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Sharedness and privateness in human early social life

Tirassa, Maurizio and Bosco, Francesca M. and Colle, Livia (2006) Sharedness and privateness in human early social life. [Journal (Paginated)]

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Abstract

This research is concerned with the innate predispositions underlying human intentional communication. Human communication is currently defined as a circular and overt attempt to modify a partner's mental states. This requires each party involved to posse ss the ability to represent and understand the other's mental states, a capability which is commonly referred to as mindreading, or theory of mind (ToM). The relevant experimental literature agrees that no such capability is to be found in the human speci es at least during the first year of life, and possibly later. This paper aims at advancing a solution to this theoretical problem. We propose to consider sharedness as the basis for intentional communication in the infant and to view it as a primitive, i nnate component of her cognitive architecture. Communication can then build upon the mental grounds that the infant takes as shared with her caregivers. We view this capability as a theory of mind in a weak sense.›

Item Type:Journal (Paginated)
Keywords:Communication; Mindreading; Theory of mind; Consciousness; Subjectivity; Sharedness; Privateness; Social cognition; Nativism
Subjects:Neuroscience > Neuropsychology
Psychology > Developmental Psychology
Philosophy > Philosophy of Language
Biology > Primatology
Psychology > Comparative Psychology
Psychology > Cognitive Psychology
Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
Psychology > Evolutionary Psychology
Psychology > Clinical Psychology
Linguistics > Pragmatics
Psychology > Social Psychology
Philosophy > Epistemology
ID Code:5215
Deposited By:Tirassa, Prof. Maurizio
Deposited On:09 Oct 2006
Last Modified:12 Sep 2007 18:08

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