Consciousness And Adaptive Behavior

Sieb, Richard/A. (2005) Consciousness And Adaptive Behavior. [Preprint]

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Consciousness has resisted scientific explanation for centuries. The main problem in explaining consciousness is its subjectivity. Subjective systems may be adaptive. Humans can produce voluntary new or novel intentional (adaptive) action and such action is always accompanied by consciousness. Action normally arises from perception. Perception must be rerepresented in order to produce new or novel adaptive action. The internal explicit states produced by a widespread nonlinear emergent mechanism from perception have all the same properties as consciousness. Hence they may be identical to consciousness. Consciousness is natural, material, and functional; utilized in the production of adaptive action.

Item Type:Preprint
Additional Information:This article is a further development of material published in a former article "The Emergence Of Consciousness" published in Medical Hyptheses (2004)63(5),900-904.
Keywords:adaptive action, consciousness, nonlinear emergence, explicit, positive feedback, voluntary, intentional, subjective
Subjects:Psychology > Physiological Psychology
Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
Neuroscience > Neurophysiology
Neuroscience > Behavioral Neuroscience
ID Code:3908
Deposited By:Sieb, Richard A
Deposited On:26 Feb 2005
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:55

References in Article

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