The roots of self-awareness

Anderson, Dr. Michael L. and Perlis, Prof. Donald R. (2005) The roots of self-awareness. [Journal (Paginated)] (In Press)

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In this paper we provide an account of the structural underpinnings of self-awareness. We offer both an abstract, logical account-by way of suggestions for how to build a genuinely self-referring artificial agent-and a biological account, via a discussion of the role of somatoception in supporting and structuring self-awareness more generally. Central to the account is a discussion of the necessary motivational properties of self-representing mental tokens, in light of which we offer a novel definition of self-representation. We also discuss the role of such tokens in organizing self-specifying information, which leads to a naturalized restatement of the guarantee that introspective awareness is immune to error due to mis-identification of the subject.

Item Type:Journal (Paginated)
Subjects:Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
Computer Science > Artificial Intelligence
ID Code:3948
Deposited By:Anderson, Dr. Michael
Deposited On:20 Nov 2004
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:55

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