On the Role of AI in the Ongoing Paradigm Shift within the Cognitive Sciences

Froese, Mr Tom (2007) On the Role of AI in the Ongoing Paradigm Shift within the Cognitive Sciences. [Book Chapter] (In Press)

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This paper supports the view that the ongoing shift from orthodox to embodied-embedded cognitive science has been significantly influenced by the experimental results generated by AI research. Recently, there has also been a noticeable shift toward enactivism, a paradigm which radicalizes the embodied-embedded approach by placing autonomous agency and lived subjectivity at the heart of cognitive science. Some first steps toward a clarification of the relationship of AI to this further shift are outlined. It is concluded that the success of enactivism in establishing itself as a mainstream cognitive science research program will depend less on progress made in AI research and more on the development of a phenomenological pragmatics.

Item Type:Book Chapter
Keywords:AI, cognitive science, paradigm shift, enactivism, phenomenology
Subjects:Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy > Philosophy of Science
Computer Science > Artificial Intelligence
ID Code:5778
Deposited By:Froese, Mr Tom
Deposited On:22 Oct 2007 11:41
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:56

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