

Life is an Adventure!

An agent-based reconciliation of narrative and scientific worldviews

Francis Heylighen
ECCO, Vrije Universiteit Brussel

Abstract: The scientific worldview is based on laws, which are supposed to be certain, objective, and independent of time and context. The narrative worldview found in literature, myth and religion, is based on stories, which relate the events experienced by a subject in a particular context with an uncertain outcome. This paper argues that the concept of “agent”, supported by the theories of evolution, cybernetics and complex adaptive systems, allows us to reconcile scientific and narrative perspectives. An agent follows a course of action through its environment with aim of maximizing its fitness. Navigation along that course combines the strategies of regulation, exploitation and exploration, but needs to cope with often-unforeseen diversions. These can be positive (affordances, opportunities), negative (disturbances, dangers) or neutral (surprises). The resulting sequence of encounters and actions can be conceptualized as an adventure. Thus, the agent appears to play the role of the hero in a tale of challenge and mystery that is very similar to the "monomyth", the basic storyline that underlies all myths and fairy tales according to Campbell [1949]. This narrative dynamics is driven forward in particular by the alternation between prospect (the ability to foresee diversions) and mystery (the possibility of achieving an as yet absent prospect), two aspects of the environment that are particularly attractive to agents. This dynamics generalizes the scientific notion of a deterministic trajectory by introducing a variable “horizon of knowability”: the agent is never fully certain of its further course, but can anticipate depending on its degree of prospect.

Introduction

People have always been searching for a conceptual framework that helps them to understand their place within the cosmos and that gives a meaning to their life. Perhaps the best term for such an encompassing philosophical system is a *worldview* [Aerts, Apostel et al., 1994]. When considering worldviews, we can distinguish two main “families” of contenders: mythical-religious, and scientific. The former are the oldest ones, dating back to the origins of humanity. The latter are relatively recent, having emerged with Enlightenment and the Industrial revolution. Due to its great

successes in prediction and application, the scientific worldview has become largely dominant in our modern age. Yet, it is still being actively challenged by various incarnations of the mythical-religious worldview, including Creationism, fundamentalist Islam, and New Age thinking.

Given the overwhelming amount of evidence for the scientific way of thinking, it may seem strange that its dominant position remains so precarious, and that the mythical-religious way of thinking remains so popular. In the present paper, I wish to explore the hypothesis that this is due not so much to the concrete content of the science, but to its form, that is, the way it is presented. Scientific knowledge is typically expressed in the form of *laws*, i.e. absolute, timeless rules that govern the behavior of all entities, thus allowing us to predict exactly what will happen to those entities in any circumstances. Mythical-religious knowledge, on the other hand, is typically expressed in the form of *stories*, which relate a sequence of events that happened to one or more protagonists. We immediately note three fundamental differences between these modes of knowledge (which Bruner [1986] calls “paradigmatic”, respectively “narrative”): 1) stories follow the arrow of *time*, while laws are normally time-independent; 2) stories take place in a concrete, local *context* centered on one or more *subjects*, while laws attempt to be universally and objectively valid; 3) a good story always includes an element of mystery, suspense or surprise, i.e. *uncertainty* about the outcome, while laws try to maximally exclude uncertainty.

Science tries to minimize the impact of time, context, subject and uncertainty [Heylighen, 1999] because these reduce our powers of prediction, and therefore of control: theories that only work sometimes, at a particular time and place, and for a particular subject, are much less useful than theories that are accurate always and everywhere. This strength of scientific theories is also the weakness of mythical-religious narratives: while a story relating the trials and tribulations of a particular hero, god, or prophet may be inspiring, it is not clear what lessons to draw from it for another person living in a different context and epoch. This explains the proliferation of multiple, mutually contradictory interpretations of the same scripture.

But a story has another great advantage: it is psychologically much more compelling than a formal theory [Oatley, 1999a]. Empirical research has shown that information presented in the form of a story is assimilated more easily, has a greater emotional impact and motivational power, and is better remembered than the same information presented in a more abstract, context-independent manner [Heath & Heath, 2007]. This can be understood from the observation that evolution has shaped our brain as a tool to remember and draw lessons from personal experiences—not from abstract theories. Indeed, one of the most advanced mechanisms in the brain is *episodic memory* [Tulving, 2002], which functions to register “episodes”, i.e. sequences of experienced events. We might say that stories have been shaped to directly enter episodic memory. When you listen to a good story you tend to empathize with the main characters, to imagine yourself to be in their place, and thus to relive their experiences inside your mind [Heath & Heath, 2007; Oatley, 1999a]. Because of this effect, educators and popularizers of science have learned long ago

that abstract knowledge is assimilated much more easily if it is presented in the form of a story—e.g. by relating anecdotes or biographical episodes about the theory’s creators, or by recounting the historical sequence of steps through which a great scientific mystery was solved.

This power of story telling not only supports mythical thinking, religion and education; it is also the basis of literature, cinema, and many forms of entertainment. A multibillion-dollar industry has arisen in Hollywood and other places just to cater for the public’s need to be entertained with compelling stories. Narrative is also the foundation on which the culture of the humanities is built. Half a century ago, the novelist-scientist C. P. Snow [1961] famously lamented the growing divide between the “two cultures”, the scientific and the literary one. In spite of several attempts to bridge this gap [e.g. Prigogine & Stengers, 1984; Brockman, 1995], the separation remains as strong as ever.

This fundamental difference in outlook may explain the recent lack of popularity of scientific studies in the US and other Western countries: students brought up in a culture of movies, comic strips and novels that is essentially narrative seem to find the formal, scientific way of thinking increasingly alien, choosing social, communicative or artistic disciplines instead. Many commentators have warned about the dangers of this development: fewer people graduating in scientific fields means fewer researchers, engineers and technologists—the professions that seem to contribute most directly to economic and social progress. Moreover, the lack of scientific education makes the population at large more vulnerable to irrational belief systems, such as various cults, creationism, New Age superstitions, and political and religious extremism.

The present paper proposes a new paradigm to bridge the gap between the two cultures. Thus, it may help us to unify the worldviews of science and those found in literature, myth and religion. This paradigm can be motivated by evolutionary psychology: if our brain has been shaped by natural selection to process events in the form of a story, then perhaps this is because human life is indeed more story-like than law-like. Using the recent theories of evolutionary cybernetics [Turchin, 1977] and of complex adaptive systems [Holland, 1992; Miller, Page & LeBaron, 2007; Axelrod & Cohen, 1999] I will argue that real-world events have the same characteristics of time sequence, context-dependence, agent-centeredness and intrinsic uncertainty as stories. This ‘narrative’ dynamics can be summarized by the slogan “life is an adventure!” I will further show that while this new outlook by necessity limits the absolutist ambitions of traditional science, it by no means invalidates its results. On the contrary, the underlying paradigm of agents and their courses of action can be seen as an extension and strengthening of the scientific worldview, albeit one that is now truly compatible with narrative culture. To get there, I will first show where classical, Newtonian science has gone too far in its ambitions of reducing life to deterministic laws, and then how the new theories of complexity and evolution have opened up a fundamental new perspective.

Beyond the Newtonian worldview

The clockwork universe

The modern scientific worldview is rooted in the mechanics of Newton, Laplace and their successors. The core metaphor of the mechanical worldview is *the world as a clockwork mechanism*: a complicated array of gears and wheels working together in perfect unison, so that all their movements are regular, clearly observable and perfectly predictable. This seemed the perfect model for the movement of the planets around the sun, which is indeed extremely regular and predictable. This was already demonstrated in ancient Greece by the Antikythera mechanism (2nd century BC), a complicated clockwork that functioned like an analog computer. It allowed users to accurately predict the positions of the astral bodies by turning a crank that would move the mechanism forward to any date in the future [Freeth, 2009].

Newton's equations allowed scientists to capture this motion in a mathematical formalism that was applicable not just to the astral bodies, but in principle to any material object. It therefore was not such a big leap of the imagination for Laplace, a century after Newton, to conceive of a demon that would be able to observe the position and velocity of all material objects in the universe, and use this information together with Newton's laws to predict the future evolution of the universe in every detail.

Laplace's demon constitutes an immensely influential thought experiment. It led both to a general philosophy of determinism and to the disappearance of God from the scientific worldview (Laplace is famously quoted as observing that he had "no need for this hypothesis"). Indeed, if the laws of motion together with the present state of the universe completely specify any future (as well as past) states, then there is no possibility for God, human or animal to intervene in the course of things, and all events, future or past, are already determined. What appears to be evolution or change is merely the translation of material objects along pre-existing trajectories determined by the laws of motion [Heylighen, 1990]. Time then is nothing more than a coordinate used to label the successive positions along those fixed trajectories—playing a role similar to the position of the crank in the Antikythera clockwork.

Since everything is a priori determined, all notions of uncertainty, freedom, surprise, novelty, creativity, and evolution become pointless. The same happens to all notions that imply will, intention, goal-directedness, purpose or meaning: since it is anyway already determined beforehand whether you will reach a particular goal or not, it becomes pointless to reason in terms of striving, trying, or achieving. The notion of goal or purpose in particular makes no sense in the Newtonian worldview: since effects are already fully determined by their (past) cause, there is no room for any (future) goal state to influence what happens here and now. This leads to the often-heard criticism that science paints a bleak, mechanistic picture of life, which leaves no space for meaning, values or ethics. Unfortunately, that criticism is often misinterpreted to imply that we need to go back to some supernatural, mystical or religious explanations.

Limitation Principles

Present-day science has long invalidated the basic tenets of the Newtonian/Laplacian worldview. Most obviously, the twentieth century has produced a raft of “limitation principles” proving that complete, certain knowledge is impossible—not just in practice, but in principle [Barrow, 1998]. The most famous ones are:

- 1) the *Heisenberg uncertainty principle*, which shows that the observable properties of particles are intrinsically indeterminate,
- 2) the *theorem of Gödel*, which shows that even in pure mathematics we will never be able to establish with certainty the truth or falsity of certain propositions,
- 3) the existence of *deterministic chaos*, more colloquially known as the “butterfly effect”, which notes that many physical systems, even when they are in principle deterministic, are so sensitive to unobservably small fluctuations in their initial conditions that we will never be able to predict their future evolution [Prigogine & Stengers, 1984].

As an illustration that this list of limitations on predictability is merely the top of an iceberg, let me just mention two lesser-known limitations:

- 4) the *halting problem*, which shows that even in the completely regulated world of computer programs, we can in general not predict whether a particular program will come to some conclusion or continue to run indefinitely;
- 5) the *finiteness of the speed of light*, which implies that in whatever way we get information about remote parts of the universe this information will be inaccurate when we get it, because the situation will have changed in the time that the information needed to travel to us.

The conclusion is that the demon of Laplace will not only be unable to get all the information he needs, but unable to calculate future trajectories based on that information, partly because of intrinsic limitations on computability, partly because the trajectories are fundamentally indeterminate and chaotic.

This means that uncertainty, and therefore surprise, has to be a part of the scientific worldview. Prigogine [1997] has explored some of the philosophical implications of this “end of certainty”, arguing that it opens the way to reconnect science with the humanities by allowing for the appearance of novelty [Prigogine & Stengers, 1984]. However, merely acknowledging uncertainty’s role in science is hardly sufficient to unify scientific and narrative modes of thought.

Complex Adaptive Systems

More important even than the theoretical limitations on predictability are the practical constraints [Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996]. Complete, accurate and reliable predictions are in practice only possible for simple, isolated, “clockwork-like”

systems, like planets rotating around the sun, balls running down an inclined plane, or strictly engineered systems such as cars and televisions (and even those break down at moments they are not supposed to). Most systems of real-world importance, such as organisms, organizations, markets, brains, ecosystems, or the weather, are extremely complex and open to a variety of perturbations coming from outside the system under observation. This makes it intrinsically impossible to establish the initial conditions of the system with any degree of accuracy. Moreover, because they are non-linear, they are particularly prone to various “butterfly effects” that magnify tiny errors or fluctuations in these initial conditions [Heylighen, 2009].

These observations have given rise to a novel paradigm for modeling complex phenomena, under the label of “multi-agent systems/simulations” (MAS) [Wooldridge, 2002; Miller, Page & LeBaron, 2007]. Instead of producing an exhaustive mathematical description of the system in question, the MAS approach starts by identifying the most active components of the system, the so called *agents*. In an organization or society, the agents are individual people, in an ecosystem they are organisms, in an organism they are cells, in a market they are firms, etc. Agents are assumed to be *goal-directed*: they try to maximize their “utility”, “benefit” or “fitness”. However, because of the complexity of the system and their intrinsic cognitive limitations, agents are by definition *uncertain*: they only have local knowledge, and cannot foresee the global or long-term effects of their actions. Agents act on their environment and on each other according to certain rules, determined by their goals and knowledge. Formalizing these rules makes it possible to write a computer program that simulates the interaction between the different agents, and its further evolution. The typical result from such a simulation is that novel, global patterns emerge out of local interactions, a phenomenon termed *self-organization* [Heylighen, 2009]. If the rules and initial conditions of the simulation are well chosen, the emergent patterns correspond to real, recognizable phenomena, such as coalitions, conflicts, cycles and clusters. While such MAS in general cannot make reliable quantitative predictions, they often succeed in producing amazingly accurate qualitative predictions and, more importantly, explanations.

While agent-based modeling has become a very popular, flexible and useful method, its conceptual foundations remain vague. The paradigm of “complex adaptive systems” (CAS) [Holland, 1992; Miller, Page & LeBaron, 2007] provides a first justification for why systems of interacting agents are so fundamental. It takes its inspiration from the biological theories of evolution and ecosystems, together with social science theories of markets and societies. In this paper, I wish to take the CAS paradigm one step further, by analyzing the concept of agent more deeply, with a focus on the agent’s interactions with its complex and uncertain environment.

The Behavioral Sciences

The disciplines that study human behavior, including psychology, sociology, economics, anthropology, history, and media studies, tend to be particularly

incoherent in their approach, being divided between scientific and narrative perspectives. With the exception of the more analytic strands of philosophy and linguistics, the humanities have generally opted for a narrative perspective—as is most obvious in history and literary theory. Economics and academic psychology like to position themselves squarely into the scientific camp, driven in part by what has been called “physics envy”, i.e. the desire for a fully mathematical, deterministic theory based on precise laws of behavior. However, this desire has been largely frustrated up to now, as human behavior appears much too complex to be reduced to deterministic models. Sociology, psychiatry, philosophy and anthropology mix both perspectives, depending on the problems addressed or the traditions within a particular school of thought. For example, psychoanalytic approaches to psychotherapy are almost exclusively narrative, while behavioristic ones aim to be strictly scientific.

The difference between the two philosophies has perhaps been formulated most sharply as a distinction between *idiographic* and *nomothetic* methodologies [Cone, 1986]. Nomothetic investigation aims at the formulation of general laws that describe the behavior of broad classes or populations of individuals. Idiographic studies aim to describe the specific characteristics of a single individual. For example, in management science, case studies are idiographic while the formulation of organizational principles is nomothetic. Although a nomothetic theory may seem preferable because it can be applied to an unlimited number of cases, proponents of the idiographic approach argue that each case is unique, and therefore nomothetic generalizations merely succeed in capturing superficial similarities between cases while neglecting their rich individual essence. Perhaps the most compelling idiographic approach for studying individual behavior is (auto)biography [De Waele & Harré, 1979], i.e. a narrative reconstructing a particular person’s life story [McAdams, 1999], as this may provide a unique insight into how or why that person came to perform certain actions (e.g. commit a crime, or make a scientific discovery).

The present paper does not propose an answer to the difficult question of when a nomothetic approach is preferable to an idiographic one, or vice versa. However, it proposes a new conceptual framework that to some degree unifies the core ideas of scientific and narrative perspectives. It achieves this by generalizing the idiographic notion of a *life story* with the help of the nomothetic notion of an *agent* whose behavior is governed by the principles of evolution, cybernetics and complex adaptive systems. This will lead us to replace the Newtonian metaphor of “behavior as the functioning of a clockwork mechanism” by the novel metaphor of “life as an adventure”.

An ontology of action and adventure

Striving for fitness

Biology has long ago come to the conclusion that all living beings are the product of evolution. This means that they must be sufficiently fit not to be eliminated by natural selection. Fitness here refers to the general ability to survive, grow and reproduce within a given environment, by making productive use of the resources available in that environment, while effectively evading its dangers. Since a potentially unlimited number of organisms compete for a finite amount of resources (nutrients, energy, water, shelter, etc.), in general only the small fraction that is best adapted (or most lucky) will survive. Through this continuing selective pressure, evolution has programmed living beings to continuously strive for *fitness*: those that would stop trying to improve their fitness relative to the others would very quickly lose the competition with those others, and be eliminated from the scene. Therefore, we may assume that all living agents are driven by fitness as their ultimate, underlying value.

Note that organisms do not explicitly aim at the abstract notion of fitness: they target a variety of more concrete goals and values that function as (not always perfect) proxies for fitness. For example, we eat not in order to gather the resources optimal for survival and reproduction, but in order to satisfy our hunger. The fact that the two goals are not always consonant is illustrated by the phenomenon of obesity, a situation in which people eat so much that it actually reduces their fitness. When we speak about people, or other higher organisms, we may in practice replace the abstract concept of fitness by the somewhat more intuitive notions of *benefit*, *happiness*, or what economists call “*utility*”. Indeed, it can be argued that evolution has shaped our instincts and feelings in such a way that the things that make us happy are in essence the things that contribute to our long-term fitness [Heylighen & Bernheim, 2000; Veenhoven, 1997]—although the example of overeating reminds us that the correspondence is not always perfect.

Since organisms need physical resources to survive and reproduce, striving for fitness implies striving for access to resources. Different types of organisms will typically need different resources, depending on the local circumstances. Therefore, while they all try to maximize the universal value of fitness, in practice they will achieve this via different local goals and values. For example, carnivores strive for meat, herbivores for plant material, and plants for sunlight and nutrients. These agent-dependent values will be realized via even more local goals. For example, while a lion in general strives for meat, in a particular condition it may aim to catch a zebra or to eat from the carcass of a wildebeest, depending on the local context. People, as the most complex organisms, will try to achieve the resources they need via a very diverse array of local strategies, which may include hunting, gathering, agriculture, trade, production of goods, offering services, gathering knowledge, striving for political power, and even prostituting oneself.

Regulation

Given that evolution implies goal-directedness, we now need to study how goals can be achieved in practice. This is the subject matter of *cybernetics*, the science of governance, communication and control [Ashby, 1964; Heylighen & Joslyn, 2001]. Cybernetics has resolved the old conundrum of how to model purposive action without contradicting causality by introducing circular processes [Rosenblueth, Wiener & Bigelow, 1943; Heylighen & Joslyn, 2001]. Goal-directed behavior is understood as a process of control or *regulation* that reduces any deviation from the goal by means of a negative feedback loop [Powers, 1973]. It consists of the following components:

- 1) perception, i.e. the process whereby an agent gathers information about its situation;
- 2) evaluation, whereby the agent compares the perceived situation with the ideal or desired situation, i.e. its goal;
- 3) decision, whereby the agent chooses the action or strategy most likely to minimize the difference between the perceived situation and the goal;
- 4) action, whereby the agent intervenes in the situation;
- 5) feedback, whereby the agent re-assesses the new situation as changed by the action and by possible outside perturbations.

If the action was successful, the difference or deviation between perceived situation and goal will have diminished. Therefore, the feedback is negative: it *reduces* deviations from the goal state. Phase (5) (feedback) is equal to phase (1) (perception) of a new feedback loop, intended to reduce the remaining differences between situation and goal.

In this way, the agent will constantly be monitoring the result of its actions, intervening whenever necessary to come closer to, or remain at, its goal state. Further intervention is necessary when the previous action was insufficient or unsuccessful. Failure to achieve the intended result may be due either to an error made by the agent (e.g. miscalculating the effect of the action, or executing it clumsily), or by a hindrance originating in the environment (e.g. appearance of a predator or obstacle, unforeseen change in the conditions). All these phenomena that obstruct or endanger the achievement of the goal can be subsumed under the generic term *disturbance*. The beauty of the cybernetic regulation loop is that the nature of the disturbance does not really matter: whatever the origin of the deviation from the desired course, it will merely trigger another corrective action. As long as actions are more likely to decrease the deviation than to increase it, a sufficiently long sequence of actions is bound to dependably advance the agent towards its goal.

This negative feedback loop is a robust method to deal with uncertainty. The environment of an agent is normally complex, dynamic and to an important degree unpredictable. This means that the agent will sooner or later be confronted with a *problem*, i.e. an unintended deviation from its goal. But whether this disturbance was foreseen or not does not matter for the mechanism of regulation: the only thing that

counts is the direction of the deviation, since this determines the corrective action. For example, when you drive a car, you will repeatedly need to brake, accelerate, turn to the left, or turn to the right in order to avoid other vehicles or obstacles that appear on your intended path. Knowing precisely where and when an obstacle will appear is only marginally useful: you will anyway have to take corrective action once you get there.

Diversions and the Course of Action

In spite of its flexibility and universality [Powers, 1973], the paradigm of regulation is still too restricted to capture the full dynamics of behavior. The notion of regulation is intrinsically *conservative*: it assumes that there is a single ideal state—the goal—and that anything causing a deviation from that state constitutes a disturbance that must be suppressed. In reality, goals are temporary and contingent on the circumstances. Ultimately, they are all subordinated to the abstract and limitless drive for fitness maximization. Successfully striving for fitness is as much a matter of choosing appropriate goals as of effectively achieving these goals. For example, the lion that failed to catch a zebra would do better to eat from the carcass of a wildebeest it just stumbled upon than to persevere in its unsuccessful attempts at killing a far-away prey.

To capture this notion of an opportunity or means to achieve a goal, I propose to introduce Gibson's [1977] concept of *affordance* as a complement to the term *disturbance* used in cybernetics [cf. Heylighen & Vidal, 2008]. An affordance is a phenomenon that makes possible, or affords, a particular action. It can variously appear as a tool (e.g. a telephone, a stick), a resource (e.g. money, food, energy), or an opportunity (e.g. encounter with someone who can help, good weather). An affordance enables you to achieve something positive, i.e. something that contributes to fitness. But whether you really get that benefit will depend on your ability to recognize the affordance, to adapt your goals and strategy so as to efficiently exploit it, and to implement the new strategy. Goals and strategy together determine an agent's *course of action*, i.e. the sequence of actions that the agent intends to execute because they seem to lead most directly to fitness increase.




Figure 1: Graphical representation of a course of action.

A course of action is the path followed by an agent through its search space, from its initial state to its (provisional) goal. The dotted arrow represents the “straightforward” course that it would follow in the absence of diversions. The full arrow represents its actual “meandering” course, which is affected by the diversions encountered on the way: disturbances (dark grey triangles) to be avoided, affordances (white ellipses) to be exploited and neutral diversions (light grey rectangles) that merely push the course in a different direction.

Both affordances and disturbances are special cases of the more general notion of *diversion*. A diversion can be defined as anything that makes an agent deviate from its present course of action (see Fig. 1). Such diversion may be positive (affordance), negative (disturbance), or neutral (general diversion). A diversion is positive when it makes it easier than expected to achieve benefit. It is negative when it makes things more difficult. It is neutral when it simply changes the situation in such a way that you need to set out a new course of action, which is neither easier nor more difficult than the previous one. For example, encountering a friend is an affordance; encountering a foe is a disturbance; encountering a stranger is an initially neutral diversion—which may turn out to be positive or negative depending on how the stranger reacts to your actions.

Exploration and Exploitation

In general, disturbances are to be counteracted, affordances are to be exploited, and as yet undetermined diversions are to be investigated or explored. This leads to a generalization of the cybernetic notion of regulation: regulation can only suppress diversions (or in the best case, when they are positive, allow them), and is therefore

intrinsically conservative. But to maximally benefit from affordances, the agent needs to actively *seek* such affordances. This requires an intervention that is directed not at suppressing diversions, but in a sense at precipitating them—in the hope that one of them turns out to be positive. This process of eliciting diversions may be called *exploration*. Exploration means venturing into the unknown with the intention of discovering new information, resources, opportunities, or—most generally—affordances. It implies a course of action that is moving away from what is foreseeable (what we will later call “prospect”), and towards what is not (what we will call “mystery”). The main rationale for moving away from the known is that the affordances it offers are less attractive than those that might be expected from the unknown. In other words, however rich or poor the known affordances may be, the agent will tend to leave them behind if it suspects that it “can do better” elsewhere.

Examples of exploration are animals foraging for food [Kramer & Weary, 1991], plants releasing their seeds to the wind in the hope that some of them land on fertile ground, children playing, scientists or artists performing experiments, and—of course—travelers exploring new territories. In our highly regulated industrial or agricultural societies exploration may seem like a rather extraordinary activity that is reserved for creative artists, inventors or adventurers. However, it is actually the default type of behavior for most animals and hunter-gatherers. Indeed, in natural circumstances food is typically scarce and its location uncertain, and therefore on-going exploration is needed to find it. If food were predictably and abundantly present at a certain location, a growing number of competing organisms would gather there to consume it, until the food would be exhausted. This would force them all to find a new source—one that is preferably as yet unknown to their competitors. That is why it is advantageous for agents to be as diverse and unpredictable as possible in their exploration strategies.

While regulation is the straightforward method to deal with disturbances, affordances call for either exploration or exploitation. *Exploitation* means making use of already known affordances in order to maximally extract benefit. *Exploration* means searching for hitherto unknown affordances. Neither approach is sufficient on its own. Exploitation is in general more efficient and less risky than exploration, since the agent does not lose time, energy or possibly life in failed ventures. Yet, as we noted, exploited resources tend to get exhausted and need to be renewed. Moreover, newly discovered resources may turn out to be much richer than the ones already known. Therefore, agents that stick to the known will sooner or later be outcompeted by those that dare to look further, and thus discover more powerful affordances.

The best strategy therefore is a mix of exploitation and exploration. The difficult choice about how much effort to invest in each alternative is known as the *exploitation-exploration trade-off* [March, 1991; Cohen et al., 2007]. While there does not seem to be an optimal strategy for making this decision, a general rule-of-thumb could be the following: the more variable or unstable the affordances—i.e. the higher the probability that known affordances would vanish or that novel affordances would appear—, the more exploration is likely to be beneficial.

A classic example of this dilemma can be found in ant foraging strategies [Sumter & Beekman, 2003]: an individual ant has the choice either to follow a pheromone trail left by other ants that leads to a known food source, or to deviate from the trail and possibly discover a new source. If ants would always follow existing trails, food sources would eventually get exhausted and the ants would die of hunger. If ants would never stick to the trail, on the other hand, they would each time again spend most of their time wandering around aimlessly until they happen to run into a food source, so that on average they would only recover a fraction of the food that they would get with a more exploitative strategy. In practice, ants follow the trails most of the time (exploitation), but with a small probability of deviating from the trail so that they could potentially discover a new source (exploration). The value of this deviation parameter has probably been set by evolution so as to optimize the long-term fitness of the ant colony.

An agent trying to maximize its fitness will therefore need to apply a judicious combination of regulation (moving away from known disturbances), exploitation (moving towards known affordances) and exploration (moving into the unknown). Together, these steering mechanisms determine the process of *navigation*. Like the great navigators in the past, navigation requires correcting any unfavorable deviations from the present course of action (regulation), while at the same time further setting out or adjusting this course of action so as to most efficiently exploit observed affordances, while still maximizing the chances of discovering new affordances (exploration). The eventual trajectory of a navigator is essentially unpredictable: while its initial aim or direction may be clear, positive and negative diversions will upset the smooth advance and are likely to create deviations so large that the end point may be completely different from the initial expectations. For example, while Columbus aimed to reach India via a Western route, he ended up discovering the unknown and much larger continent of America.

Life as an Adventure

The appearance of diversions, in the sense of unintended phenomena that make the agent deviate from its course, is an inevitable result of the fundamental unpredictability of the universe. But these diversions are not random: most of them are very meaningful to the agent, in the sense that they signal dangers or opportunities; obstacles or resources; disturbances or affordances. The information they provide helps the agent to correct its course of action, adding to its overall knowledge of its surroundings. Yet, in an infinitely extended universe the unknown will always remain larger than the known. Moreover, extending the known will at the same time extend its frontiers with the unknown, and therefore the opportunities for further exploration. Scientists will be the first to admit that the more they get to know about a domain, the more they become aware of all the things they do not know yet.

A good metaphor for this driven but meandering course of action, mixing the expected with the unexpected, is the concept of *adventure*. The Latin root of this

word, the verb *advenire*, means “to come about, to arrive, to happen to (someone)”. This refers to the (in general unpredictable) diversions that an agent encounters on its journey. The future participle of this verb, *adventura*, means “(the things) that are about to happen”. From this, the word got its modern meaning of a succession of essentially unintended or unpredictable (and therefore potentially dangerous) encounters. According to the American Oxford Dictionary, “to adventure” means “to engage in hazardous and exciting activity, esp. the exploration of unknown territory”. More generally, an adventure may be defined as a course of action that involves risk and surprise, while producing exciting experiences. This includes the fundamental concepts of *action*, risk or *uncertainty*, and excitement or *emotion*.

Emotion is the only concept that we have not yet discussed in our ontology of action. An emotion can be seen as a state of “action readiness” [Frijda et al., 1989; Frijda, 2007], in which mental and physical resources, such as muscular tension, arousal and attention, are mobilized in order to deal with an important situation. According to cognitive theories of emotion [Simon, 1967; Oatley, 1999b], excitement or arousal is typically produced by a deviation from the normal routine, or what I have called a “diversion”. As long as things go the way they are expected to go, there is no need for excitement—just for quietly focused continuation. Therefore, an adventure, as an activity that includes surprising deviations from the course set out by the agent, will necessarily bring about emotional arousal.

This brings us to another clear difference between the scientific and narrative cultures: the former insists on cool, rational analysis; the latter is most interested in subjective, emotional reactions. While there is definitely a great value in rational thought, the fact that evolution has given us such a sophisticated sense of emotion should remind us that feelings and intuitions are often more effective than logic in quickly coming to grips with a complex and especially novel situation. Modern science has started studying these inevitable deviations from rational thinking under the label of “bounded rationality” [Simon, 1982; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Kahneman, 2003].

In conclusion, building further on a variety of novel scientific theories and insights, I propose to replace the fundamental metaphor “*the universe is a clockwork mechanism*”, by the metaphor “*life is an adventure*”. This metaphor, I believe, provides a more accurate picture of life as a sequence of goal-directed, but uncertain, actions that frequently meet with surprises, positive as well as negative. Moreover, since a story is a rendering in language of an “adventure” that happened to some agent(s), this immediately explains why narrative exerts such a strong power on our feeling and thinking [Oatley, 1999a]. Let me now go back to the narrative worldview and try to map our new ontology of action and adventure onto its most enduring component: the *myth*.

The monomyth as archetypal storyline

Possibly the most influential general analysis of the structure of myths was made by Joseph Campbell [1949]. Campbell's thesis is that all the myths, legends and fairy tales of the different world cultures are variations on the same basic storyline, which he called the *monomyth*, and later often referred to as "the hero's journey". He summarized it as follows:

"A hero ventures forth from the world of common day into a region of supernatural wonder: fabulous forces are there encountered and a decisive victory is won: the hero comes back from this mysterious adventure with the power to bestow boons on his fellow man." [Campbell, 1949]

The Hero

This story typically has one central protagonist, the *hero*. While the function of the hero is essentially the same in all myths, the actual properties vary. The hero can be young or old, male or female, rich and powerful or poor and destitute, human or (like in fables) animal, historically real (like Buddha or Charlemagne) or a literary creation (like Hercules or Beowulf). That is why Campbell called his book "The Hero with a Thousand Faces". What these different incarnations of the archetypal hero have in common is that they stand out from the ordinary people: they are independent and not afraid to venture into the unknown. This natural self-assurance is due in part to certain gifts that they exhibited from an early age, such as intelligence, wisdom, physical strength, gentleness, courage, or beauty.

In our ontology of adventure, we may see the hero as a prototypical agent, whose abilities for autonomous action have been somewhat aggrandized in order to serve as a role model or example. The qualities that characterize the hero are the kind of qualities that support evolutionary fitness in general. The hero is merely a particularly fit exemplar of the population. That is part of what makes a myth educational: by showing how certain qualities contribute to long-term benefit, it admonishes people to promote these qualities in themselves and others.

The hero's lack of fear for the unknown in particular is indicative of a strategy of exploration—while the ordinary people's strategy tends to be one of regulation and exploitation. By taking risks as an explorer, the hero may compensate for the more conservative, fearful strategy of the majority, and thus help the group as a whole to advance. This is enough to make the hero into an object of admiration. Moreover, this fascination for the explorer may in part be inspired by unconscious remembrances of our past as hunter-gatherers, who indeed followed a much more explorative strategy than the ensuing farmers and industrial workers.




Figure 2: a simplified representation of the hero's journey according to Campbell [1949]

Stages in the Hero's Journey

Campbell [1949] identifies 17 common, archetypal stages in a typical myth. Both he and later critics note that most myths only exhibit a few of these stages. Therefore, I will not discuss all of them in detail, but focus on those that seem most universal (see Fig. 2). A typical myth will start by setting the stage with a short description of the hero's birth, upbringing, and social environment. This gives us a feeling for the "normal", i.e. known or predictable, environment.

The first actual stage is the "call to action": the hero receives some signal of the existence of a great danger to be tackled or an extraordinary resource to be found. As the message typically has a mysterious origin—e.g. a dream, a manuscript found in a bottle, or an announcement made by a witch or angel—, this call can be seen as an intrusion from another, unknown realm into the everyday world. In essence, the call represents a mystery or problem to be resolved, thus defining the overall goal or quest that will direct the hero's further course of action. Perhaps after some hesitations and ruminations about whether the potential benefits outweigh the dangers ("refusal of the call"), the hero decides to follow the call and prepares for the journey into the unknown.

In this stage ("supernatural aid"), the hero typically gathers special resources that may help to cope with unfamiliar dangers. These can be material (e.g. a sword, a magic potion, or an amulet), informational (e.g. advice, a map), or social (e.g. a companion, or someone to call on in case of emergency). A classic example is the

Greek myth about Theseus who receives advice together with a ball of thread from Ariadne. These resources turn out to be critical in helping him find his way back out of the labyrinth that he is preparing to enter in order to slay the Minotaur monster that resides there.

The next stage is “the crossing of the first threshold”, i.e. the actual entering into the unknown territory. Campbell emphasizes the weirdness of this transition by discussing the recurrent image of the hero being swallowed into “the belly of the whale” or other monster, thus becoming completely shut off from the normal environment. The agent is now in a different world where the rules, dangers and opportunities are not known. While this crossing is already a severe challenge, it is merely a warming up for the next stage, “the road of trials”, in which the hero has to overcome a variety of challenges that test the hero’s abilities to the full. A classic example of such a series of trials are the twelve labors imposed on the Greek/Roman hero Hercules. Typical challenges involve killing a dangerous animal (often a dragon or monster), winning a combat, acquiring a hard-to-get resource (e.g. a flower, ring or sword), overcoming a physical obstacle (e.g. crossing a desert, climbing a mountain), and solving a mystery (e.g. answering a riddle, discovering a hidden treasure, or finding a way out of a labyrinth).

The series culminates in a final contest, the “apotheosis”. As a reward for succeeding in this last trial, the hero receives “the ultimate boon”. This is Campbell’s term for the affordance that constitutes the final goal of the hero’s quest. It typically offers extraordinary powers or benefits, enabling the bearer to achieve goals or riches that otherwise would remain out of reach. Examples are the Holy Grail (whatever that may be...), the fountain of youth, the philosophers’ stone, marriage to a prince or princess, a kingdom, a magic formula, or spiritual enlightenment.

The hero finally needs to bring back the boon to the ordinary world. This may involve some further complications, such as the hero preferring to stay (“refusal of the return”), having to escape from pursuers that try to recover the boon (“the magic flight”), needing a “rescue from without”, or having to overcome the challenge of integrating the extraordinary boon into ordinary life (“the crossing of the return threshold”). If everything goes well, the hero ends up as a “master of the two worlds”, who feels at home both in the ordinary environment and in the mysterious realm where the boon originated, thus achieving a true “freedom to live”, characterized by an absence of fear or constraint.

From this summary of the monomyth, it is clearly a depiction of the process that I have called *navigation* or *adventure*, in which an agent (the hero) follows a meandering course towards a goal (the boon) that passes through an unknown or uncertain environment (the mysterious world) which throws up various surprises or diversions (trials or challenges), some of which are negative (dangers), others positive (aids, boons). Achieving the goal (succeeding in the quest) significantly enhances the agent’s fitness. Moreover, exploration of the unknown territory results in the discovery of affordances that are now ready to be exploited (by the hero or others) thanks to the newly achieved knowledge.

Transcendence of dichotomies

This summary of the monomyth has on purpose omitted three of Campbell's [1949] stages: "meeting with the goddess", "woman as temptress", and "atonement with the father". As indicated by the names, these stages are of a psychosexual nature. Their interpretation seems strongly influenced by (the now dated) Freudian psychoanalysis with its Oedipus complex, together with Buddhist philosophy. They assume that the hero is a sexually mature man with an ambivalent relationship to both his mother and father. As such, they cannot be applied to other agents, such as women, children, or animals, and therefore do not fit into the general "life is an adventure" paradigm.

However, Campbell's analysis may be salvaged by moving to a more abstract plane. In Campbell's view, the hero's contradictory emotions (e.g. sexual attraction to the female figure combined with fear for its powers; anger at the father figure's harshness combined with admiration for its wisdom) are elicited in essence in order to be overcome in one of the later stages ("atonement", "apotheosis", "freedom to live", ...), where the hero reaches peace with himself, attaining some form of enlightenment. If we make abstraction of the psychosexual nature of these emotions, we are left with a process of *transcending inadequate dichotomies*.

Dichotomies or distinctions are the basic elements of all cognitive processes [Heylighen, 1990]. Distinctions function to categorize the encountered phenomena into different classes that require different actions. The most fundamental distinction is the one between positive (affordance) and negative (disturbance), as this determines whether the subsequent course of action will be one of approach or one of evasion. The first thing any agent needs to know is which diversions are likely to enhance fitness (opportunities) and which are likely to reduce it (dangers). Initially, an agent will perform this classification using some rough and ready rules, such as "small animals with many legs (e.g. spiders, scorpions) are dangerous; those with few legs (e.g. birds, frogs) are potential food". Through experience, such rudimentary distinctions normally become more subtle and precise, e.g. when the agent learns that some types of frogs are poisonous while some spiders are harmless.

This is the general process of cognitive development, maturation, or learning, which can succeed only through extensive experience with a large variety of situations. Exploration is the best strategy to quickly gather such diverse experiences. Therefore, the hero's journey, in the sense of an adventure wandering through a diverse and as yet unknown domain, will by definition increase the hero's level of knowledge. Initially, some of the hero's distinctions will be inadequate, in the sense that classifications either turn out to be erroneous (e.g. perceiving a witch as a desirable princess, or a prince as a repugnant frog) or lead to inconsistent guidelines for action (e.g. being both attracted to and afraid of the dazzling goddess). However, by experimenting with possibly inadequate actions, the hero will be able to observe what works and what does not. Through this experience, the hero will develop more adequate distinctions, and therefore a more accurate model of reality. If this process

of cognitive transformation is profound enough (e.g. leading up to a “metasystem transition” [Turchin, 1977]), it may trigger the higher level of consciousness or understanding that is commonly called “enlightenment”.

From Myth to Modern Narrative

What distinguishes the heroic adventures of a mythical individual from the down-to-earth processes of regulation, exploitation and exploration that every living being has to perform is essentially *simplification*, *exaggeration* and *dramatization*. That is exactly what you would expect from a story that has been told and retold thousands of times. Both the storyteller and the listener have cognitive limitations that make that they will not be able to assimilate or remember the often-subtle details of a complex series of events involving many interacting agents. Therefore, such subtleties will disappear from the story after a few rounds of retelling, as illustrated by the experiments of Lyons and Kashima [2003]. This is likely to leave merely a straightforward plot revolving around a single protagonist. The subtle interaction between known, predictable events and unknown, mysterious influences will tend to be reduced to the simple dichotomy: ordinary world vs. magical realm.

Moreover, a good storyteller tends to aggrandize those aspects that are most dramatic, in the sense that they create intense feelings in the listener. Even when the narrator does not intentionally dramatize the story, it are the most emotionally loaded episodes and story variants that are most likely to be remembered and passed on by the listeners—as confirmed by an empirical investigation of urban legends [Heath & Sternberg, 2001] Thus, the hero will not just run fast, but faster than the wind; not just be strong, but strong enough to lift an ox; not just be pretty, but the most beautiful in the realm. The beast to be confronted will not just be a wild bore with a smelly breath, but a fire-breathing dragon. The aim of the quest will not just be some precious metal, but a Holy Grail with magical powers.

Given this understanding of the ancient stories we find in the oral tradition of myths and fairy tales, it becomes clear how narrative has evolved into its modern forms. When stories are transmitted via writing, like in novels, there is much less need for simplification, since the paper or electronic medium takes on the role of an external memory [Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Heylighen & Vidal, 2008] that dependably registers all the details about protagonists, settings, and interactions. Moreover, with an increasingly educated, well-read and sophisticated audience, there is less need to exaggerate or to reduce subtleties to black-and-white dichotomies, and more impetus for an author to distinguish oneself and stimulate curiosity by deviating from well-known formulas.

Therefore, narrative in modern literature tends to be much more complex, involving a greater variety of agents, actions and interactions, and following an often convoluted flow of time, including flashbacks, flashforwards, and different storylines going on in parallel until they come together in the closing stages. The difference between positive (goals, opportunities, affordances) and negative (dangers,

disturbances) is less straightforward, and the actual depiction of characters and events is more realistic, in the sense of less caricatural, implausible, or simplistic. However, the basic ingredients remain the same: agents, environments and their interactions; goals and values directing the initial course of action; the tradeoffs between regulation, exploration and exploitation in deciding about and navigating along that course; diversions, disturbances and affordances producing unforeseen upsets of those courses, with the concomitant emotions and corrective actions.

Modern Myths

In spite of the greater sophistication of modern story telling, the structure and components of the monomyth retain a strong appeal even for contemporary audiences—probably because of the emotional impact caused by directly eliciting deeply ingrained instincts and traditional cognitive schemata (“archetypes”). Vogler [2007] wrote a frequently used handbook for novelists and screenwriters in which he uses the hero’s journey as a basic scheme for developing compelling stories. For concrete examples, one can refer to the enduring popularity of ‘superheroes’ in movies and comic strips and of attempts to create contemporary myths, such as Tolkien’s [1991] “The Lord of the Rings” trilogy, or George Lucas’s “Star Wars” series of movies. While Tolkien probably was inspired by much of the same material as his contemporary Campbell [1949], Lucas explicitly used Campbell as a source of inspiration [Vogler, 2007].

My personal preference goes to a lesser-known example, the Amber series of fantasy/science fiction novels written by Roger Zelazny [1999]. The imaginary universe created by Zelazny offers a perfect synthesis of archetypical mythical components (heroes with suprahuman powers, magical realms, mythical beasts, epic battles, ...) with modern realism and subtlety in the description of the characters’ psychology, the complexity of their interactions, reflections and scheming, and the colorful and finely textured details of the settings. Moreover, the protagonists’ ability to travel between (or is it create?) parallel universes offers a fascinating variation on the theme of crossing the threshold into a mysterious world.

But what is perhaps most remarkable is that this teeming complexity is held in check by an extremely simple, linear flow of time, centered on a single agent: the events are narrated in the first person by the main protagonist, Corwin, in the strictly chronological order as experienced by him while following an uninterrupted course of action. Even the hero’s own background and character is revealed by means of such a step-by-step journey of discovery, as the novel starts with Corwin waking up in a hospital, having lost his memory, and trying to reconstruct his identity by searching for clues.

Such a first-person perspective makes it particularly easy for readers to imagine themselves perceiving the events from the hero’s point of view while performing his actions. It is this internal mental simulation of the narrative’s flow of action by the reader that makes a story so efficient as a vehicle to convey complex

ideas and emotions [Oatley, 1999a; Heath & Heath, 2007]. Moreover, a chronological sequence of events centered on a single agent seems like the most natural format for information to easily enter episodic memory. In that sense, the hero-centered, linear structure of myths and traditional tales (whether told in the first or in the third person) may be intrinsically easier to assimilate than more complex narrative structures.

The Amber series [Zelazny, 1999] is a particularly good illustration of the “life is an adventure” paradigm in another aspect too. In the fantastic and epic grandeur of its settings, Amber is probably most comparable to Tolkien’s “Lord of the Rings”. However, while the threat posed to Amber by the “Black Road” is just as sinister as the one posed by Mordor in “Lord of the Rings”, the Amber universe lacks Tolkien’s simple dichotomy between good and evil. Amber’s reigning philosophy is one of moral relativism, or at least fundamental *uncertainty* about what is good and what is evil. From the outset, it is clear that no one—family and friends in particular—can be trusted, while eventually some of the hero’s worst enemies turn out to have been allies in disguise.

In spite of this cynical, Machiavellian outlook, the tone of the narrative is uplifting, as the hero through ingenuity, willpower and an occasional lucky break manages to overcome all adversity and eventually succeeds in what he set out to do, becoming wiser and more mature in the process. The character of Corwin emanates the powerful sense of freedom and personal control that characterizes a truly autonomous agent, who is not bound by conventions, morals or expectations. This stands in contrast with the fatalistic philosophy of many myths, ancient and modern, where the ending of the story has been preordained (e.g. the final achievement has been predicted by a witch at the hero’s birth), and the protagonists’ attempts to intervene appear merely as a device to prolong the suspense. Nevertheless, the outcome of Corwin’s enterprises is never fully what he intended, as every step forward reveals new surprises and mysteries, and no victory is ever final. This is precisely what the “life is an adventure” paradigm prescribes, as we will explore in further detail.

Prospect and Mystery

Landscapes of adventure

The agent’s goal-directed navigation through an environment that throws up unforeseen challenges and opportunities may be likened to a *quest* or *search*. The notion of search has been studied extensively in the theory of problem solving [Newell & Simon, 1972]. A problem can be defined simply as a difference between the present situation (the starting point) and the desired situation (the goal, or solution of the problem) [Heylighen, 1988], but such that there is no obvious path that leads to the goal. Searching for the goal can be conceived as the heuristic exploration of a problem space, i.e. a space of possibilities or potential solutions, until an actual solution is found. A *heuristic* is a method or form of knowledge that guides the

exploration process so as to increase the probability of finding a solution, and thus reduce the amount of search needed. Heuristics do not guarantee success, however, and the result therefore remains intrinsically uncertain.

Probably the most common heuristic method is *hill climbing*. The idea is that each point in the problem space is evaluated in terms of its “goodness” or “fitness”, i.e. how close it is to the ideal situation. The fitness value of a point is represented vertically, as the “elevation” of that possibility above the plane. Excellent solutions then correspond to high peaks, awful possibilities to deep valleys. This introduction of the vertical dimension to represent the fitness of a possible situation turns the problem space into a *fitness landscape* [Gavrilets, 2004]. The hill-climbing heuristic then means that the agent exploring the landscape will simply move from point to point in the direction of steepest ascent. This means that whenever the agent needs to choose between different options for the next step, it will choose the step that increases fitness most, in the hope that by continuing in this direction it will eventually reach the fitness peak, i.e. the best solution in the neighborhood. The disadvantage of the hill-climbing method is that the best local solution is in general not the best overall solution. The local hill may actually be much lower than the highest mountain. But once you are on the top of that hill all the roads by definition lead downwards, and therefore the hill-climbing method is no longer useful as a guide to indicate the highest peak.

The notions of hill-climbing and fitness landscape are defined on an abstract space of possibilities. The underlying assumption is that the agent does not know the fitness of a possibility until it has reached it. Therefore, the agent can only explore locally: it cannot plan ahead, and decide to move in a particular direction because the faraway prospect in that direction looks promising. This is a good model of totally ignorant or blind processes of exploration, such as the random variation that underlies evolution through natural selection [Campbell, 1960]. More sophisticated agents, such as animals or humans, on the other hand, can to some degree *foresee* the consequences of their actions, and thus make choices that do not immediately increase fitness because they anticipate that they will lead to greater fitness in the longer term. This implies the use of more complex and powerful heuristics than hill climbing. However, the landscape metaphor remains useful as a way to understand how the agent decides in what direction it will go. To illustrate that, we need to go back from abstract landscapes of possibilities to real landscapes with rocks and trees.

There exists an interesting scientific literature on the aesthetic qualities of landscapes [e.g. Aoki, 1999; Ruso et al., 2003]: what are the features of a landscape that make it more or less attractive to a human observer? Some of the attraction can be explained rather straightforwardly on the basis of evolutionary psychology: most people like features such as lakes, animals, trees and flowers which indicate the presence of resources (water, food, shelter...) that enhance fitness. They similarly tend to dislike features that indicate hindrances or dangers, such as storm clouds, sharp objects, snakes, and darkness. This fits in with the postulated tendency of an

agent to approach affordances and evade disturbances. But a landscape may also exhibit more abstract features that make it attractive.

Prospect

Perhaps the most basic abstract feature characterizing attractive landscapes is *prospect* [Appleton, 1996; Hudson, 1992]. A landscape has prospect if it offers a far and wide, panoramic view. Prospect is normally high from the top of a mountain or in an open plain, and low at the bottom of a pit or in a dense, dark jungle. The more and the farther you can see, the better you can distinguish the different dangers and opportunities in your environment, and therefore the easier it becomes to plan your further course. This makes landscapes with prospect intrinsically more attractive.

In a wider, more abstract sense, prospect refers to the number of things an agent can *foresee* (prospect derives from the Latin verb *prospicere*, which means ‘look forward’). Prospect in this sense is opposite to blindness, ignorance or uncertainty, which indicate a lack of foresight. However, prospect is not the same as certainty about what will come: prospect rather indicates *potential*, i.e. the remote availability or presence of affordances to be exploited or disturbances to be avoided. Whether the affordance is effectively exploited depends on the agent’s choice of course of action, and on eventual diversions interfering with that course. The larger the prospect, the easier it is for the agent to set out, and navigate along, a high-fitness course without risk of diversion, and hence the more the agent is in control of its near-term future. Therefore, it is clear that agents will be motivated to maximize their prospect.

Several authors [e.g. Neisser, 1976; Riegler, 2001; Hawkins & Blakeslee, 2005] have argued that prediction constitutes the essence of cognition: the function of knowledge and intelligence is to enable an agent to anticipate what it will encounter, so that it can prepare for future events by action, reflection, or simply being particularly attentive or sensitive to the most likely outcomes (priming). Obviously, the better an agent can anticipate the diversions it will encounter, the more efficient it will be in exploiting the affordances while evading the disturbances: it is much easier to avoid a danger if you can see it coming well in time. Prospect may be conceived as the *extent of this anticipation*, i.e. as the number or proportion of impending diversions that can be foreseen—perhaps weighted by the degree of certainty of those predictions. As depicted in Fig. 3, prospect can be visualized as the area ahead that is perceived by the agent, either directly through its eyes (as in the case of a landscape), or more indirectly through its “mind’s eye”, i.e. its powers of conceptualization, inference and prediction (as in the case of a more abstract space of possibilities).

We started from the principle that uncertainty cannot be eliminated. Therefore, prospect must remain limited. This is obvious in real landscapes: normally there are always obstacles to vision, such as hills, bushes, walls or the haze of distance. Even in a flat plain with perfect visibility you cannot see further than the horizon. Yet, with a little bit of effort obstacles can be circumvented, and sustained advance will make the




Figure 3: prospect and mystery from an agent's perspective.

White areas are regions of prospect, which the agent can perceive from its present point of view. Black rectangles represent obstacles to prospect. The grey areas that are behind them relative to the agent therefore are zones of mystery, where the agent cannot foresee what it will encounter when its course of action leads it there.

horizon recede. This brings us to a second abstract feature that makes landscapes attractive: mystery [Kaplan, 1988, 1992; Gimblett et al., 1985].

Mystery

In the aesthetics of landscape, *mystery* has been defined as “the promise of more information if one can venture deeper into the scene” [Kaplan, 1992, p. 588]. A typical example of a “mysterious” landscape is a path that bends around an obstacle so that its continuation remains invisible, or dense vegetation with a hint of a gap where one might pass through. More generally, mystery is present wherever prospect is interrupted or obscured by some kind of obstacle (see Fig. 3). However, mystery is not just the absence of prospect, but *the potential to establish an as yet non-existing prospect*. If prospect is anticipation of affordances and disturbances, then mystery is a *second-order anticipation*: the prospect of prospect.

Like prospect, mystery is easily generalized from landscapes to more abstract search spaces and the courses of action that meander through them. In general, a mystery is a situation characterized by lack of knowledge, but where different clues hint at the possibility that such knowledge may be obtained given some special effort.

This ties in with the Greek origin of the word, *mysterion*, which denotes a secret rite by which a selected individual is initiated into the knowledge that remains hidden for the non-initiated. This word itself derives from the verb *muein*, which means “to close the eyes”. Closing your eyes makes you temporarily blind (implying lack of prospect), while maintaining the ability of opening them later (thus revealing a new prospect).

Assuming that prospect can be quantified, we may define the extent or magnitude of a mystery as the extent of the prospect that potentially is to be revealed by resolving the mystery. While prospect invites exploitation of the prospected resources, mystery invites exploration [Spielberger & Starr, 1994]. The larger the mystery, the more knowledge can potentially be gained by exploring it, and therefore the larger the potential reward in terms of increased fitness.

Mystery, in the sense of a perceived gap in one’s knowledge, is a prime trigger of the emotion of *curiosity*. This emotion tends to strongly direct or drive a person’s further course of action, as the subject feels an urge to “fill the gap” by seeking further information and thus to resolve the mystery [Loewenstein, 1994; Menon & Soman, 2002; Heath & Heath, 2007]. The more an individual already knows about a situation, the stronger the urge to fill in the knowledge that still seems to be missing. Therefore, a mystery appears most attractive when it is surrounded by prospect. Why is the attraction of mystery so immediate, intense and difficult to resist? Loewenstein [1994] explains this need to fill a knowledge gap by the desire for cognitive closure (which is also apparent in Gestalt perception). But from an evolutionary perspective such cognitive needs should not be seen as primary, but as derivable from the fundamental value of fitness.

Imagine an agent in a landscape that is mostly visible, although some part of it is hidden by a rock or bush. Assuming that nothing in the prospect appears particularly dangerous or attractive, where are the truly important disturbances (e.g. predators) or affordances (e.g. prey) most likely to be? In the hidden part! There are two arguments for this higher probability. The first—trivial or tautological—reason is that important diversions can *only* exist in the unknown part of the environment, since we started by assuming that they are not in the prospect part (if they were, *they* are likely to be the focus of attention, rather than the remaining mystery). A more positive reason can be inferred from the nature of common diversions. As we noted earlier, affordances (such as food or gold) for which there is strong demand are likely to already have been seized by other agents. The ones most likely to remain are the ones that are difficult to find—which means that they are likely to be hidden within a “mystery zone”. It is by exploring that mystery that the agent is most likely to get an edge over its competitors. Disturbances, on the other hand, have a reason to remain out of view if they are embodied as intentional agents, such as predators, enemies or criminals, with a motivation to attack the present agent.

Therefore, the priority for the agent would be to inspect the hidden section (preferably from a safe position), and thus try to fill the gap in its prospect. Ignoring that mystery may cost the agent dearly, in terms of subjecting itself to an unknown danger and/or missing out on a great opportunity. Even when in the large majority of

cases the invisible spot would have nothing important to hide, the potential implications of ignoring a disturbance or affordance are too great to warrant saving a little bit of energy by not “looking around the corner”. That is why, as Loewenstein [1994] observes, the feeling of curiosity elicited by a mystery tends to be intense and difficult to resist, but short-lived and with a tendency to disappoint once the missing information has come in.

Mystery is a core feature of adventure and its expression in novels, tales and others forms of narrative [Cawelti, 1976], where it functions as a powerful device to capture the attention of the audience. In film and literature, the most popular instantiation of this device can be found in the genre known as a “murder mystery”, “detective story”, or “whodunit”. Here, the mystery in question is a crime whose perpetrator needs to be discovered on the basis of various clues [Knobloch-Westerwick & Keplinger 2006]. The narrator starts by producing a description of the settings, people involved and their relationships, thus creating a detailed prospect of the environment in which the crime is going to occur. However, when then one of the protagonists gets killed, and it is not obvious how or why that happened, the remaining characters (and with them the readers) become aware of a potentially fatal gap in their knowledge that demands resolution. The rest of the story will provide a gradual filling in of that gap as new facts are revealed one by one, thus keeping the reader on alert for any potentially important clue.

A closely related genre is a thriller or suspense story. *Suspense* is a more limited form of mystery, where the outcome (e.g. an attack by the killer, or an escape from the burning building) can in general be anticipated, but where the precise timing and circumstances of that outcome remain unknown [Knobloch, 2003]. The effort demanded to get that knowledge is patience and attention to any clue, however insignificant it may seem, in order to process it as quickly as possible in order to resolve the mystery in time for the danger to be averted. Thus, suspense is an effective method to create and sustain the focused excitement that we characterized as the fundamental “readiness for action” [Frijda et al., 1989; Frijda, 2007] that underlies the emotions necessary to live through an adventure.

Anticipation of Mystery

A more subtle emotion results from third-order anticipation: the anticipation of mystery. It is difficult to find a simple term to capture this feeling. Perhaps closest in meaning is the Dutch “weemoed”, which is usually translated as “melancholy”, but is closer to a kind of longing for something indeterminate, or nostalgia for something as yet unknown. In English, the closest term may be *wistfulness*, but without its connotation of pensiveness. Literary examples of the sentiment are readily found in the genre of *magical realism* [Zamora & Faris, 1995], which may be exemplified by authors such as Franz Kafka, Gabriel García Márquez and Haruki Murakami. Stories in this genre typically describe ordinary, realistic courses of action that are gradually mixed up with strange, seemingly inexplicable events and coincidences—as if some

magical realm is intruding into the everyday world. This generates step-by-step a sense of mystery. However, the mystery is rarely formulated explicitly, and never truly resolved, thus sustaining a “magical” atmosphere impervious to rational analysis.

A simple example can be found in the novel “Return to Atlantis” by the Belgian magical realist Hubert Lampo. The novel describes the experiences of a doctor who visits his patients in a poor, old neighborhood, which is enveloped in a melancholy atmosphere of things either gone by, or never realized. These visits bring back some of his childhood experiences, including the fact that his father, whom he assumed to be dead, actually disappeared without leaving a trace. He moreover discovers that his father had always been fascinated by the mystery of Atlantis. The novel ends with the suggestion that his father may have left to seek (and perhaps even find) that lost continent. While it is easy to imagine a sequel in which the hero searches for and eventually locates his father, this would have completely destroyed the “magical” sense of third-order anticipation. In fact, the story can be seen as little more than the careful building up of an atmosphere of dreamy wistfulness, characterized by a longing for or anticipation of a mystery, here symbolized by the missing father’s peculiar obsession with Atlantis. In terms of the monomyth [Campbell, 1949], a story like this never goes beyond the first stage, the “call to action”.

It is further worth noting that narratives in this genre tend to have a much more fatalistic perspective than stories in the more traditional genres of adventure and mystery. Indeed, for the agent to be in control of its further course of action, it needs to have a prospect of where to go or what to do, or at least be able to pinpoint the mystery whose solution is likely to produce that prospect. If the agent cannot even formulate that mystery, and merely feels that some crucial insight is lacking, then the natural sentiment is a melancholy resignation or wistful contemplation, in the hope that the missing answer will reveal itself, independently of the agent’s actions. This may explain why anticipation of mystery tends to be associated with sadness, and why the heroes of magical realistic novels tend to undergo their fate rather passively. Still, these negative feelings remain mild, tempered as they are by the vague expectation of some miraculous turnaround...

Alternation between Prospect and Mystery

During a more standard adventure, prospect and mystery tend to *alternate*: the effort invested in resolving a mystery produces a new prospect; further exploration eventually runs into the limits of that knowledge (anticipation of mystery); sooner or later, the agent becomes aware of the unknown that remains hidden behind further obstacles (new mystery); elucidating that mystery engenders another prospect; and so on. This continuous alternation between the two perspectives can again be visualized as a journey meandering through a landscape.

An illustration can be found in the second book of Zelazny's [1999] Amber series. The hero, Corwin, is driving a horse-drawn wagon along a dust road that twists and turns through a hilly countryside. From time to time, between the hills on his left, he can see a stretch of misty, blackened terrain in which odd shapes seem to move, but it is too far away to distinguish, and the advance of the wagon along another incline makes it disappear again behind the horizon. While the wagon advances, the black land continues to reappear and disappear, depending on the perspective, like a distant road that advances in parallel with his own road. As the black road seems menacing, Corwin tries to steer away from it. Yet, the road he is following does not leave him any option but to continue in the same direction, until the two roads eventually intersect. At that moment, Corwin is forced to enter the blackness and thus confront the mystery—which will turn out to be decisive for the further epic.

More generally, a strong excitement, feeling of freedom and sense of adventure is created by the sensation of movement along an irregular terrain, so that the vista continuously changes, and things that were hidden (mystery) come into plain view (prospect), while those that were clearly to be seen (prospect) disappear again behind the horizon (mystery). This sensation is efficiently exploited in many computer games, where the gamer can steer a car, motorcycle or a running "avatar" through a virtual, 3-dimensional landscape containing plenty of surprises. This sensation may also explain the intense pleasure that people can experience while hiking through forests and hills, or driving a motorcycle or car along a scenic, winding road.

This joyful experience can be seen as an instance of *flow*: a feeling of total absorption into an activity that is accompanied by a sense of being in control and the vanishing of all anxiety, doubt and self-consciousness [Csikszentmihalyi, 1990]. People are likely to experience flow when the following conditions are met:

- their activity has clear *goals*;
- they receive immediate *feedback* on the actions they perform.
- the degree of difficulty or *challenge* of the task remains in balance with their level of *skill*.

The first two rules express the essence of the cybernetic paradigm of regulation, while the third one implicitly adds the exploration necessary to find a new challenge (affordance or disturbance) when the present one has been met.

In the case of driving, elucidating the mystery of the as yet concealed landscape elements provides a goal and challenge for further exploration. The experienced driver or hiker normally has the necessary navigating skills to meet that challenge. The new prospect that opens up behind the hill or bend in the road is the feedback signal confirming that the chosen action was indeed sufficient to meet the challenge. But his prospect immediately creates a new challenge, as further hills or twists in the road come into view, defining a new mystery that calls out for resolution...

A similar flow-producing dynamic of mysteries being resolved just in order to reveal new mysteries is efficiently exploited by writers in the mystery and suspense

genres. A recent example is “The Da Vinci Code” [Brown, 2003], a bestselling novel that was later made into a movie. In this page-turner (as in other books in the same vein by the same author), the hero has to solve a series of mysteries, typically by decoding some obscure message, and then finding the place referred to in the message, only to discover another coded message hiding there. This on-going series of challenges and resolutions is made more exciting by time pressure, as the hero is being chased, both by the police for a murder that he did not commit, and by the actual murderer who is similarly searching for the solution to the mystery. (No time for wistful contemplation here!) The fast-paced succession of all the classic ingredients of adventure, mystery and suspense packed in a storyline that gradually elaborates plausible solutions to age-old mysteries about the Holy Grail, the Knights Templar, and the origins of Christianity may explain the extraordinary popular success of this novel.

Such a perfectly controlled, smooth alternation between mystery and prospect is not the general rule, though. In reality, mysteries do not always get resolved just when the agent needs the answer, and long, boring prospects do not readily make place for the excitement and challenge of mystery. The uncertainties and dangers of real-life adventure can just as readily produce fear, anxiety and frustration as the pleasurable excitement of flow. In that sense, the typical narrative structures in novels, movies or computer games are just as idealized in their perfect balance of mystery and prospect as Newtonian theories are in their total exclusion of mystery. This brings us back to the need to unify scientific and narrative perspectives.

Integrating Scientific and Narrative Representations

Trajectories and Observers

Starting from novel scientific concepts originating in the theories of evolution, cybernetics and complex adaptive systems, we have developed an agent-centered perspective that seems to fit in perfectly with the narrative perspective found in myths, novels and movies. However, this narrative perspective, with its emphasis on mystery, uncertainty and surprise, seems like the exact opposite of the Laplacean worldview, which is founded on certain and complete knowledge. Yet, on a deeper level these contradictory perspectives are actually surprisingly consonant. Part of the reason why the recent notion of agent was so readily accepted in science is that it is a relatively straightforward extension of the notion of dynamical system [Miller et al., 2007; Heylighen, 2009], which is itself a generalization of the way dynamics is modeled in Newtonian mechanics.

Underlying the worldview of Newton and Laplace is the notion of *trajectory*: a dynamical system follows a predictable trajectory through some abstract space [Heylighen, 1988, 1990]. Initially, this referred to the ordinary three-dimensional space of positions. This was generalized, first, to multidimensional configuration space, then to the multidimensional phase space of positions and velocities, and

finally to state space, where a state is defined by the values of all variables or properties relevant for the system. While spaces became increasingly abstract and general, the concept of trajectory, i.e. a continuous sequence of points describing a path through that space, remained in essence the same.

The basic method to determine that trajectory also remained consistent: *optimization*. Optimization means that the trajectory is chosen in such a way that some general property of the state acquires an “optimal” value (maximal or minimal, depending on the definition of the property). This is essentially the same principle as what we have called “hill climbing”: at each point on its trajectory the system chooses as its next “destination” the point with the highest “fitness”—or whatever name is given to the property that needs to be optimized. In physics, the most common optimization criteria are potential energy, free energy, or “action”—which need to be minimized, and entropy—which needs to be maximized. Like in hill climbing, the choice about what position to move to next is *local*, i.e. dependent only on the value of the optimization criterion in the immediate neighborhood of the present state. In that sense, mechanical systems are not subject to the complex alternation between prospect and mystery that characterize the narrative dynamics of living agents. Mechanical systems, such as particles, cannon balls or planets, cannot anticipate and therefore cannot experience prospect or mystery. They are blind to everything except their immediate neighborhood.

However, the Newtonian worldview implicitly assumes that there is an observer who can “see” not just the neighborhood, but the whole state space and everything that is in it. This observer is typically the scientist who has accurately measured and mapped out the complete environment of the system, and used these data to build a mathematical model. Therefore, this observer can foresee or predict the complete trajectory of the system as it will meander through this space, following the gradient that points to the successive “optimal” points. In the limit where the system encompasses the whole universe, this all-seeing observer becomes Laplace’s demon. (In Newton’s original, more religious interpretation, this ideal observer would have been the omniscient God). Thus, the Newtonian worldview implicitly distinguishes two agents: the system, which has zero prospect, and the observer, who has infinite prospect.

Horizons of Knowability

As we saw, twentieth century science has discovered a raft of limitation principles that all imply a restriction of prospect [Barrow, 1998; Heylighen, 1990]. Such a limit on knowledge can be interpreted as a horizon beyond which we cannot see. For example, in general relativity theory the finiteness of the speed of light entails a so-called *event horizon* surrounding a black hole. Beyond that horizon, light is “too slow” to escape from the gravitation of the black hole, and therefore from the outside it is intrinsically impossible to observe what is happening inside the horizon.

Note that the notion of horizon does not imply *absolute* unknowability. The lack of prospect is *relative* to the position from which you are looking: by moving to another place (e.g. inside the event horizon), the outlook will change, and some hidden things will become visible. But other things that were visible will at the same time disappear behind the horizon.

The same dependence on perspective underlies most limitation principles. For example, the Heisenberg uncertainty principle does not say that it is impossible to accurately measure the position or the momentum of a particle: it only states that if you accurately determine the one property, then you cannot *simultaneously* determine the other. Similarly, the theorem of Gödel does not state that the truth or falsity of certain propositions can never be established: it merely states that their truth cannot be demonstrated within a given formal system, while allowing that it may be demonstrated within an extended system—which, however, will contain other undemonstrable propositions.

This notion of *horizon of knowability* (i.e. context-dependent limitation on prospect) immediately implies the complementary notion of mystery: from a given vantage point, some things must remain hidden, i.e. mysterious, for an agent. From time to time, this mystery may intrude into the agent's course of action, producing a surprise—for example, when a ship appears on the horizon, when the agent after climbing to the top of a hill discovers a beautiful lake stretching in the distance, when a predator that was hiding in a tree suddenly jumps into plain view, or when the trajectory of a particle is deflected by one of the quantum fluctuations implied by the Heisenberg principle. Such events are what we have called “diversions”. They change the prospect of affordance and disturbances, and thus in general also the course along which the agent will navigate. They are in essence what makes life into an adventure.

Generalizing Scientific Models

It is this ever-changing mixture of prospect and mystery that distinguishes a real-life agent from either the prospectless dynamic system or the all-knowing Laplacean observer. Yet, at the same time, it situates the agent squarely in between these two extreme cases. Thus, the “life is an adventure” perspective can be seen as a straightforward generalization of the Newtonian worldview. Instead of fixing the parameter “prospect” either at zero or at infinity, it allows it to vary continuously, from zero towards infinity (but without ever reaching the latter limit). Vice-versa, this means that the Newtonian theory could be recovered from the adventure theory as a limit case for prospect going towards infinity. This is an application of the so-called “correspondence principle”, which says that the new theory (e.g. relativity theory) and the old theory (e.g. Newtonian mechanics) should produce corresponding results for the limit case (e.g. speeds much slower than light) in which the old theory has proven to be accurate.

By turning the constant “prospect” into a variable, the ontology of adventure brings the creativity, uncertainty and adaptivity of life, mind and society back into the

scientific modeling paradigm. This newfound flexibility is part of what has made the MAS and CAS perspectives so popular in such a relatively short time: by generalizing the already successful notion of dynamic system following a (deterministic or stochastic) trajectory to the more flexible notion of agent(s) following a goal-directed course of action it has opened the way to unifying physical, biological and social sciences [Holland, 1992; Miller et al., 2007].

My contention here is that not much is needed to also include the humanities, with their focus on literature, history and religion, into that emerging unification. The agent-based approaches have as yet not explored the interactions between prospect and mystery: most agents in existing computer simulations have a fixed (and typically very limited) prospect. They can only plan one or two steps ahead. Therefore, they cannot anticipate increasing their prospect, which I defined as the experience of mystery. The only mystery exists for the observer who is running the simulation, and who is curious to see what may emerge from it. In that sense, typical agents in the CAS/MAS tradition are rather shortsighted, and would not fit into the role of a mythological hero. What is needed to recover the full subtlety and complexity of human life is a prospect that can be stretched or shrunk depending on the context, so that distant ideals can define a long-term quest, while unplanned diversions create more short-term challenges.

An elegant example of such a more realistic agent-based simulation model is the “virtual laboratory” that was designed by Gershenson [2004; Gershenson et al., 2002] to experiment with different cognitive strategies for behavior. Gershenson’s agents navigate through a virtual, three-dimensional environment in search of affordances, such as food and water, while trying to avoid disturbances, such as rocks and predators. These diversions are generated by the program at random times and positions across the environment. Their appearance thus constitutes a true, unforeseeable “surprise”. However, the agents have a limited prospect or field of vision (similar to the one in Fig. 3), allowing them to perceive all diversions within a certain radius and angle that are not hidden behind obstacles [Gershenson et al., 2002]. Assuming that a diversion rarely appears in their immediate vicinity, this means that they have in general time to adapt their course of action in reaction to the diversions that appear in their prospect. Thus, they can start fleeing in the opposite direction as soon as they perceive a predator ahead, or change course from a more remote or smaller source of food to a more nearby or larger one that has just entered their field of vision.

The agent’s course is visualized as a trail left behind by the agent’s movements across the virtual space. This makes it possible to examine a course of action both in “narrative mode” as a real-time succession of movements, and in “scientific mode” as a fixed trajectory. The virtual laboratory synthesizes narrative and scientific perspectives in other respects too: a single “run” of the simulation can be seen as a virtual adventure, idiographically describing the things happening to a specific agent in a specific context. However, when a large number of such unique runs have been generated (differing in the values of random diversions or the initial

state of the agent), it becomes possible to perform a statistical analysis of the outcomes, in order to discover possibly invariant “laws” that nomothetically apply to all “adventures”. For example, such a series of experiments might find out that agents who use a particular system of rules are more fit—in the sense of successfully exploiting affordances and avoiding disturbances and thus surviving—than those following different rules [Gershenson, 2004].

The formulation of such “rules of behavior” is the implicit goal of both narrative and scientific worldviews. The typical function of myths, fairy tales and fables is to teach the audience various rules of good behavior—both in the sense of moral and ethical values (e.g. help the weak, do not strive purely for material gains), and in the more pragmatic sense of problem-solving strategies (e.g. get informed well before undertaking a major enterprise, exercise in order to build physical strength). These rules are taught by illustrative stories in which the heroes who follow these rules fare well, while those who do not get in trouble. The scientific worldview eschews any notion of moral values, formulating rules or laws as “the way agents behave” rather than “the way agents *ought* to behave”. But an accurate description of how things tend to behave is easily and naturally translated into a strategy for making things behave more effectively, as the endless technological and social applications of science illustrate. In that sense, as many observers have pointed out, science is much less “neutral” or “value-free” in its implications than it theoretically claims to be: the neutral observation that some phenomenon A (e.g. smoking) tends to cause some other phenomenon B (e.g. cancer), where B is generally considered to have negative (or positive) value, will automatically lead to a negative (positive) evaluation of A.

Conclusion

This paper has tried to lay the foundations for a unification of the “two cultures”: the scientific and narrative modes of looking at the world. At first sight, these two perspectives are completely opposed: science strives to formulate objective, timeless and context-independent laws, while narrative describes unique sequences of events happening to particular subjects in particular contexts. Moreover, science seeks rationality, predictability and certainty, while narrative delights in emotion, surprise and mystery. Yet, on a more abstract level, both aim to provide dependable knowledge, by formulating rules about how agents are supposed to behave in different circumstances. In that sense, both science and narrative function as a guiding framework that helps us to act, to decide, and to understand the complex world we live in.

My approach towards integrating these frameworks was inspired by cybernetics and complex adaptive systems (CAS), two relatively new approaches that aim to extend scientific methods towards the more complex and dynamic phenomena that are typical of life, mind and society. Possibly the most fundamental scientific insight developed in the 20th century is the observation that there are context-dependents limits to knowledge, or what I have called “horizons of knowability”. This

precludes the existence of an omniscient observer like the demon of Laplace, and therefore the possibility of predicting with certainty. It entails that any realistic model of behavior will have to take into account uncertainty, mystery and surprise. Cybernetics and CAS have shown how agents can cope effectively with that uncertainty, by using regulation to counteract unforeseen disturbances and exploration to discover novel affordances.

I have proposed to integrate the insights from these approaches by introducing the concept of *navigation* as a combination of regulation, exploration and exploitation. Navigating means setting out and following a *course of action* while taking into account any foreseen or unforeseen diversions. Diversions are the phenomena that make an agent depart from its ideal or intended course of action, thus forcing it to correct that course. A course of action should therefore not be conceived as a predetermined trajectory—like the one followed by a planet around the sun—but as an *adventure*, i.e. a goal-directed activity affected by unpredictable and often mysterious encounters. These upsets, whether positive, negative or neutral, are the fundamental triggers of emotions: they produce the arousal or excitement that prepares body and mind for corrective action.

Campbell's [1949] analysis of the "hero's journey" shows how a simplified and exaggerated narration of such an adventure provides the basic storyline for all myths, legends and fairy tales: the hero (agent) in a quest (search) for a magical boon (fitness enhancing resource) explores a mysterious world (uncertain environment), having to overcome difficult trials (disturbances), while sometimes receiving unexpected aid or making surprising discoveries (affordances). The same ingredients assembled in a more complex and realistic course of action and with a more subtle description of the concomitant emotions form the basis for modern forms of narrative, such as novels, movies [Vogler, 2007], and computer games [Dickey, 2006].

While navigating, agents are attracted to *prospect*, because the ability to foresee diversions helps them to set out a more effective course of action. However, at the same time they are attracted by *mystery*, which is the potential for an even better prospect. Mystery may be the most important trigger of exploratory behavior, as it invites agents to leave behind their ordinary, known environment and embark on the adventure of the unknown. Effective exploration means that mystery dissolves itself into prospect. However, the horizon of unknowability principle implies that this prospect will eventually expose new mysteries. The resulting alternation between prospect and mystery, supported by the flow experience, appears like a particularly effective mechanism for driving the action forward—both for the agent living the adventure and for the audience empathizing with its narration.

It may even be argued that this variability of prospect is precisely what makes life most interesting, by fueling curiosity and an enduring drive for exploration. However, such a varying degree of foresight is as yet absent in scientific models of behavior. Unlike the idealized agents of Newtonian theory, real-life agents are neither blind to everything but their most immediate surroundings, nor omniscient like Laplace's demon. It is as yet unclear how best to incorporate this missing dimension

into scientific models—although simple computer simulations of agents navigating through a virtual environment point the way towards a first formalization and operationalization of this idea. Further research will need to address this issue in order to develop a more concrete unification of narrative and scientific modes of representation.

What is also still lacking in the present approach is a discussion of the social interactions and relationships between agents—such as conflict, competition, alliance, friendship, and love—which form the spice of most modern narrative. Including the whole gamut of social interactions in the present—relatively simple—conceptualization of an adventure may seem like a tall order. Yet, the way to approach this problem appears straightforward. Indeed, the MAS/CAS tradition is focused especially on interactions between agents, and has produced numerous instructive models and simulations of competition, cooperation, groups, cultural diffusion, social networks etc. together with their dynamics [Miller et al., 2007]. It is actually the relative lack of analysis of individual behavior in this tradition that has prompted me to focus on the “single-hero” adventure in the present paper.

Finally, another important area for further research is the role of emotions, which I conceive as the primary mental reactions to diversions. While some of the existing theories of emotion [e.g. Frijda, 2007; Oatley, 1999b] seem quite compatible with the present perspective, it would seem worthwhile to use the present ontology of adventure as a starting point for a more detailed taxonomy of emotions, which classifies and explains feelings according to dimensions such as positive-negative, experienced-anticipated, expected-surprising, prospect-mystery, etc. This would allow a much more profound analysis of which type of diversion elicits which type of feeling, and thus a better understanding of the emotional dimension that makes a good story so compelling [Heath & Heath, 2007]. We have seen a first example of such an analysis in our discussion of the rather subtle emotion of “anticipation of mystery”, a feeling that is frequently evoked in literature but which in existing psychological theories, under the guise of wistfulness, is seen as nothing more than a type of sadness.

References

- Aerts, D., L. Apostel, Bart De Moor, Staf Hellemans, Edel Maex, Hubert Van Belle, and Jan Van der Veken. 1994. *World Views. From fragmentation to integration*. VUB Press.
- Aoki, Y., 1999. Review article: trends in the study of the psychological evaluation of landscape. *Landscape research*, 24(1), 85–94.
- Appleton, J., 1996. *The experience of landscape*, John Wiley & Sons Inc.
- Ashby, W.R., 1964. *An introduction to cybernetics*, Methuen London.
- Axelrod, R. & Cohen, M.D., 1999. *Harnessing Complexity: Organizational Implications of a Scientific Frontier*, Free Press.

- Barrow, J.D., 1998. *Impossibility: the Science of Limits and the Limits of Science*, Oxford UP, Oxford.
- Boyd, B., 2009. *On the Origin of Stories: Evolution, Cognition, and Fiction*, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Brockman, J., 1995. *The third culture*, Simon & Schuster.
- Brown, D., 2003. *The Da Vinci Code*, Anchor Books.
- Bruner, J., 1986. *Actual minds, possible worlds*, Harvard University Press.
- Campbell, D. T., 1960. Blind variation and selective retention in creative thought as in other knowledge processes. *Psychological Review*, 67(6), 380–400.
- Campbell, J., 1949. *The hero with a thousand faces*, Princeton University Press.
- Cawelti, J.G., 1976. *Adventure, mystery, and romance: Formula stories as art and popular culture*, University of Chicago Press.
- Clark, A. & Chalmers, D., 1998. The extended mind. *Analysis*, 58(1), 7–19.
- Cohen, J.D., McClure, S.M. & Yu, A.J., 2007. Should I stay or should I go? How the human brain manages the trade-off between exploitation and exploration. *Philosophical Transactions B*, 362(1481), 933.
- Cone, J.D., 1986. Idiographic, nomothetic, and related perspectives in behavioral assessment. In R. O. Nelson & S. C. Hayes (Eds.): *Conceptual foundations of behavioral assessment*. New York: Guilford, pp. 111–128.
- Csikszentmihalyi, M., 1990. *Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience*, Harper & Row.
- De Waele, J.P. & Harré, R., 1979. Autobiography as a psychological method. *Emerging strategies in social psychological research*, 177–224.
- Dickey, M.D., 2006. Game design narrative for learning: appropriating adventure game design narrative devices and techniques for the design of interactive learning environments. *Educational Technology Research and Development*, 54(3), 245–263.
- Freeth T., 2009. Decoding an Ancient Computer, *Scientific American* 301 (6), 52–59.
- Frijda, N.H., 2007. *The laws of emotion*, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Frijda, N.H., Kuipers, P. & Ter Schure, E., 1989. Relations among emotion, appraisal, and emotional action readiness. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 57(2), 212–228.
- Gavrilets, S. 2004 *Fitness Landscapes and the Origin of Species* (Princeton Univ. Press.)
- Gershenson, C., 2004. Cognitive paradigms: which one is the best? *Cognitive Systems Research*, 5(2), 135-156.
- Gershenson, C., Gonzalez, P.P. & Negrete, J., 2002. Thinking Adaptive: Towards a Behaviours Virtual Laboratory. Arxiv preprint cs/0211028.
- Gibson, J.J., 1977. The theory of affordances. In *Perceiving, acting and knowing: toward an ecological psychology*. Houghton-Mifflin, pp. 67–82.
- Gigerenzer, G. & Goldstein, D.G., 1996. Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality. *Psychological review*, 103(4), 650–669.
- Gimblett, H.R., Itami, R.M. & Fitzgibbon, J.E., 1985 Mystery in an information processing model of landscape preference. *Landscape journal (USA)*, 4(2) p. 87-95
- Hawkins, J., and S. Blakeslee. 2005. *On intelligence*. Owl Books.
- Heath C., Bell C. & Sternberg E., 2001. Emotional Selection in Memes: The Case of Urban Legends. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 81(6), 1028-1041.
- Heath, C. & Heath, D., 2007. *Made to Stick: Why Some Ideas Survive and Others Die*, Random House.
- Heylighen F. 2009: Complexity and Self-organization, in: *Encyclopedia of Library and Information*

- Sciences, eds. M. J. Bates & M. N. Maack (Taylor & Francis)
- Heylighen F., 1990: Representation and Change. A Metarepresentational Framework for the Foundations of Physical and Cognitive Science, (Communication & Cognition, Gent).
- Heylighen, F. & Bernheim, J., 2000. Global Progress I: empirical evidence for increasing quality of life. *Journal of Happiness Studies*, 13, 323-349.
- Heylighen, F. & Joslyn, C., 2001. Cybernetics and Second Order Cybernetics. *Encyclopedia of Physical Science & Technology*, 4, 155-170.
- Heylighen, F. & Vidal, C., 2008. Getting things done: the science behind stress-free productivity. *Long Range Planning*, 41(6), 585–605.
- Heylighen, F., 1988. Formulating the Problem of Problem-Formulation. *Cybernetics and Systems*, 88, 949-957.
- Heylighen, F., 1999. Advantages and limitations of formal expression. *Foundations of Science*, 4(1), 25-56.
- Holland, J.H., 1992. Complex adaptive systems. *Daedalus*, 121(1), 17–30.
- Hudson, B.J., 1992. Hunting or a sheltered life: prospects and refuges reviewed. *Landscape and Urban Planning*, 22(1), 53–57.
- Kahneman, D., 2003. Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics. *American Economic Review*, 93(5), 1449-1475.
- Kaplan, S., 1988. Perception and landscape: conceptions and misconceptions. In (Ed. Nasar, J.) *Environmental aesthetics: Theory, research, and application*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 45–55.
- Kaplan, S., 1992. Environmental preference in a knowledge-seeking, knowledge-using organism. *The Adapted Mind*. Ed. Jerome H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides, and John Tooby. New York: Oxford UP, 581–600.
- Knobloch, S., 2003. Suspense and mystery. in: J Bryant, D Roskos-Ewoldsen, J Cantor, *Communication and emotion: Essays in honor of Dolf Zillmann*, Lawrence Erlbaum 379–396.
- Knobloch-Westerwick, S. & Keplinger, C., 2006. Mystery Appeal: Effects of Uncertainty and Resolution on the Enjoyment of Mystery. *Media Psychology*, 8(3), 193.
- Kramer, D.L. & Weary, D.M., 1991. Exploration versus exploitation: a field study of time allocation to environmental tracking by foraging chipmunks. *Animal Behaviour*, 41(3), 443-449.
- Loewenstein, G., 1994. The psychology of curiosity: A review and reinterpretation. *Psychological Bulletin*, 116, 75–75.
- Lyons A., & Kashima Y. (2003). How are stereotypes maintained through communication?: The influence of Stereotype sharedness. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 989-1005.
- March, J.G., 1991. Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning. *Organization science*, 71–87.
- McAdams, Dan (1999) 'Personal Narratives and the Life Story', in L. Pervin and O. John (eds) *Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research*, 2nd edn, pp. 478—500. New York: Guilford Press.
- Menon, S. & Soman, D., 2002. Managing the power of curiosity for effective Web advertising strategies. *Journal of Advertising*, 31(3), 1–14.
- Miller, J.H., Page, S.E. & LeBaron, B., 2007. *Complex adaptive systems: an introduction to*

- computational models of social life*, Princeton University Press Princeton and Oxford.
- Neisser, U. 1976. *Cognition and reality: Principles and implications of cognitive psychology*. Freeman San Francisco, CA.
- Newell, A. & Simon, H.A., 1972. *Human problem solving*, Prentice-Hall Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
- Oatley, K. 1999b. 'Emotions' in: *The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences*. R. A. Wilson and F. C. Keil. Cambridge, Mass. and London,
- Oatley, K., 1999a. Why fiction may be twice as true as fact: Fiction as cognitive and emotional simulation. *Review of General Psychology*, 3, 101–117.
- Powers, W.T., 1973. *Behavior: The control of perception*, Aldine Chicago.
- Prigogine, I. & Stengers, I., 1984. *Order out of chaos: Man's new dialogue with nature*, Bantam books.
- Prigogine, I. & Stengers, I., 1997. *The end of certainty: Time, chaos, and the new laws of nature*, Free Press.
- Riegler, A. (2001) The role of anticipation in cognition. In: Dubois, D. M. (ed) *Computing Anticipatory Systems. Proceedings of the American Institute of Physics 573*. American Institute of Physics: Melville, New York, pp. 534–541.
- Rosenblueth, A., Wiener, N. & Bigelow, J., 1943. Behavior, Purpose and Teleology. *Philosophy of Science*, 10(1), 18-24.
- Ruso, B., Renninger, L.A. & Atzwanger, K., 2003. Human Habitat Preferences: A Generative Territory for Evolutionary Aesthetics Research. In: E. Voland, K. Grammer (eds.) *Evolutionary Aesthetics* (Springer), 279–94.
- Simon, H.A., 1967. Motivational and emotional controls of cognition. *Psychological review*, 74(1), 29–39.
- Simon, H.A., 1982. *Models of Bounded Rationality*, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
- Snow, C.P., 1961. *The two cultures and the scientific revolution: the Rede Lecture 1959*, Cambridge University Press.
- Spielberger, C.D. & Starr, L.M., 1994. Curiosity and exploratory behavior. *Motivation: Theory and research*, 221–243.
- Sumpter, D.J. & Beekman, M., 2003. From nonlinearity to optimality: pheromone trail foraging by ants. *Animal behaviour*, 66(2), 273–280.
- Tolkien, J.R.R., 1991. *The Lord of the Rings*. London: Grafton.
- Tulving E (2002). "Episodic memory: from mind to brain". *Annual review of psychology* 53: 1–25.
- Turchin, V., 1977. *The Phenomenon of Science. A Cybernetic Approach to Human Evolution*. New York: Columbia University.
- Veenhoven, R. 1997. Advances in Understanding Happiness. *Revue Québécoise de Psychologie* 182, 29-74.
- Vogler, C., 2007. *The Writer's Journey: mythic structure for writers* (3rd edition), Michael Wiese Productions.
- Wooldridge, M.J., 2002. *Introduction to Multiagent Systems*, Wiley. New York.
- Zamora, L.P. & Faris, W.B., 1995. *Magical realism: theory, history, community*, Duke University Press.

Zelazny, R., 1999. *The Great Book of Amber: The Complete Amber Chronicles, 1-10*, Eos.