Commentary on "What is consciousness?" by Mark Solms.

Abstract

The puzzle of how an "objectively real" brain might produce "subjectively real" experiences dissolves if experiences can be shown to be nothing more than (ontologically identical to) states of the brain. However, this form of reductionism cannot be made to work. Science may discover the neural causes and correlates of consciousness, but causation and correlation are very different to ontological identity. Solms suggests a solution to this puzzle which breaks down the classical "objective/subjective" distinction, and his proposals, informed by psychodynamic theory, are very close to ones I have developed in the effort to construct a phenomenologically-sensitive cognitive science. This involves a nonreductionist analysis of first- and third-person access to mental life, and a dual-aspect theory in which "subjective" conscious experiences and "objective" brain states are treated as two ways of viewing one, unfolding, mental life or thing-itself.