"104","Neural activation, information, and phenomenal consciousness.","O'Brien & Opie defend a \"vehicle\" rather than a \"process\" theory of consciousness largely on the grounds that only conscious information is \"explicit\". I argue that preconscious and unconscious representations can be functionally explicit (semantically well-formed and causally active). I also suggest that their analysis of how neural activation space mirrors the information structure of phenomenal experience fits more naturally into a dual-aspect theory of information than into their reductive physicalism.","http://cogprints.org/104/","Velmans, Max","UNSPECIFIED","       <span class=\"person_name\">Velmans, Max</span>     (1999)  <a href=\"http://cogprints.org/104/\"><em>Neural activation, information, and phenomenal consciousness.</em></a>       [Journal (Paginated)]           ","","1999"