New mathematical foundations for AI and Alife: Are the necessary conditions for animal consciousness sufficient for the design of intelligent machines?

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Abstract

Rodney Brooks’ call for ‘new mathematics’ to revitalize the disciplines of artificial intelligence and artificial life can be answered by adaptation of what Adams has called ‘the informational turn in philosophy’ and by the novel perspectives that program gives into empirical studies of animal cognition and consciousness. Going backward from the necessary conditions communication theory imposes on cognition and consciousness to sufficient conditions for machine design is, however, an extraordinarily difficult engineering task. The most likely use of the first generations of conscious machines will be to model the various forms of psychopathology, since we have little or no understanding of how consciousness is stabilized in humans or other animals.

Key words artificial intelligence, artificial life, cognition, consciousness, groupoid, information theory, mathematics, mental disorder, psychopathology, topological manifold

INTRODUCTION

Recently MIT’s robotics guru Rodney Brooks raised the question of whether some ‘new mathematics’ might be necessary for further advances in artificial intelligence and artificial life (Brooks, 2001). Half a century of treating ‘the brain’ as a computer, while producing efficient chess-playing automata, missile guidance systems, search engines, and interesting computer games, has failed to make much progress toward creating devices which can do the functional equivalent of riding a bicycle in heavy traffic.

Brooks put it thus (Brooks, 2001):

“The disciplines of artificial intelligence and artificial life build computational systems inspired by various aspects of life. Despite the fact that living systems are composed only of non-living atoms there seem to be limits in the current levels of understanding within these disciplines in what is necessary to bridge the gap between non-living and living matter... We may simply not be seeing some fundamental mathematical description of what is going on in living systems and so be leaving it out of our AI and Alife models... There might be some organizing principle, some mathematical notion that we need in order to understand how they work... What form might this mathematical notion take? It need not be disruptive of our current view of living things, but could be as non-threatening as the notion of computation, just different from anything anyone has currently thought of. Perhaps other mathematical principles or notions, necessary to build good explanations of the details of evolution, cognition, consciousness or learning, will be discovered or invented and let those subfields of AI and Alife flower. Or perhaps there will be just one mathematical notion, one ‘new mathematics’ idea, that will unify all these fields, revolutionize many aspects of research involving living systems, and enable rapid progress in AI and Alife. That would be surprising, delightful and exciting. And of course whether or not this will happen is totally unpredictable.”

If one seeks “...mathematical principles or notions necessary to build good explanations of the details of evolution, cognition, consciousness or learning...” then the foundation for most of what Brooks seeks to do has been in the literature for some time, what Adams (2003) calls ‘the informational turn in philosophy’:

“It is not uncommon to think that information is a commodity generated by things with minds. Let’s say that a naturalized account puts matters the other way around, viz. It says that minds are things that come into being by purely natural causal means of exploiting the information in their environments. This is the approach of [the philosopher] Dretske as he tried consciously to unite the cognitive sciences around the well-understood mathematical theory of communication..."
Dretske himself (1994) wrote, based on work published in the early 1980’s,

“Communication theory can be interpreted as telling one something important about the conditions that are needed for the transmission of information as ordinarily understood, about what it takes for the transmission of semantic information. This has tempted people... to exploit [information theory] in semantic and cognitive studies, and thus in the philosophy of mind.

...Unless there is a statistically reliable channel of communication between [a source and a receiver]... no signal can carry semantic information... [thus] the channel over which the [semantic] signal arrives [must satisfy] the appropriate statistical constraints of communication theory.”

The asymptotic limit theorems of information theory impose necessary conditions on high level mental functions, including cognition and consciousness. In the same sense that the Central Limit Theorem permits construction of statistical models of real data that often can help cleave the Gordian Knot of scientific inference, so too the Shannon Coding, Shannon-McMillan Source Coding and the Rate Distortion Theorems allow development of necessary condition ‘regression models’ applicable to a great spectrum of experimental and observational data on high level mental functions. Inversion of such experimentally-derived models - characterizing them as defining ‘sufficient conditions’ - would appear to permit manufacture of a vast array of strikingly capable machines.

We focus on a particular case history, an application of Dretske’s method to the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness developed by Bernard Baars in the early 1980’s, inspired by the blackboard computing model of Alan Newell. One wishes to think, taking Brooks’ perspective, that the mathematical model we produce from Baars’ theory by using Dretske’s approach can be inverted, creating, in the sense of the Nix/Vose Markov chain model of evolutionary computing (Nix and Vose, 1992), a mathematical structure that could serve as a foundation for machine design.

Matters are, however, profoundly complicated by the logical problem that necessary conditions need not be sufficient conditions.

### THE FORMAL THEORY

**The Global Workspace consciousness model**

Bernard Baars’ Global Workspace Theory (Baars, 1988, 2005) is rapidly becoming the de facto standard model of consciousness (e.g. Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Dehaene and Changeaux, 2005). The central ideas are as follows (Baars and Franklin, 2003):

1. The brain can be viewed as a collection of distributed specialized networks (processors).
2. Consciousness is associated with a global workspace in the brain – a fleeting memory capacity whose focal contents are widely distributed (broadcast) to many unconscious specialized networks.
3. Conversely, a global workspace can also serve to integrate many competing and cooperating input networks.
4. Some unconscious networks, called contexts, shape conscious contents, for example unconscious parietal maps modulate visual feature cells that underlie the perception of color in the ventral stream.
5. Such contexts work together jointly to constrain conscious events.
6. Motives and emotions can be viewed as goal contexts.
7. Executive functions work as hierarchies of goal contexts.

Although this basic approach has been the focus of work by many researchers for two decades, consciousness studies has only recently, in the context of a deluge of empirical results from brain imaging experiments, begun digesting the perspective and preparing to move on.

Currently popular agent-based and artificial neural network (ANN) treatments of cognition, consciousness and other higher order mental functions, to take Krebs’ (2005) view, are little more than sufficiency arguments, in the same sense that a Fourier series expansion can be empirically fitted to nearly any function over a fixed interval without providing real understanding of the underlying structure. Necessary conditions, as Dretske argues (Dretske, 1981, 1988, 1993, 1994), give considerably more insight. Perhaps the most cogent example is the difference between the Ptolemaic and Newtonian models of the solar system: one need not always expand in epicycles, but can seek the central motion. Dretske’s perspective provides such centrality.

Wallace (2005a, b) has, in fact, addressed Baars’ theme from Dretske’s viewpoint, examining the necessary conditions which the asymptotic limit theorems of information theory impose on the Global Workspace. A central outcome of this work has been the incorporation, in a natural manner, of constraints on individual consciousness, i.e. what Baars calls contexts. Using information theory methods, extended by an obvious homology between information source uncertainty and free energy density, it is possible to formally account for the effects on individual consciousness of parallel physiological modules like the immune system, embedding structures like the local social network, and, most importantly, the all-encompassing cultural heritage which so uniquely marks human biology (e.g. Richerson and Boyd, 2004). This embedding evades the mereological fallacy which so fatally bedevils brain-only theories of human consciousness (Bennett and Hacker, 2003).

Transfer of phase change approaches from statistical physics to information theory via the same homology generates the punctuated nature of accession to consciousness in a similarly natural manner. The necessary renormalization calculation focuses on a phase transition driven by variation in the average strength of nondisjunctive ‘weak ties’ (Granovetter, 1973) linking unconscious cognitive submodules. A second-order ‘universal class tuning’ allows for adaptation of conscious attention via ‘rate distortion manifolds’ which generalize the idea of a retina. Aversion of the Baars model...
emerges as an almost exact parallel to hierarchical regression, based, however, on the Shannon-McMillan rather than the Central Limit Theorem.

Wallace (2005b) recently proposed a somewhat different approach, using classic results from random and semirandom network theory (Erdos and Renyi, 1960; Albert and Barabasi, 2002; Newman, 2003) applied to a modular network of cognitive processors. The unconscious modular network structure of the brain is, of course, not random. However, in the spirit of the wag who said “all mathematical models are wrong, but some are useful”, the method serves as the foundation of a different, but roughly parallel, treatment of the Global Workspace to that given in Wallace (2005a), and hence as another basis for a benchmark model against which empirical data can be compared.

The first step is to argue for the existence of a network of loosely linked cognitive unconscious modules, and to characterize each of them by the ‘richness’ of the canonical language – information source – associated with it. This is in some contrast to attempts to explicitly model neural structures themselves using network theory, e.g. the ‘neuroperturbation’ approach of Kozma et al. (2004, 2005), which nonetheless uses many similar mathematical techniques. Here, rather, we look at the necessary conditions imposed by the asymptotic limits of information theory on any realization of a cognitive process, be it biological ‘wetware’, silicon dryware, or some direct or systems-level hybrid. All cognitive processes, in this formulation, are to be associated with a canonical ‘dual information source’ which will be constrained by the Rate Distortion Theorem, or, in the zero-error limit, the Shannon-McMillan Theorem. It is interactions between nodes in this abstractly defined network which will be of interest here, rather than whatever mechanism or biological system, or mixture of them, actually constitute the underlying cognitive modules.

The second step is to examine the conditions under which a giant component (GC) suddenly emerges as a kind of phase transition in a network of such linked cognitive modules, to determine how large that component is, and to define the relation between the size of the component and the richness of the cognitive language associated with it. This is the candidate for Baars’ shifting Global Workspace of consciousness.

While Wallace (2005a) examines the effect of changing the average strength of nondisjunctive weak ties acting across linked unconscious modules, Wallace (2005b) focuses on changing the average number of such ties having a fixed strength, a complementary perspective whose extension via a kind of ‘renormalization’ leads to a far more general approach.

The third step, following Wallace (2005b), is to tune the threshold at which the giant component comes into being, and to tune vigilance, the threshold for accession to consciousness.

Wallace’s (2005b) information theory modular network treatment can be enriched by introducing a groupoid formalism which is roughly similar to recent analyses of linked dynamic networks described by differential equation models (e.g. Stewart et al., 2003, Stewart, 2004; Weinstein, 1996; Connes, 1994). Internal and external linkages between information sources break the underlying groupoid symmetry, and introduce more structure, the global workspace and the effect of contexts, respectively. The analysis provides a foundation for further mathematical exploration of linked cognitive processes.

Cognition as ‘language’ Cognition is not consciousness. Most mental, and many physiological, functions, while cognitive in a formal sense, hardly ever become entrained into the Global Workspace of consciousness: one seldom is able to consciously regulate immune function, blood pressure, or the details of binocular tracking and bipedal motion, except to decide ‘what shall I look at’, ‘where shall I walk’. Nonetheless, many cognitive processes, conscious or unconscious, appear intimately related to ‘language’, broadly speaking. The construction is fairly straightforward (Wallace, 2000, 2005a, b).

Atlan and Cohen (1998) and Cohen (2000) argue, in the context of immune cognition, that the essence of cognitive function involves comparison of a perceived signal with an internal, learned picture of the world, and then, upon that comparison, choice of one response from a much larger repertoire of possible responses.

Cognitive pattern recognition-and-response proceeds by an algorithmic combination of an incoming external sensory signal with an internal ongoing activity – incorporating the learned picture of the world – and triggering an appropriate action based on a decision that the pattern of sensory activity requires a response.

More formally, a pattern of sensory input is mixed in an unspecified but systematic algorithmic manner with a pattern of internal ongoing activity to create a path of combined signals $x = (a_0, a_1, ..., a_n, ...)$.

Each $a_k$ thus represents some functional composition of internal and external signals. Wallace (2005a) provides two neural network examples.

This path is fed into a highly nonlinear, but otherwise similarly unspecified, ‘decision oscillator’, $h$, which generates an output $h(x)$ that is an element of one of two disjoint sets $B_0$ and $B_1$ of possible system responses. Let

$$B_0 \equiv b_0, ..., b_k,$$

$$B_1 \equiv b_{k+1}, ..., b_m.$$  

Assume a graded response, supposing that if

$$h(x) \in B_0,$$

the pattern is not recognized, and if

$$h(x) \in B_1,$$

the pattern is recognized, and some action $b_j, k+1 \leq j \leq m$ takes place.

The principal objects of interest are paths $x$ which trigger pattern recognition-and-response exactly once. That is, given a fixed initial state $a_0$, such that $h(a_0) \in B_0$, we examine all possible subsequent paths $x$ beginning with $a_0$ and leading
The cognitive modular network symmetry groupoid

A formal equivalence class algebra can be constructed by choosing different origin points \( a_0 \) and defining equivalence by the existence of a high probability meaningful path connecting two points. Disjoint partition by equivalence class, analogous to orbit equivalence classes for dynamical systems, defines the vertices of the proposed network of cognitive dual languages. Each vertex then represents a different information source dual to a cognitive process. This is not a representation of a neural network as such, or of some circuit in silicon. It is, rather, an abstract set of ‘languages’ dual to the cognitive processes instantiated by either biological wetware, mechanical dryware, or their direct or systems-level hybrids.

This structure is a groupoid, in the sense of Weinstein (1996). States \( a_j, a_k \) in a set \( A \) are related by the groupoid morphism if and only if there exists a high probability grammatical path connecting them, and tuning across the various possible ways in which that can happen – the different cognitive languages – parametrizes the set of equivalence relations and creates the groupoid. This assertion requires some development.

Note that not all possible pairs of states \( (a_j, a_k) \) can be connected by such a morphism, i.e. by a high probability, grammatical and syntactical cognitive path, but those that can define the groupoid element, a morphism \( g = (a_j, a_k) \) having the ‘natural’ inverse \( g^{-1} = (a_k, a_j) \). Given such a pairing, connection by a meaningful path, it is possible to define ‘natural’ end-point maps \( \alpha(g) = a_j, \beta(g) = a_k \) from the set of morphisms \( G \) into \( A \), and a formally associative product in the groupoid \( g_1 g_2 \) provided \( \alpha(g_1 g_2) = \alpha(g_1), \beta(g_1 g_2) = \beta(g_2) \), and \( \beta(g_1) = \alpha(g_2) \). Then the product is defined, and associative, i.e. \((g_1 g_2) g_3 = g_1 (g_2 g_3)\).

In addition there are ‘natural’ left and right identity elements \( \lambda_p, \rho_g \) such that \( \lambda_p g = g = gp_\rho \) whose characterization is left as an exercise (Weinstein, 1996).

An orbit of the groupoid \( G \) over \( A \) is an equivalence class for the relation \( a_j \sim Ga_k \) if and only if there is a groupoid element \( g \) with \( \alpha(g) = a_j \) and \( \beta(g) = a_k \).

The isotopy group of \( a \in X \) consists of those \( g \) in \( G \) with \( \alpha(g) = a = \beta(g) \).

In essence a groupoid is a category in which all morphisms have an inverse, here defined in terms of connection by a meaningful path of an information source dual to a cognitive process.

If \( G \) is any groupoid over \( A \), the map \((\alpha, \beta) : G \rightarrow A \times A \) is a morphism from \( G \) to the pair groupoid of \( A \). The image of \((\alpha, \beta) \) is the orbit equivalence relation \( \sim G \), and the functional kernel is the union of the isotropy groups. If \( f : X \rightarrow Y \) is a function, then the kernel of \( f \), \( ker(f) = \{ (x_1, x_2) \in X \times X \colon f(x_1) = f(x_2) \} \) defines an equivalence relation.

As Weinstein (1996) points out, the morphism \((\alpha, \beta) \) suggests another way of looking at groupoids. A groupoid over \( A \) identifies not only which elements of \( A \) are equivalent to one another (isomorphic), but it also parametrizes the different ways (isomorphisms) in which two elements can be equivalent, i.e. all possible information sources dual to some cognitive process. Given the information theoretic characterization of...
cognition presented above, this produces a full modular cognitive network in a highly natural manner.

The groupoid approach has become quite popular in the study of networks of coupled dynamical systems which can be defined by differential equation models, e.g. Stewart et al. (2003), Stewart (2004). Here we have outlined how to extend the technique to networks of interacting information sources which, in a dual sense, characterize cognitive processes, and cannot at all be described by the usual differential equation models. These latter, it seems, are much the spiritual offspring of 18th Century mechanical clock models. Cognitive and conscious processes in humans involve neither computers nor clocks, but remain constrained by the limit theorems of information theory, and these permit scientific inference on necessary conditions.

Internal forces breaking the symmetry groupoid The symmetry groupoid, as we have constructed it for unconscious cognitive submodules in ‘information space’, is parametrized across that space by the possible ways in which states \( a_j, a_k \) can be ‘equivalent’, i.e. connected by a meaningful path of an information source dual to a cognitive process. These are different, and in this approximation, non-interacting unconscious cognitive processes. But symmetry groupoids, like symmetry groups, are designed to be broken, by internal cross-talk akin to spin-orbit interactions within a symmetric atom, and by cross-talk with slower, external, information sources, akin to putting a symmetric atom in a powerful magnetic or electric field.

As to the first process, suppose that linkages can fleetingly occur between the ordinarily disjoint cognitive modules defined by the network groupoid. In the spirit of Wallace (2005a), this is represented by establishment of a non-zero mutual information measure between them: a cross-talk which breaks the strict groupoid symmetry developed above.

Wallace (2005a) describes this structure in terms of fixed magnitude disjunctive strong ties which give the equivalence class partitioning of modules, and nondisjunctive weak ties which link modules across the partition, and parametrizes the overall structure by the average strength of the weak ties, to use Granovetter’s (1973) term. By contrast the approach of Wallace (2005b), which we outline here, is to simply look at the average number of fixed-strength nondisjunctive links in a random topology. These are obviously the two analytically tractable limits of a much more complicated regime.

Since we know nothing about how the cross-talk connections can occur, we will – at first – assume they are random and construct a random graph in the classic Erdos/Renyi manner. Suppose there are \( M \) disjoint cognitive modules – \( M \) elements of the equivalence class algebra of languages dual to some cognitive process – which we now take to be the vertices of a possible graph.

For \( M \) very large, following Savante et al. (1993), when edges (defined by establishment of a fixed-strength mutual information measure between the graph vertices) are added at random to \( M \) initially disconnected vertices, a remarkable transition occurs when the number of edges becomes approximately \( M/2 \). Erdos and Renyi (1960) studied random graphs with \( M \) vertices and \((M/2)(1+\mu)\) edges as \( M \to \infty \), and discovered that such graphs almost surely have the following properties (Molloy and Reed, 1995, 1998; Grimmett and Stacey, 1998; Luczak, 1990; Aiello et al., 2000; Albert and Barabasi, 2002):

If \( \mu < 0 \), only small trees and ‘unicyclic’ components are present, where a unicyclic component is a tree with one additional edge; moreover, the size of the largest tree component is \((\mu - \ln(1 + \mu))^{-1} + O(\log \log n)\).

If \( \mu = 0 \), however, the largest component has size of order \( M^{2/3} \). And if \( \mu > 0 \), there is a unique ‘giant component’ (GC) whose size is of order \( M \); in fact, the size of this component is asymptotically \( \alpha M \), where \( \mu = -\alpha^{-1} \ln(1-\alpha) - 1 \). Thus, for example, a random graph with approximately \( M \ln(2) \) edges will have a giant component containing \( \approx M/2 \) vertices.

Such a phase transition initiates a new, collective, cognitive phenomenon: the Global Workspace of consciousness, emergently defined by a set of cross-talk mutual information measures between interacting unconscious cognitive submodules. The source uncertainty, \( H_s \), of the language dual to the collective cognitive process, which characterizes the richness of the cognitive language of the workspace, will grow as some monotonic function of the size of the GC, as more and more unconscious processes are incorporated into it. Wallace (2005b) provides details.

Others have taken similar network phase transition approaches to assemblies of neurons, e.g. ‘neuroperculation’ (Kozma et al., 2004, 2005), but their work has not focused explicitly on modular networks of cognitive processes, which may or may not be instantiated by neurons. Restricting analysis to such modular networks finesse much of the underlying conceptual difficulty, and permits use of the asymptotic limit theorems of information theory and the import of techniques from statistical physics, a matter we will discuss later.

External forces breaking the symmetry groupoid Just as a higher order information source, associated with the GC of a random or semirandom graph, can be constructed out of the interlinking of unconscious cognitive modules by mutual information, so too external information sources, for example in humans the cognitive immune and other physiological systems, and embedding sociocultural structures, can be represented as slower-acting information sources whose influence on the GC can be felt in a collective mutual information measure. For machines these would be the onion-like ‘structured environment’, to be viewed as among Baars’ contexts (Baars, 1988, 2005; Baars and Franklin, 2003). The collective mutual information measure will, through the Joint Asymptotic Equi-partition Theorem which generalizes the Shannon-McMillan Theorem, be the splitting criterion for high and low probability joint paths across the entire system.

The tool for this is network information theory (Cover and Thomas, 1991, p. 387). Given three interacting information sources, \( Y_1, Y_2, Z \), the splitting criterion, taking \( Z \) as the ‘external context’, is given by
\[ I(Y_1, Y_2|Z) = H(Z) + H(Y_1|Z) - H(Y_1, Y_2, Z), \]

(2)

where \( H(\cdot|\cdot) \) and \( H(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot) \) represent conditional and joint uncertainties (Khinchin, 1957; Ash, 1990; Cover and Thomas, 1991). This generalizes to

\[ I(Y_1, ..., Y_n|Z) = H(Z) + \sum_{j=1}^{n} H(Y_j|Z) - H(Y_1, ..., Y_n, Z). \]

(3)

If we assume the Global Workspace/Giant Component to involve a very rapidly shifting, and indeed highly tunable, dual information source \( X \), embedding contextual cognitive modules like the immune system will have a set of significantly slower-responding sources \( Y_j, j = 1..m \), and external social, cultural and other ‘environmental’ processes will be characterized by even more slowly-acting sources \( Z_k, k = 1..n \). Mathematical induction on equation (3) gives a complicated expression for a mutual information splitting criterion which we write as

\[ I(X|Y_1, ..., Y_n|Z_1, ..., Z_n). \]

(4)

This encompasses a fully interpenetrating ‘biopsychosocio-cultural’ structure for individual human or machine consciousness, one in which Baars’ contexts act as important, but flexible, boundary conditions, defining the underlying topology available to the far more rapidly shifting global workspace (Wallace, 2005a, b).

This result does not commit the mereological fallacy which Bennett and Hacker (2003) impute to excessively neurocentric perspectives on consciousness in humans, that is, the mistake of imputing to a part of a system the characteristics which require functional entirety. The underlying concept of this fallacy should extend to machines interacting with their environments, and its baleful influence probably accounts for a significant part of AI’s failure to deliver. See Wallace (2005a) for further discussion.

**Punctuation phenomena** As a number of researchers have noted, in one way or another, – see Wallace, (2005a) for discussion – equation (1),

\[ H \equiv \lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{\log|N(n)|}{n}, \]

is homologous to the thermodynamic limit in the definition of the free energy density of a physical system. This has the form

\[ F(K) = \lim_{V \to \infty} \frac{\log[Z(K)]}{V}, \]

(5)

where \( F \) is the free energy density, \( K \) the inverse temperature, \( V \) the system volume, and \( Z(K) \) is the partition function defined by the system Hamiltonian.

Wallace (2005a) shows at some length how this homology permits the natural transfer of renormalization methods from statistical mechanics to information theory. In the spirit of the Large Deviations Program of applied probability theory, this produces phase transitions and analogs to evolutionary punctuation in systems characterized by piecewise, adiabatically stationary, ergodic information sources. These ‘biological’ phase changes appear to be ubiquitous in natural systems and can be expected to dominate machine behaviors as well, particularly those which seek to emulate biological paradigms. Wallace (2002) uses these arguments to explore the differences and similarities between evolutionary punctuation in genetic and learning plateaus in neural systems.

**Renormalizing the giant component: the second order iteration** The random network development above is predicated on there being a variable average number of fixed-strength linkages between components. Clearly, the mutual information measure of cross-talk is not inherently fixed, but can continuously vary in magnitude. This we address by a parametrized renormalization. In essence the modular network structure linked by mutual information interactions has a topology depending on the degree of interaction of interest. Suppose we define an interaction parameter \( \omega \), a real positive number, and look at geometric structures defined in terms of linkages which are zero if mutual information is less than, and ‘renormalized’ to unity if greater than, \( \omega \). Any given \( \omega \) will define a regime of giant components of network elements linked by mutual information greater than or equal to it.

The fundamental conceptual trick at this point is to invert the argument: A given topology for the giant component will, in turn, define some critical value, \( \omega_C \), so that network elements interacting by mutual information less than that value will be unable to participate, i.e. will ‘locked out’ and not be consciously perceived. We hence are assuming that the \( \omega \) is a tunable, syntactically-dependent, detection limit, and depends critically on the instantaneous topology of the giant component defining the global workspace of consciousness. That topology is, fundamentally, the basic tunable syntactic
filter across the underlying modular symmetry groupoid, and variation in \( \omega \) is only one aspect of a much more general topological shift. More detailed analysis is given below in terms of a topological rate distortion manifold.

Suppose the giant component at some ‘time’ \( k \) is characterized by a set of parameters \( \Omega_k \equiv \omega_1^k, ..., \omega_m^k \). Fixed parameter values define a particular giant component having a particular topological structure (Wallace, 2005b). Suppose that, over a sequence of ‘times’ the giant component can be characterized by a (possibly coarse-grained) path \( x_n = \Omega_0, \Omega_1, ..., \Omega_{n-1} \) having significant serial correlations which, in fact, permit definition of an adiabatically, piecewise stationary, ergodic (APSE) information source in the sense of Wallace (2005a). Call that information source \( X \).

Suppose, again in the manner of Wallace (2005a), that a set of (external or else internal, systemic) signals impinging on consciousness, i.e. the giant component, is also highly structured and forms another APSE information source \( Y \) which interacts not only with the system of interest globally, but specifically with the tuning parameters of the giant component characterized by \( X \). \( Y \) is necessarily associated with a set of paths \( y_n \).

Pair the two sets of paths into a joint path \( z_n \equiv (x_n, y_n) \), and invoke some inverse coupling parameter, \( K \), between the information sources and their paths. By the arguments of Wallace (2005a) this leads to phase transition punctuation of \( I[K] \), the mutual information between \( X \) and \( Y \), under either the Joint Asymptotic Equipartition Theorem, or, given a distortion measure, under the Rate Distortion Theorem.

\( I[K] \) is a splitting criterion between high and low probability pairs of paths, and partakes of the homology with free energy density described in Wallace (2005a). Attentional focusing then itself becomes a punctuated event in response to increasing linkage between the organism or device and an external structured signal, or some particular system of internal events. This iterated argument parallels the extension of the General Linear Model into the Hierarchical Linear Model of regression theory.

Call this the Hierarchical Cognitive Model (HCM).

The HCM version of Baars’ global workspace model, as we have constructed it, stands in some contrast to other current work.

Tononi (2004), for example, takes a ‘complexity’ perspective on consciousness, in which he averages mutual information across all possible bipartitions of the thalamocortical system, and, essentially, demands an ‘infomax’ clustering solution. Other clustering statistics, however, may serve as well or better, as in generating phylogenetic trees, and the method does not seem to produce conscious punctuation in any natural manner.

Dehaene and Changeux (2005) take an explicit Baars global workspace perspective on consciousness, but use an elaborate neural network simulation to generate a phenomenon analogous to inattentional blindness. While their model does indeed display the expected punctuated behaviors, as noted above, Krebs (2005) unsurprisingly labels such constructions with the phrase ‘neurological possibility does not imply neurological plausibility’, suggesting that the method does little more than fit a kind of Fourier series construction to high level mental processes.

Here we have attempted a step toward a central motion model of consciousness, focusing on modular networks defined by function rather than by structure.

Cognitive quasi-thermodynamics A fundamental homology between the information source uncertainty dual to a cognitive process and the free energy density of a physical system arises, in part, from the formal similarity between their definitions in the asymptotic limit. Information source uncertainty can be defined as in equation (1). This is quite analogous to the free energy density of a physical system, equation (5).

Feynman (1996) provides a series of physical examples, based on Bennett’s work, where this homology is, in fact, an identity, at least for very simple systems. Bennett argues, in terms of irreducibly elementary computing machines, that the information contained in a message can be viewed as the work saved by not needing to recompute what has been transmitted.

Feynman explores in some detail Bennett’s microscopic machine designed to extract useful work from a transmitted message. The essential argument is that computing, in any form, takes work, the more complicated a cognitive process, measured by its information source uncertainty, the greater its energy consumption, and our ability to provide energy to the brain is limited. Inattentional blindness emerges as an inevitable thermodynamic limit on processing capacity in a topologically-fixed global workspace, i.e. one which has been strongly configured about a particular task (Wallace, 2006).

Understanding the time dynamics of cognitive systems away from phase transition critical points requires a phenomenology similar to the Onsager relations of nonequilibrium thermodynamics. If the dual source uncertainty of a cognitive process is parametrized by some vector of quantities \( K \equiv (K_1, ..., K_m) \), then, in analogy with nonequilibrium thermodynamics, gradients in the \( K_j \) of the disorder, defined as

\[
S \equiv H(K) - \sum_{j=1}^{m} K_j \partial H / \partial K_j
\]  

become of central interest.

Equation (6) is similar to the definition of entropy in terms of the free energy density of a physical system, as suggested by the homology between free energy density and information source uncertainty described above.

Pursuing the homology further, the generalized Onsager relations defining temporal dynamics become
\[ dK_j/dt = \sum_i L_{j,i} \partial S/\partial K_i, \]

where the \( L_{j,i} \) are, in first order, constants reflecting the nature of the underlying cognitive phenomena. The L-matrix is to be viewed empirically, in the same spirit as the slope and intercept of a regression model, and may have structure far different than familiar from more simple chemical or physical processes. The \( \partial S/\partial K \) are analogous to thermodynamic forces in a chemical system, and may be subject to override by external physiological driving mechanisms (Wallace, 2005c).

Imposing a metric for different cognitive dual languages parametrized by \( K \) leads quickly into the rich structures of Riemannian, or even Finsler, geometries (Wallace, 2005c).

One can apply this formalism to the example of the giant component, with the information source uncertainty/channel capacity taken as directly proportional to the component’s size, which increases monotonically with the average number of (renormalized) linkages, \( a \), after the critical point. \( H(a) \) then rises to some asymptotic limit.

As the system rides up with increasing \( a \), \( H(a) \) increases against the ‘force’ defined by \(-dS/da\). Raising the cognitive capacity of the giant component, making it larger, requires energy, and is done against a particular kind of opposition. Beyond a certain point, the system just runs out of steam. Altering the topology of the network, no longer focusing on a particular demanding task, would allow detection of cross-talk signals from other submodules, as would the intrusion of a signal above the renormalization limit \( \omega \).

We propose, then, that the manner in which the system ‘runs out of steam’ involves a maxed-out, fixed topology for the giant component of consciousness. As argued above, the renormalization parameter \( \omega \) then becomes an information/energy bottleneck. To keep the giant component at optimum function in its particular topology, i.e. focused on a particular task involving a necessary set of interacting cognitive submodules, a relatively high limit must be placed on the magnitude of a mutual information signal which can intrude into consciousness.

Consciousness is tunable, and signals outside the chosen ‘syntactical/grammatical bandpass’ are often simply not strong enough to be detected, accounting for the phenomena of inattentual blindness (Wallace, 2006). This basic focus mechanism can be modeled in far more detail.

**Focusing the mind’s eye: the simplest rate distortion manifold** The second order iteration above – analogous to expanding the General Linear Model to the Hierarchical Linear Model – which involved paths in parameter space, can itself be significantly extended. This produces a generalized tunable retina model which can be interpreted as a ‘Rate Distortion manifold’, a concept which further opens the way for import of a vast array of tools from geometry and topology.

Suppose, now, that threshold behavior in conscious reaction requires some elaborate system of nonlinear relationships defining a set of renormalization parameters \( \Omega_k \equiv \omega^1_k, ..., \omega^m_k \).

The critical assumption is that there is a tunable ‘zero order state,’ and that changes about that state are, in first order, relatively small, although their effects on punctuated process may not be at all small. Thus, given an initial \( m \)-dimensional vector \( \Omega_0 \), the parameter vector at time \( k + 1 \), \( \Omega_{k+1} \), can, in first order, be written as

\[ \Omega_{k+1} \approx R_{k+1} \Omega_k. \]

where \( R_{k+1} \) is an \( m \times m \) matrix, having \( m^2 \) components.

If the initial parameter vector at time \( k = 0 \) is \( \Omega_0 \), then at time \( k \)

\[ \Omega_k = R_k R_{k-1} \ldots R_1 \Omega_0. \]

The interesting correlates of consciousness are, in this development, now represented by an information-theoretic path defined by the sequence of operators \( R_k \), each member having \( m^2 \) components. The grammar and syntax of the path defined by these operators is associated with a dual information source, in the usual manner.

The effect of an information source of external signals, \( Y \), is now seen in terms of more complex joint paths in \( Y \) and \( R \)-space whose behavior is, again, governed by a mutual information splitting criterion according to the JAEPT.

The complex sequence in \( m^2 \)-dimensional \( R \)-space has, by this construction, been projected down onto a parallel path, the smaller set of \( m \)-dimensional \( \omega \)-parameter vectors \( \Omega_0, ..., \Omega_k \).

If the punctuated tuning of consciousness is now characterized by a ‘higher’ dual information source – an embedding generalized language – so that the paths of the operators \( R_k \) are autocorrelated, then the autocorrelated paths in \( \Omega_k \) represent output of a parallel information source which is, given Rate Distortion limitations, apparently a grossly simplified, and hence highly distorted, picture of the ‘higher’ conscious process represented by the \( R \)-operators, having \( m \) as opposed to \( m \times m \) components.

High levels of distortion may not necessarily be the case for such a structure, provided it is properly tuned to the incoming signal. If it is inappropriately tuned, however, then distortion may be extraordinary.

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Let us examine a single iteration in more detail, assuming now there is a (tunable) zero reference state, \( \mathbf{R}_0 \), for the sequence of operators \( \mathbf{R}_k \), and that

\[
\Omega_{k+1} = (\mathbf{R}_0 + \delta \mathbf{R}_{k+1}) \Omega_k,
\]

(10)

where \( \delta \mathbf{R}_k \) is ‘small’ in some sense compared to \( \mathbf{R}_0 \).

Note that in this analysis the operators \( \mathbf{R}_k \) are, implicitly, determined by linear regression. We thus can invoke a quasi-diagonalization in terms of \( \mathbf{R}_0 \). Let \( \mathbf{Q} \) be the matrix of eigenvectors which Jordan-block-diagonalizes \( \mathbf{R}_0 \). Then

\[
\mathbf{Q} \Omega_{k+1} = (\mathbf{Q} \mathbf{R}_0 \mathbf{Q}^{-1} + \mathbf{Q} \delta \mathbf{R}_{k+1} \mathbf{Q}^{-1}) \mathbf{Q} \Omega_k.
\]

(11)

If \( \mathbf{Q} \Omega_k \) is an eigenvector of \( \mathbf{R}_0 \), say \( Y_j \) with eigenvalue \( \lambda_j \), it is possible to rewrite this equation as a generalized spectral expansion

\[
Y_{k+1} = (\mathbf{J} + \delta \mathbf{J}_{k+1}) Y_j \equiv \lambda_j Y_j + \delta Y_{k+1}
\]

\[
= \lambda_j Y_j + \sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i Y_i.
\]

(12)

\( \mathbf{J} \) is a block-diagonal matrix, \( \delta \mathbf{J}_{k+1} \equiv \mathbf{Q} \mathbf{R}_{k+1} \mathbf{Q}^{-1}, \) and \( \delta Y_{k+1} \) has been expanded in terms of a spectrum of the eigenvectors of \( \mathbf{R}_0 \), with

\[
|a_i| \ll |\lambda_j|, |a_{i+1}| \ll |a_i|.
\]

(13)

The point is that, provided \( \mathbf{R}_0 \) has been tuned so that this condition is true, the first few terms in the spectrum of this iteration of the eigenstate will contain most of the essential information about \( \delta \mathbf{R}_{k+1} \). This appears quite similar to the detection of color in the retina, where three overlapping non-orthogonal eigenmodes of response are sufficient to characterize a huge plethora of color sensation. Here, if such a tuned spectral expansion is possible, a very small number of observed eigenmodes would suffice to permit identification of a vast range of changes, so that the rate-distortion constraints become quite modest. That is, there will not be much distortion in the reduction from paths in \( R \)-space to paths in \( \Omega \)-space. Inappropriate tuning, however, can produce very marked distortion, even inattentional blindness.

Reflection suggests that, if consciousness indeed has something like a grammatically and syntactically-tunable retina, then appropriately chosen observable correlates of consciousness may, at a particular time and under particular circumstances, actually provide very good local characterization of conscious process. Large-scale global processes are, like hyperfocal tuning, another matter.

Note that Rate Distortion Manifolds can be quite formally described using standard techniques from topological manifold theory (Glazebrook, 2005). The essential point is that a rate distortion manifold is a topological structure which constrains the ‘stream of consciousness’ much the way a river-bank constrains the flow of the river it contains. This is a fundamental insight.

**DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS**

Application of Dretske’s communication theory perspective on necessary conditions for mental phenomena to Baars’ global workspace picture of consciousness gives an empirical model of high level cognitive process recognizably similar to, if much richer than, a regression structure. Necessary conditions are, however, not sufficient conditions. The Nix/Vose Markov chain model of evolutionary computing can be shown, in the presence of a nonzero mutation rate, to always converge to an equilibrium distribution. This distribution is, in fact, the ‘solution’ to the computing problem.

No such simple outcome is possible for higher level mental function in the model we have outlined here. The best one can do is specify the initial topology of the manifold which constrains consciousness. What then happens is self-driven within the structure defined by that topology, which may itself be tunable. This suggests that the final topology of the rate distortion manifold, along with its occupation point, in fact, constitutes the answer to the computing problem, similar to the manner that the equilibrium distribution is the answer to a Nix/Vose evolutionary computing problem without, however, the possibility of a global optimization strategy defined by some maximizable fitness measure. Relating global topology to local properties is, of course, the meat and drink of topological manifold theory. Answering general topological questions – is it a torus or a sphere, and where are we on it? – is, however, not at all like a ‘Deep Blue’ win at chess.

Two critical, intertwined, and likely competing, difficulties intrude:

(1) How does one specify the best initial cognitive or rate distortion topology for a conscious machine, given some particular problem of interest? This is a kind of generalized pro-
gramming question. For the usual computing architecture, of course, the program carries the solution within it, modulo a set of logical operations to be performed by the machine which, hopefully, then stops. For intelligent machines, as we have defined them, the question is the final topology, which will be driven by self-dynamic processes. Since these are necessary conditions machines, unlike ergodic Markov or ‘logical’ devices, there can never be a guaranteed convergence, (hence, perhaps, the ‘stream of consciousness’, as it were). This ambiguity intersects with a second problem:

(2) How does one ensure, if some ‘best’ initial problem-topology program has been specified, that the machine actually remains constrained by it, and does not go entirely off the rails? Raising the probability of such compliance may place significant limits on possible starting topologies and subsequent developmental pathways, and may indeed preclude many paths which might well constitute the most computationally efficient attacks on the underlying problem of interest.

Biological and, more recently, cultural, evolution have taken several hundred million years to work out this trade-off, and the result is not at all well understood. Failure of consciousness in humans causes various forms of debilitating mental disorder or inattentional blindness, both of which remain poorly characterized (Wallace, 2005b, 2006).

Brooks’ ‘new mathematics that will unify the various fields of AI and Alife’ has, in fact, been around for some decades, masquerading as Dretske’s interpretation of communication theory. Designing reliable intelligent machines based on necessary conditions principles, however, is going to be a difficult engineering task. Our emerging understanding of consciousness and cognition suggests that Pandora’s new box is going to be very, very hard to open.

Perhaps the most fruitful outcome of a program to produce conscious machines would be the insight that difficulty in making and operating them could provide regarding the structure of consciousness in higher animals. The failure modes of the first generations of conscious machines would likely give new and important perspectives on psychopathology in humans.

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