Subjekt und Selbstmodell. Die Perspektivität phänomenalen Bewußtseins vor dem Hintergrund einer naturalistischen Theorie mentaler Repräsentation

Metzinger, Thomas K. (1999) Subjekt und Selbstmodell. Die Perspektivität phänomenalen Bewußtseins vor dem Hintergrund einer naturalistischen Theorie mentaler Repräsentation. [Book Chapter]

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Abstract

This book contains a representationalist theory of self-consciousness and of the phenomenal first-person perspective. It draws on empirical data from the cognitive and neurosciences.

Item Type:	Book Chapter
Keywords:	consciousness self-consciousness first-person perspective qualia mental models mental representation metarepresentation
Subjects:	Biology > Theoretical Biology Psychology > Cognitive Psychology Neuroscience > Computational Neuroscience Psychology > Evolutionary Psychology Neuroscience > Neuropsychology Philosophy > Epistemology Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind Philosophy > Philosophy of Science
ID Code:	388
Deposited By:	Metzinger, Thomas
Deposited On:	14 Jul 1999
Last Modified:	12 Sep 2007 17:27

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