Only Friends, despite the rumors
Philosophy of mind's Consciousness & Intentionality

1. **Wedge Philosophy**

Traditional philosophy of mind has been operating under the assumption of a mild form of ontological dualism.

2. **Mind and World Back Together**

Understanding content and representation involves more than just the mind.

3. **Intentionality Naturalized**

Symbol Grounding

- "Minimal" Representations
  - Response to anti-representationalism
  - Non-traditional type of representation to account for successes of evolutionary robotics
  - Components of a system which embody information about something, and which are responsible for behaviour towards this object.
  - Fuzzy contour
    - Not discrete and identifiable thing

Evolutionary Robotics

- Furnish models of cognitive systems which seem to lack implementation of a proper symbolic representational system, in the traditional sense of the word, yet present intelligent behaviour.

Anti-representationalism

- Systems can be described using representational or non-representational descriptions, but the latter involves postulating extra entities (nomological dangers)

4. **Consciousness Trivialized**

Consciousness in Embodied Science

- Consciousness Discontinuity
  - Minimal consciousness is an either/or concept: either you are subject of phenomenal experience (even minimally) or you aren't.
  - Fuzzy categories of embodied cognition make it harder to accommodate consciousness

Stance and Reality

- One might think consciousness should transcend the descriptive stance used to account for phenomena
  - However, current cognitive ontological categories are different whether one adopts a dynamical or an information-processing descriptive stance

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Philosophy of mind has largely been drawing a picture of the mind as a sort of exception to normal laws of physics. Yet, the mind must be realized by physical stuff.

Louis Chartrand, Université du Québec à Montréal

[Diagram of Mind and World]

There is a sense that they must be studied together.

Searle (1991): consciousness is implicit in intentionality. It is the relation to which intentionality relates its object.

"The core cognition tends to recruit, on the spot, whatever of problem-solving resources will yield an acceptable result with a minimum of effort." (Clark, 2008, 13)

Cognitive processes involve processes that span across brain, body and world.

Mind processes interactions between mind, body and environment.

Ecology and Proper Function

- An organism's faculties are to be understood in relation to the organism itself, its ecosystem and its evolutionary history (Millikan 1984)
- Something's proper function is defined by its contribution to them
- Thus an organism's faculties depend on external environment in order to function.

Embodied / Extended Mind

- Mental processes, if they do not extend into body and environment, rely heavily on them.

Emergence

- Consciousness as emerging from interactions between mind, body and world.
- It may explain, to a certain degree, content and quality of experience

But consciousness entailed by physical interactions?

- Extra hypothesis: plays no role in explaining content of experience
- Therefore it is *ad hoc*

(Similar things can be said of many enterprises to explain consciousness)

**Disclaimer**

Emergence: 2000, courtesy of Frode Kleven, Norway

Roshi, from Wimsatt (2007), p. 1999

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From Wimsatt (2007), Stance and Reality

Minimal consciousness is an either/or concept: either you are subject of phenomenal experience (even minimally) or you aren't.

"Well you see," Roshi replied, "for most people, and especially for most educated people, koans don't make any sense, and I don't feel a dynamical or an information-processing descriptive stance?

But consciousness entailed by physical interactions?

- Extra hypothesis: plays no role in explaining content of experience
- Therefore it is *ad hoc*

(Similar things can be said of many enterprises to explain consciousness)

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