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Is Phenomenal Consciousness a Complex Structure?

Stieg, Chuck (2009) Is Phenomenal Consciousness a Complex Structure? [Journal (Paginated)]

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Abstract

Evolutionary explanations of psychological phenomena have become widespread. This paper examines a recent attempt by Nichols and Grantham (2000) to circumvent the problem of epiphenomenalism in establishing the selective status of consciousness. Nichols and Grantham (2000) argue that a case can be made for the view that consciousness is an adaptation based on its complexity. I set out this argument and argue that it fails to establish that phenomenal consciousness is a complex system. It is suggested that the goal of establishing consciousness as an adaptation may be better served by rejecting the distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness.

Item Type:Journal (Paginated)
Keywords:Consciousness, Evolutionary Psychology, Function, Complexity
Subjects:Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy > Epistemology
Philosophy > Philosophy of Science
Psychology > Cognitive Psychology
Philosophy > Metaphysics
Psychology > Evolutionary Psychology
ID Code:6765
Deposited By:Stieg, Chuck
Deposited On:01 Apr 2010 20:37
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:57

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