--- abstract: 'In this chapter I attempt to curb the pretensions of simulationism. I argue that it is, at best, an epistemological doctrine of limited scope. It may explain how we go about attributing beliefs and desires to others, and perhaps to ourselves, in some cases. But simulation cannot provide the fundamental basis of our conception of, or knowledge of, minded agency.' altloc: [] chapter: 3 commentary: ~ commref: ~ confdates: ~ conference: ~ confloc: ~ contact_email: ~ creators_id: [] creators_name: - family: Carruthers given: Peter honourific: '' lineage: '' date: 1996 date_type: published datestamp: 2001-01-09 department: ~ dir: disk0/00/00/11/94 edit_lock_since: ~ edit_lock_until: ~ edit_lock_user: ~ editors_id: [] editors_name: - family: Carruthers given: Peter honourific: '' lineage: '' - family: Smith given: Peter K honourific: '' lineage: '' eprint_status: archive eprintid: 1194 fileinfo: /style/images/fileicons/text_html.png;/1194/1/Simula~1.htm full_text_status: public importid: ~ institution: ~ isbn: ~ ispublished: pub issn: ~ item_issues_comment: [] item_issues_count: 0 item_issues_description: [] item_issues_id: [] item_issues_reported_by: [] item_issues_resolved_by: [] item_issues_status: [] item_issues_timestamp: [] item_issues_type: [] keywords: 'Simulation, theory-theory, self-knowledge, Gordon, Goldman' lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:54:28 latitude: ~ longitude: ~ metadata_visibility: show note: ~ number: ~ pagerange: 22-38 pubdom: FALSE publication: Theories of theories of mind publisher: Cambridge University Press refereed: TRUE referencetext: ~ relation_type: [] relation_uri: [] reportno: ~ rev_number: 8 series: ~ source: ~ status_changed: 2007-09-12 16:36:54 subjects: - dev-psy - phil-mind succeeds: ~ suggestions: ~ sword_depositor: ~ sword_slug: ~ thesistype: ~ title: 'Simulation and self-knowledge: a defence of theory-theory' type: bookchapter userid: 1231 volume: ~