title: Neural activation, information, and phenomenal consciousness.
creator: Velmans, Max
subject: Cognitive Psychology
subject: Neuropsychology
description: O'Brien & Opie defend a "vehicle" rather than a "process" theory of consciousness largely on the grounds that only conscious information is "explicit". I argue that preconscious and unconscious representations can be functionally explicit (semantically well-formed and causally active). I also suggest that their analysis of how neural activation space mirrors the information structure of phenomenal experience fits more naturally into a dual-aspect theory of information than into their reductive physicalism.
date: 1999
type: Journal (Paginated)
type: PeerReviewed
format: text/html
identifier: http://cogprints.org/104/1/OPIE.html
identifier:   Velmans, Max  (1999) Neural activation, information, and phenomenal consciousness.  [Journal (Paginated)]     
relation: http://cogprints.org/104/