HETEROPHENOMENOLOGY VERSUS CRITICAL PHENOMENOLOGY
Max Velmans, Department of Psychology, New Cross,
Phenomenology and the Cognitive
Sciences (in press)
Abstract
Following an on-line dialogue with Dennett (Velmans, 2001) this paper
examines the similarities and differences between heterophenomenology
(HP) and critical phenomenology (CP), two competing accounts of the way that
conscious phenomenology should be, and normally is incorporated into psychology
and related sciences. Dennett’s heterophenomenology includes
subjective reports of conscious experiences, but according to Dennett, first
person conscious phenomenena in the form of “qualia”
such as hardness, redness, itchiness etc. have no real existence. Consequently,
subjective reports about such qualia should be understood as prescientific attempts to make sense of brain functioning
that can be entirely understood in third person terms. I trace the history of
this position in behaviourism (Watson, Skinner and Ryle)
and early forms of physicalism and functionalism (Armstrong),
and summarise some of the difficulties of this view. Critical
phenomenology also includes a conventional, third person,
scientific investigation of brain and behaviour that includes subjects’ reports
of what they experience. CP is also cautious about the accuracy or completeness
of subjective reports. However, unlike HP, CP does not assume that subjects are
necessarily deluded about their experiences or doubt that these experiences can
have real qualities that can, in principle, be described. Such experienced qualities cannot be
exhaustively reduced to third-person accounts of brain and behaviour. CP is
also reflexive, in it assumes experimenters to have first-person experiences
that they can describe much as their subjects do. And crucially, experimenter’s third-person
reports of others are based, in the first instance, on their own first-person
experiences. CP is commonplace in psychological science,
and given that it conforms both to scientific practice and common sense, I
argue that there is little to recommend HP other than an attempt to shore up a
counterintuitive, reductive philosophy of mind.
Keywords: heterophenomenology, critical phenomenology, Dennett,
Velmans, first person, third person, psychology, science, consciousness,
qualia, mind, subjective report, experience, behaviourism, behaviourism,
reductionism
How can one understand
the nature of conscious experience? To
begin with, one needs a description of the phenomenology of consciousness and
that, in turn, requires an investigative method, an appropriate descriptive
language and an embedding theoretical framework that is sufficiently shared by
a community of consciousness researchers for communal research to progress.
Traditionally, it is assumed in such phenomenologies that experiences are, in
essence, subjective and must, at least in the first instance, be described from
a first-person perspective. In the present paper I focus on the current status
of some of these methods in psychology. It is worth noting however that in its
classical philosophical form, Phenomenology (with a capital P) goes further
than advocating the use of first-person methods, suggesting that “the pure and
transcendental nature and meaning of phenomena, and hence their real and ultimate
significance, can only be apprehended subjectively” (Shorter Oxford
English Dictionary, 2002 – my italics). While this advocates a “reduction” of a
kind, it is opposed to any reduction of consciousness to a set of scientific
facts or third-person theories. One the contrary, Phenomenology is a “method of
reduction whereby all factual knowledge and reasoned assumptions about a
phenomenon are set aside so that pure intuition of its essence may be analysed”
(Ibid).
Psychology
on the other hand has developed a more critical stance towards phenomenal
description and method, driven by the rather chequered history of trying to
apply phenomenological methods in practice—for example, the problems with
“experimental introspectionism” developed by Wilhelm
Wundt in the first experimental psychology
laboratory, at the
A little bit of history
For Wundt, the task of
psychology was the scientific study of the "mind" and, for him, the "mind" was identical to consciousness. In
his laboratory, controlled, measurable stimuli were used to bring about given
conscious states. Rather like chemical compounds these states were thought to
have a complex structure and the aim of experimentation was to analyse the
entire structure into its fundamental, component elements. This was to be
achieved by trained subjects carefully introspecting and reporting on their
detailed, moment-to-moment experiences.
This categorising of conscious states presented a
formidable task and extensive inventories were developed, for example in the
laboratories of Külpe (1901) and Titchener
(1915). However, in the early years of
the 20th century, this programme fell into disrepute. How can one give a definitive list of the
contents of consciousness? In his
analysis of this period Boring (1942) noted that Külpe's
laboratory discovered less than 12,000 distinct sensations, whereas Titchener's laboratory discovered more than 44,435! These differences appeared to be largely due
to differences in how subjects had been trained to
attend to and describe what they experience, and without agreement in the field
about the fine details of the introspective method, disagreements between
different laboratories were difficult to settle. Worse, given the privacy of individual
experience and the sole reliance on
subjective reports, introspective findings were difficult to falsify.
Other reasons for the demise of introspectionism
had more to do with the prevailing, positivist intellectual climate.
Psychologists were keen to reformulate their discipline along the lines of
natural science. John Watson (1913) for
example, argued that the subject matter of psychology should not just be
restricted to humans, but should include other animals. The introspective method does not allow this
for the reason that other animals cannot make verbal reports about what they
experience. Nor, he argued, does it make
much sense to speculate about what they experience. Psychology, therefore, should confine itself
to a study of overt behaviours, the stimuli which produce them,
and observable physiological functions such as the behaviour of nerves, glands,
muscles and so on. Thus refocused, psychology would become a behavioural form
of biological science, and it was hoped that this would make it more suitable
for practical purposes—for example for the purposes of social engineering.
In short, "Psychology as a behaviorist views it is a purely objective experimental
branch of natural science. Its theoretical goal is the prediction and control
of behavior. Introspection forms no essential part of
its method nor is the scientific value of its data dependent upon the readiness
with which they lend themselves to interpretation in terms of
consciousness" (Watson, 1913, p 158).
Indeed, "The time has come when psychology must discard all
reference to consciousness; when it need no longer delude itself into thinking
that it is making mental states the object of observation..." (Ibid, p163).
Methodological versus ontological behaviourism.
Methodologically, there were clear advantages to
be gained from this refocusing of psychological enquiry. Organism’s responses
may be measured with precision and, being publicly observable, allow
intersubjective agreement or the settling of disagreement. Watson's commitment
to behaviourism, however, was more than methodological. In his view mental
events are irrelevant to
psychological enquiry—and some mental events are in any case nothing more than
the behaviour of internal organs. For
example, thinking (Descartes' prime exemplar of nonmaterial mind) is, for
Watson, nothing more than minute muscular activity of the vocal tract.
Clearly, if inner variables such as consciousness
or mind reduce to behaviour, and behaviour is entirely under stimulus control,
then nothing is lost by restricting psychology to the study of responses and
the stimuli that produce them. In this way methodological
behaviourism, which is basically a thesis about how psychological research
should be carried out, and analytical behaviourism a reductive thesis
about the ontological nature of consciousness or mind, are mutually
supportive. Consequently, behaviourist
psychologists often adopted aspects of both positions.
Skinner (1953), for example, argued that talk
about conscious, mental events is mostly vague and metaphysical. For example, if someone forgets something (an
observable behaviour) we speak, metaphorically, of his ‘mind’ being ‘absent.’
Other mental accounts, he claims, simply restate the facts of observed
behaviour and are, therefore, redundant.
For example, "He eats because he is hungry" is, arguably, no
more informative than to say "he eats". Such attempts to translate statements about
mental events into statements about observable responses exemplify Skinner's ontological behaviourism.
Difficulties with behaviourist analyses of consciousness.
Watson's theory that thought is nothing more than
the minute movements of articulatory muscles was
heroically put to the test by E. M. Smith (1947) who temporarily paralysed all
his muscular activity with curare. He
reported afterwards that his ability to think and remember while paralysed was
unimpaired - thereby falsifying the "minute muscle movement" theory
of thought.
Ontological behaviourism is, in any case,
counterintuitive. As Chappell (1962)
pointed out, "If behaviorism were true, I could
find out that I myself had a pain by observing my behavior,
but since I do not find out that I have a pain, when I do, by observing my behavior ... behaviorism is not
true" (p 10).
In any case, we are often not able to determine the mental states of others even if they make
no attempt to conceal these states and their overt behaviour is clearly
visible. Again, as Chappell comments, "If behaviorism
were true I could always in principle find out when you had a pain by observing
your behavior, but since I cannot always find out,
even in principle, that you have a pain when you do, whereas I can always
observe your behavior it follows that behaviorism is not true" (Ibid, p 10).
There are also many instances where overt
behaviour is inconsistent with what
one thinks, feels or otherwise experiences. For example, one may experience
hunger without eating—which makes it difficult to argue that hunger is nothing
more than eating behaviour. One can also eat in spite of the fact that one is
not hungry; one may conceal or lie about one's intentions and so on. Even if
one tries to express some experience faithfully in overt behaviour it is not
always possible to do so. For example,
the phenomenology of experience cannot always be unambiguously and exhaustively
described in words ("translated into verbal behaviour"). This was, in
fact, one of the stumbling blocks of introspectionism.
Given the many dissociations
between conscious states and overt behaviour, the attempt to reduce conscious states to overt
behaviour seemed ill conceived. As a
methodology, radical behaviourism also failed to fulfil its mandate, “the
prediction and control of behaviour”, for the reason that complex behaviours
such as verbal descriptions of visual scenes (verbal responses to visual input
stimuli) were not entirely under stimulus control, and could not, therefore be
reliably be predicted or controlled.
Given such problems it is not surprising that radical behaviourism, like
Wundt’s experimental introspectionism, has largely
passed into history.
Are
mental states just "dispositions" to behave?
However, there were subtler versions of
behaviourism, that to some extent internalised the causes of behaviour
that were not so easily dismissed, such as Gilbert Ryle's
(1949) suggestion that mental states reduce not to overt behaviour but rather
to "dispositions to behave".
This was elaborated by D.M. Armstrong (1968) who tried to apply such a
dispositional behaviourist reduction to the qualia of consciousness, arguing
(a) that mental states (of whatever kind) are nothing but states of a person
apt for bringing about certain sorts of behaviour, and (b) that states of a
person apt for bringing about certain sorts of behaviour are nothing but states
of the brain. In this way, Armstrong tried to eliminate phenomenal qualia by
means of a two-stage reduction, combining dispositional behaviourism with a
form of physicalism. For example,
according to Armstrong, perception is just,
".. a matter of acquiring capacities to make physical
discriminations within our environment" (p83), and ".. nothing but the acquiring of true or false beliefs
concerning the current state of the organism, body and environment"
(p209). "Our perceptions, then, are
not the basis for our perceptual judgements, nor are they mere phenomenological
accompaniments of our perceptual judgements.
They are simply the acquirings of these judgements
themselves" (p226).
If Armstrong is right, there is nothing
mysterious about perceptual qualia, as there is nothing about perceptions that
is additional to the capacity to make discriminations based on the acquiring
true or false beliefs about the organism and environment. Such a reanalysis, he argues, has two
advantages. It both captures the
"inner character of perception" and creates "a logical tie
between the inner event and the outer behaviour" (Ibid, p248).
It
is in the above historical context that Dan Dennett’s later heterophenomenology
is best understood. According to Dennett (2003)
heterophenomenology is just a conventional, third person, scientific
investigation of brain and behaviour that includes subjects’ reports of what
they experience. It is simply “a
phenomenology of another not oneself.” The verbal responses of subjects (in
which they describe their experiences) allow them “to collaborate with
experimenters—making suggestions, interacting verbally, telling what it is like
[for them to have experiences]” (p20). And, “This third-person methodology is …
the sound way to take the first person point of view as seriously as it
can be taken.” (p19).
How can a third-person
methodology be the sound way to take the first-person point of view as
seriously as it can be taken? Because it gives you a
“catalogue of what the subject believes to be true about his or her conscious
experience. This catalogue of beliefs fleshes out the subject’s heterophenomenological world … not to be confused with the
real world. The total set of details of heterophenomenology,
plus all the data we can gather about concurrent events in the brains of
subjects and in the surrounding environment, comprise the total data set
for a theory of human consciousness. It
leaves out no objective phenomena and no subjective phenomena of consciousness.”
(p20, my italics)
The crucial point is
of course the last one. Does (third-person) heterophenomenology leave out the
(first-person) subjective phenomena of consciousness? Dennett claims not—but
like the radical and dispositional behaviourists before him, in order to make
good that claim he has to argue that the subjective phenomena of consciousness
are not what they seem to be.
Dennett asks, “Just what kinds of things does this methodology commit us
to? Beyond the unproblematic things all of science is committed to (neurons and
electrons, clocks and microscopes…) just to beliefs—the beliefs
expressed by subjects and deemed constitutive of their subjectivity (p20,
my italics).”
Again, the crucial
point is the last one—and it involves exactly the same reduction of experiences
to beliefs proposed by Armstrong (1968) (see above), although in
Armstrong’s case the beliefs are about the world, not about the experiences as
such. While Dennett is willing to listen
to what people have to say about their experiences, he is not prepared to
believe what they say. What a subject believes to be true about his or her
phenomenology is “not to be confused with the real world.” (see
above) Because their subjective worlds are not real, subjects’ beliefs about
their qualitative nature are false. Consequently, such beliefs are not about
some independent subjective world or subjectivity, as there is no such world
for them to be about—which makes subjects’ beliefs entirely, “constitutive
of their subjectivity.” As brain science progresses, such beliefs about the
nature of mind will be swept away much as science swept away the idea that evil
spirits are the cause of illness and disease (personal communication – see
Velmans, 2001).
Note that, although
Dennett sometimes claims that he is not denying the existence of
consciousness (cf Velmans, 2001), he is
unquestionably denying the existence of what most individuals have in mind by
the term “consciousness”, that is subjective, phenomenal consciousness.
Dennett makes this eliminative intent perfectly clear in his other writings,
for example when he points out that "Philosophers have adopted various
names for the things in the beholder (or properties of the beholder) that have
been supposed to provide a safe home for the colors
and the rest of the properties that have been banished from the external world
by the triumphs of physics: raw feels, phenomenal qualities, intrinsic
properties of conscious experiences, the qualitative content of mental states,
and, of course, qualia, the term I use. There are subtle differences in how
these terms have been defined, but I am going to ride roughshod over them. I deny that there are any such properties.
But I agree wholeheartedly that there
seem to be." (my italics - Dennett, 1994,
p129, see also Dennett, 1991, p372).
In sum, although Dennett tries to present
heterophenomenology as a theory-neutral, scientific approach to the study of
consciousness, he is far from neutral about the status of subjective qualities
or qualia. He has already made up his mind, and, like his behaviourist
predecessors, the third-person investigative method that he advocates and his
eliminative ontology for first-person experiences are mutually supportive.
Heterophenomenology “leaves out … no subjective phenomena of consciousness”
only if there are no first-person phenomena to leave out.
Critical
Phenomenology
In various ways,
Dennett’s heterophenomenology (HP) bears a family resemblance to the critical
phenomenology (CP) that I have described in Velmans (1999,
2000a,b)—although I would argue that the latter more closely reflects a
practice that is theory-neutral about subjective, first-person evidence—as well
as being common practice in psychological research. As with HP, CP includes a
conventional, third person, scientific investigation of brain and behaviour,
which includes subjects’ reports of what they experience. As with HP, the verbal responses of subjects
(in which they describe their experiences) allow them to collaborate with
experimenters—making suggestions, interacting verbally, telling what it is like
for them to have experiences and so on. However CP differs from HP in that it
does not assume that subjects are necessarily deluded and scientifically naïve
about their experiences, or doubt that it really is like something for subjects
to have experiences, or that these experiences have qualities that can, in
principle, be described. On the
contrary, the default assumption in CP is that subjects really do have
subjective, conscious experiences, and if one tries to reduce such first-person
experiences to third-person descriptions of brain and behaviour, one is likely
to leave something out that is of central importance to the nature of
consciousness. Unlike HP, CP is also
reflexive. It is not just “a phenomenology of another not oneself.” Rather, it is a phenomenology of another and
oneself. CP takes it for granted, for example, that experimenters have
first-person experiences and can describe those experiences much as their
subjects do. And crucially,
experimenter’s third-person reports of others are based, in the first
instance, on their own first-person experiences. This last
point is largely missed or at any rate dismissed in discussions of
heterophenomenology, and I will return to it below.
Why call this approach
“critical phenomenology” rather than just “phenomenology”? Partly, to dissociate it from the classical,
philosophical versions of Phenomenology mentioned at the beginning of this
essay, in which third-person methods and third-person science are sometimes
treated with the same distain as heterophenomenology treats first-person
methods. Instead, critical phenomenology
adopts a form of “psychological complementarity
principle” in which first- and third person accounts of the mind are treated as
being complementary and mutually irreducible. A complete account of mind
requires both (Velmans, 1991a,b). While CP assumes subjective phenomena to be
real, it remains cautious about phenomenal reports in that it assumes neither
first- or third-person reports of phenomena to be incorrigible, complete, or
unrevisable, and it remains open about how such reports should be interpreted
within some body of theory. CP is also open to the possibility that
first-person investigations can be improved by the development of more refined
first-person investigative methods, just as third-person investigations can be
improved by the development of more refined third-person methods. CP also takes
it as read that first- and third-person investigations of the mind can be used
conjointly, either providing triangulating evidence for each other, or in other
instances to inform each other. Third-person observations of brain and behaviour
for example can sometimes inform and perhaps alter interpretations of
first-person accounts (subtle differences in first-person experience for
example can sometimes be shown to have distinctive, correlated differences in
accompanying neural activity in the brain). Likewise, first-person accounts of
subjective experience can inform third-person accounts of what is going on in
the brain—indeed, without such first-person accounts, it would be difficult to
discover the neural correlates of given conscious experiences. In adopting the
view that subjective conscious experiences are real, but our descriptions and
understanding of them revisable, CP follows an entirely conventional critical
realist epistemology that is widely adopted in science.
HP versus CP
Does
heterophenomenology or critical phenomenology more closely describe actual
psychological research? As noted above, if matters are viewed solely from the
third-person perspective of an external observer, restricted (in both data and
theory) to observations of the brain and (verbal or other) behaviour of a
subject, there is little to choose between them. This is hardly surprising, as
if, in behaviourist style, one adopts a pretheoretical commitment to including
only third-person observable data and theory based on that data in one’s
science, then third-person methods should leave nothing out. In debate with Chalmers and Goldman, Dennett
(2001) challenged them to name any experimental investigation of consciousness
that did not follow the heterophenomenological
method. In an online dialogue with
Dennett (Velmans, 2001) I reversed the challenge, asking Dennett to name any
scientific investigation of consciousness that did not follow the critical
phenomenological method. As one might
predict (given the similarities in our accounts of third-person methods),
Dennett was unable to do so. However,
CP (unlike HP) is not confined to third-person methods. Do psychologists
ever use first-person methods (in isolation, or in combination with
third-person methods)? Of course we do.
When setting up a laboratory experiment, say on perception, the very first
thing one usually does is to try the experiment on oneself. For example, in
setting up a study on visual masking the first thing one might check is whether
the time of onset of the mask, its duration and its form prevent one’s own
conscious perception of the stimulus. If
it does not work for oneself, it probably won’t work for others. When studying the conditions under which
illusions occur, if they don’t occur for oneself, one needs
to alter the experimental conditions, and so on. These preliminary phases are
commonly followed by pilot studies and carefully designed experimental trials
that adopt third-person methods, which include subjective reports. Even so, the
default assumption in such experiments is that subjective reports are reports
about what subjects experience, and that (barring
individual differences) these experiences resemble the experiences of the
experimenters when they tried the experiment themselves. While it is true that,
during the behaviourist years, some psychologists tried to present the entire
procedure in third-person, behaviourist language that made no reference to what
subjects or experimenters experience, this exclusion of subjective experience
had more to do with what passed for “political correctness” at the time, than
with what was really going on (see discussion in Velmans, 2000a, ch4).
Dennett (2003)
recognises that experimenters commonly draw on their first person experiences
in psychological research in the manner described above, and that this is not
covered by heterophenomenology (in the sense that he defines it). Consequently he tries to argue that such
first person investigations are preliminary to science rather than integral
to it. For him, “Lone-wolf autophenomenology, in
which the subject and the experimenter are one and the same person, is a foul,
not because you can’t do it, but because it isn’t science until you turn your
self-administered pilot studies into heterophenomenological
experiments.” (p23) In my view this
gerrymandering of the borders of science has more to do with the preservation
of Dennett’s philosophical position than with the nature of psychological
science. Scientists are experiencing human beings as much as their
subjects. So why should something as
obviously empirical as trying an experimental treatment on oneself before
trying it on others be preliminary to rather than part
of good science? In medical research, for example, this can be a brave (and
honourable) thing to do. And what
exactly makes observations of the effects of treatments on oneself
less “scientific” than observing such effects on others? Aren’t both kinds of
observation based on what we experience of others or ourselves? (See Velmans, 1999, 2000
ch8 for a detailed analysis of how the empirical method incorporates
subjective experience.)
Returning
to Dennett’s challenge to Chalmers and Goldman (above), there are in fact many
examples of studies that explicitly use first-person methods (in the way that
CP describes) where a translation into the exclusively third-person
descriptions of HP look very forced.
According to Dennett (2003) “Neither Chalmers nor Velmans has responded
to my challenge to describe an experiment that is licensed by, or motivated by,
or approved by ‘critical phenomenology’ but off limits to heterophenomenology”
(p26). Actually, it was Dennett that did
not respond to the examples offered at the end of our dialogue in Velmans (2001).
One simple example is the study of pain.
Pain is often taken to be a prime exemplar of a “mental event” within
philosophy of mind. Yet it is one of the
most highly researched subjects in medicine. Over
the period 1966 to 1998, for example, the Medline database listed over 148,000
publications on pain and its alleviation.
As noted above, Dennett explicitly denies the existence of qualia. But
if the qualia of pain were not real (just false beliefs), why spend so much
time, money and effort on their removal?
And how could aspirin remove a false belief? Given its subjective
nature, how is pain measured? By subjective reports involving verbal
rating scales, numerical rating scales, visual analogue scales and
questionnaires such as the McGill Pain Questionnaire. Significantly, even in 2005 no valid “objective” measure of pain experience
(in the form of a physiological index) exists.
Equally difficult for
heterophenomenology, over the last 20 years or so, there has also been a
renewed interest in the development of first-person research methods that focus
on “what it is like” for subjects in various situations of interest to
investigators, for example with the expanded use of phenomenologically
inspired qualitative methods that are used both in isolation and in
conjunction with triangulating third-person quantitative methods in
psychological research (see for example, Denzin &
Lincoln, 2000, for a review). Complementary first- and third-person methods are
also widely used (without embarrassment or apology) in much of neuropsychology,
for example in the search for the neural correlates of consciousness using neuroimaging techniques. There have also been in-depth
re-evaluations of how the use of such combined first- and third-person methods
can be refined, for example in the field of neurophenomenology and more
generally in cognitive neuroscience (see for example, readings in Varela and
Shear, 1999, Velmans, 2000b, Jack & Roepstorff,
2003, 2004). All of these developments
adopt a critical phenomenology that assumes first-person subjective experience to
be both real and investigable—without minimising the methodological
difficulties that such research can sometimes present.
In sum, one can be
“critical” or cautious about how well or how reliably a subject can communicate
the qualia of his or her subjective experience in experimental settings,
without for a moment doubting their existence or claiming them to be
something completely different to how they seem. One can study colour vision without doubting
that there really are colours and that subjects really experience them, study
pain without doubting that subjects really feel pain, and so on. Given this,
Dennett’s heterophenomenology with its accompanying “qualia denial” looks like
nothing more than an attempt to shore up his counterintuitive, eliminativist philosophy of mind.
.
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