%2C+by+a+large+body+of+research+which+purports+to+show+that+the%0Aexplicit+representation+of+information+in+the+brain+and+conscious+experience+are+dissociable%2C+and+on+the%0Aother%2C+by+the+classical+computational+theory+of+mind+%E2%80%93+the+theory+that+takes+human+cognition+to+be+a+species%0Aof+symbol+manipulation.+But+two+recent+developments+in+cognitive+science+combine+to+suggest+that+a%0Areappraisal+of+this+situation+is+in+order.+First%2C+a+number+of+theorists+have+recently+been+highly+critical+of+the%0Aexperimental+methodologies+employed+in+the+dissociation+studies+%E2%80%93+so+critical%2C+in+fact%2C+it%E2%80%99s+no+longer%0Areasonable+to+assume+that+the+dissociability+of+conscious+experience+and+explicit+representation+has+been%0Aadequately+demonstrated.+Second%2C+classicism%2C+as+a+theory+of+human+cognition%2C+is+no+longer+as+dominant+in%0Acognitive+science+as+it+once+was.+It+now+has+a+lively+competitor+in+the+form+of+connectionism%3B+and%0Aconnectionism%2C+unlike+classicism%2C+does+have+the+computational+resources+to+support+a+robust+vehicle+theory%0Aof+consciousness.+In+this+paper+we+develop+and+defend+this+connectionist+vehicle+theory+of+consciousness.+It%0Atakes+the+form+of+the+following+simple+empirical+hypothesis%3A+phenomenal+experience+consists+in+the+explicit%0Arepresentation+of+information+in+neurally+realized+PDP+networks.+This+hypothesis+leads+us+to+re-assess+some%0Acommon+wisdom+about+consciousness%2C+but%2C+we+will+argue%2C+in+fruitful+and+ultimately+plausible+ways.%0A&rft.publisher=Cambridge+University+Press&rft.date=1999&rft.type=Journal+(Paginated)&rft.type=PeerReviewed&rft.format=application%2Fpdf&rft.identifier=http%3A%2F%2Fcogprints.org%2F1412%2F3%2FA_connectionist_theory_of_phenomenal_experience.pdf&rft.identifier=++O'Brien%2C+Gerard+and+Opie%2C+Jon++(1999)+A+Connectionist+Theory+of+Phenomenal+Experience.++%5BJournal+(Paginated)%5D+++++&rft.relation=http%3A%2F%2Fcogprints.org%2F1412%2F