?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Adc&rft.title=A+Defence+of+Cartesian+Materialism&rft.creator=O'Brien%2C+Gerard&rft.creator=Opie%2C+Jon&rft.subject=Cognitive+Psychology&rft.subject=Computational+Neuroscience&rft.subject=Philosophy+of+Mind&rft.description=One+of+the+principal+tasks+Dennett+sets+himself+in+%22Consciousness+Explained%22+is+to+demolish+the+Cartesian+theatre+model+of+phenomenal+consciousness%2C+which+in+its+contemporary+garb+takes+the+form+of+Cartesian+materialism%3A+the+idea+that+conscious+experience+is+a+process+of+presentation+realized+in+the+physical+materials+of+the+brain.+The+now+standard+response+to+Dennett+is+that%2C+in+focusing+on+Cartesian+materialism%2C+he+attacks+an+impossibly+naive+account+of+consciousness+held+by+no+one+currently+working+in+cognitive+science+or+the+philosophy+of+mind.+Our+response+is+quite+different.+We+believe+that%2C+once+properly+formulated%2C+Cartesian+materialism+is+no+straw+man.+Rather%2C+it+is+an+attractive+hypothesis+about+the+relationship+between+the+computational+architecture+of+the+brain+and+phenomenal+consciousness%2C+and+hence+one+that+is+worthy+of+further+exploration.+Consequently%2C+our+primary+aim+in+this+paper+is+to+defend+Cartesian+materialism+from+Dennett's+assault.+We+do+this+by+showing+that+Dennett's+argument+against+this+position+is+founded+on+an+implicit+assumption+(about+the+relationship+between+phenomenal+experience+and+information+coding+in+the+brain)%2C+which+while+valid+in+the+context+of+classical+cognitive+science%2C+is+not+forced+on+connectionism.&rft.date=1999&rft.type=Journal+(Paginated)&rft.type=PeerReviewed&rft.format=application%2Fpdf&rft.identifier=http%3A%2F%2Fcogprints.org%2F1139%2F3%2FA_Defense_of_Cartesian_Materialism.pdf&rft.identifier=++O'Brien%2C+Gerard+and+Opie%2C+Jon++(1999)+A+Defence+of+Cartesian+Materialism.++%5BJournal+(Paginated)%5D+++++&rft.relation=http%3A%2F%2Fcogprints.org%2F1139%2F