--- abstract: 'How might consciousness have evolved? Unfortunately for the prospects of providing a convincing answer to this question, there is no agreed account of what consciousness is. So any attempt at an answer will have to fragment along a number of different lines of enquiry. More fortunately, perhaps, there is general agreement that a number of distinct notions of consciousness need to be distinguished from one another; and there is also broad agreement as to which of these is particularly problematic - namely phenomenal consciousness, or the kind of conscious mental state which it is like something to have, which has a distinctive subjective feel or phenomenology (henceforward referred to as p-consciousness). I shall survey the prospects for an evolutionary explanation of p-consciousness, on a variety of competing accounts of its nature. My goal is to use evolutionary considerations to adjudicate between some of those accounts.' altloc: [] chapter: 12 commentary: ~ commref: ~ confdates: ~ conference: ~ confloc: ~ contact_email: ~ creators_id: [] creators_name: - family: Carruthers given: Peter honourific: '' lineage: '' date: 2000 date_type: published datestamp: 2001-01-22 department: ~ dir: disk0/00/00/12/05 edit_lock_since: ~ edit_lock_until: ~ edit_lock_user: ~ editors_id: [] editors_name: - family: Carruthers given: Peter honourific: '' lineage: '' - family: Chamberlain given: Andrew honourific: '' lineage: '' eprint_status: archive eprintid: 1205 fileinfo: /style/images/fileicons/text_html.png;/1205/1/Concevol.htm full_text_status: public importid: ~ institution: ~ isbn: ~ ispublished: pub issn: ~ item_issues_comment: [] item_issues_count: 0 item_issues_description: [] item_issues_id: [] item_issues_reported_by: [] item_issues_resolved_by: [] item_issues_status: [] item_issues_timestamp: [] item_issues_type: [] keywords: 'consciousness, evolution, higher-order experience, higher-order thought, inner sense' lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:54:28 latitude: ~ longitude: ~ metadata_visibility: show note: ~ number: ~ pagerange: 254-275 pubdom: FALSE publication: 'Evolution and the human mind: modularity, language and meta-cognition' publisher: Cambridge University Press refereed: TRUE referencetext: | Armstrong, D. 1968. 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The Child's Theory of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. relation_type: [] relation_uri: [] reportno: ~ rev_number: 8 series: ~ source: ~ status_changed: 2007-09-12 16:36:57 subjects: - evol-psy - phil-mind succeeds: ~ suggestions: ~ sword_depositor: ~ sword_slug: ~ thesistype: ~ title: The evolution of consciousness type: bookchapter userid: 1231 volume: ~