title: Sympathy and subjectivity
creator: Carruthers, Peter
subject: Ethics
subject: Philosophy of Mind
description: This paper shows that even if the mental states of non-human animals lack phenomenological properties, as some accounts of mental-state consciousness imply, this need not prevent those states from being appropriate objects of sympathy and moral concern. The paper argues that the most basic form of mental (as opposed to biological) harm lies in the existence of thwarted agency, or thwarted desire, rather than in anything phenomenological. 
publisher: Oxford University Press
contributor: D'Agostino, Fred
date: 1999
type: Journal (On-line/Unpaginated)
type: PeerReviewed
format: text/html
identifier: http://cogprints.org/1204/1/Sympathy.htm
identifier:   Carruthers, Peter  (1999) Sympathy and subjectivity.  [Journal (On-line/Unpaginated)]     
relation: http://cogprints.org/1204/