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From a Flaw in the Knowledge Argument to a Physicalist Account of Qualia

Nicholson, Mr D.M. (2005) From a Flaw in the Knowledge Argument to a Physicalist Account of Qualia. [Preprint]

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Abstract

The Knowledge argument based on the grey Mary thought experiment cannot be claimed as a basis for rejecting physicalism. First, because it is flawed, being so formulated as to predetermine the outcome of the thought experiment in favour of a refutation of physicalism. Second, because, once this is recognised, it becomes clear that there is one - and only one - account of the qualia-physical relationship that will permit physicalism to survive the thought experiment itself. It is suggested that the position in question is worthy of further consideration as a reasonable candidate theory for a physicalist account of qualia.

Item Type:Preprint
Keywords:Knowledge argument, physicalism, qualia, mind-body problem, Identity theory, hard problem of consciousness, Kripke, Leibniz’s law
Subjects:Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
ID Code:4020
Deposited By:Nicholson, Dennis
Deposited On:08 Jan 2005
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:55

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References in Article

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