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'Reflexive Monism' versus 'Complementarism': An analysis and criticism of the conceptual groundwork of Max Velmans's 'reflexive model' of consciousness

Hoche, Prof. em. Dr. Hans-Ulrich (2006) 'Reflexive Monism' versus 'Complementarism': An analysis and criticism of the conceptual groundwork of Max Velmans's 'reflexive model' of consciousness. [Journal (Paginated)] (In Press)

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Abstract

From 1990 on, the London psychologist Max Velmans developed a novel approach to (phenomenal) consciousness according to which an experience of an object is phenomenologically identical to an object as experienced. On the face of it I agree; but unlike Velmans I argue that the latter should be understood as comparable, not to a Kantian, but rather to a noematic ‘phenomenon’ in the Husserlian sense. Consequently, I replace Velmans’s reflexive model with a complementaristic approach in a strict sense which leaves no room for either monistic or dualistic views (including Velmans’s ontological monism and his dual-aspect interpretation of complementarity) and hence requires us to radically reinterpret the concept of psychophysical causation.

Item Type:Journal (Paginated)
Keywords:Consciousness, mind-body problem, complementarity, dual-aspect theory, phenomenology, psychophysical causation, pure noematics, reflexive monism, Velmans.
Subjects:Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
ID Code:4748
Deposited By:Hoche, Prof. em. Dr. Hans-Ulrich
Deposited On:06 Mar 2006
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:56

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References in Article

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