Civil Society Iraq: Location Influences on Outgroup Perception

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Abstract
A significant research question in the immediate post-war (May 2003) environment of Iraq was: "How do Iraqis' location affect expressed perceptions of threat from outgroups?"

We collected 479 surveys of Iraqi opinions, in five locations (in Iraq, Jordan, and The Netherlands), with a single page instrument. Religion, ethnic origin, like location alone, had little strong bearing on respondents' expressed attitudes towards outgroups or the government in Iraq. However, certain sets of interacting elements did reflect significant differences in perceptions of threat. For example, Shi'a Muslims of urban Basra had very different expressions towards return of expatriate Iraqis than did Shi'a Muslims of rural Basra.

A serendipitous innovation was that of publishing our research process onto a "wiki" web page where visitors could add to or change contents of the documents. The wiki live publishing helped fellow scientists, decision-makers, resource agencies, and Iraq fieldworkers participate in our project.

Why Civil Society? The term describes both behavior and social systems and provides an overarching framework from which to explore social interactions in Iraq.

Follow-up is warranted. We found, for example, that "moderate Arabs" in Iraq were the most opposed to foreign involvement and were the most opposed to expatriate Iraqis returning to Iraq. This finding is relevant to decision-makers and field workers in relief, development, and reconstruction in Iraq.

This paper describes our research process in a post-regime-change environment. I would welcome comments onto the web site: http://CivilSocietyIraq.seedwiki.com.

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Introduction

Inter-group relations research can be conducted in the laboratory of a university; research can also be done in social networks of a multicultural city. In this study, our laboratory was the immediate post-conflict (2003) environment of southern Iraq, the refugee-filled environs of Amman, Jordan, and the immigrant communities of The Netherlands.

I wanted to accomplish five things in this project:

1. Collect data immediately after cessation of war about Iraq ethnic and religious groups and their perceptions about other groups and countries that may appear as threats;
2. Examine the data for evidence of consistent surveying by the field collectors;
3. Analyze the data, testing our hypotheses about intergroup biases and looking for interesting details and correlations about the people surveyed and their expressed opinions about themselves and about others;
4. Put the findings quickly into the hands of Iraqis, United Nations and Coalition Forces decision-makers, and non-governmental organization field personnel working in and around Iraq;
5. Define the social systems context within which to place follow up studies of social networks as they affect the repatriation and reintegration into home societies of Iraqi expatriates.
**Background: Civil Society research in this post-conflict environment**

This "Civil Society" hope for good living in peace and security in Iraq comes from the three integrated levels of civility:

1. Personal norms, morals, and values promoted as "good";
2. Associations (organized entities and informal networks) that serve in geographic, financial, political, religious interests of members, and
3. Overarching authority to secure equality before the law, secure food-shelter-clothing resources, and secure voice in shaping future physical and social ecosystems. According to Edwards, the World Bank working definition for civil society is "the arena in which people come together to pursue the interests they hold in common; it includes all organisations and associations between family and state, except firms". Kaviraj's historical framework: comments that "Civil society is not a new, post-Hegelian concept. It is a much older term, which entered into English usage via the Latin translation, 'societas civilis', of Aristotle's 'koinonia politike'. In its original sense, it allowed no distinction between 'state' and 'society' or between political and civil society: it simply meant a community, a collection of human beings united within a legitimate political order, and was variously rendered as 'society' or 'community'…It was Hegel who first bifurcated the concept, but in a way whereby state and civil society functioned in his account as redescriptions of one another”.

Nation building in Iraq provides governance through just political and legal processes, and support for threat-free associations for the common good. This is the first priority for the governing council in Iraq and is the only foundation from which to deal morally with criminal actions while increasing security for non-criminals. In the absence of a strong central government (or non-state, trans-religio-ethnic organizations) to guarantee equal protection under the law and equal access to resources, and with uncertainty about the status of the former president (in April 2003), security would likely be based, for most people, in social networks--mostly among near-kinsmen.

What then is a basis for comparing outgroup perceptions? Nelson claims that traditional prejudice (bias) research relies upon measures that confound emotional response with general group evaluation or stereotypes. For example, bias is usually measured as (ingroup evaluation – outgroup evaluation). We suggest that exploring expressions of bias and prejudice as they affect the social environment in Iraq, needs to begin with overt and with discreet uncovering of personal perspectives on generalized outgroup classifications to refine relevant questions to ask in follow-on studies, and then to move towards analyzing group perspectives and group identities as they have impact on policy development. We cannot afford to confound emotional responses with categorical responses.

Without this objective, stepwise exploration of a foundation of social stability for the more-distant future, an "implosion" of society is almost certain to occur. Drake uses this term as follows. "The model for Iraq's disintegration, if it occurs, will likely not be the Soviet Union but rather Lebanon; in contrast to the notion of "breakup," which implies a territorial explosion of an entity into separate states, we refer here to the opposite notion of "breakdown"--a form of civil anarchy resulting from the implosion of society, economy, and polity within the boundaries of a failed state.” Drake goes on to state that although a synthetic overarching superstructure can be enforced, it does not do away with the underlying group characteristics, though they may be hidden from view. Since the groups are not geographically limited, a geographic identity is not present to nurture cooperation and conciliatory behavior. Neither is there evidence of many inter-ethnic non-state organizations, other than the General Federation of Iraqi Women, the UNICEF/WHO-promoted Primary Health Care services, and the agricultural research system.

However, the lower-level groups and "patron-client" networks are very strong, as they are the social capital resource pools to which group members have first allegiance. A confessional-pluralist democracy is not yet evident, but neither is an absolute re-tribalization of Iraq.

The article "UNDP and Civil Society Organizations" at [http://www.undp.org/cso](http://www.undp.org/cso) states, "On the ground, civil society organizations (CSOs)--including community-based organizations, women's rights..."
organizations, environmental groups, think tanks, religious congregations, grass roots and indigenous peoples’
movements—have always been vital partners in helping communities build their own solutions to development
challenges. From debt relief to land mine movements, the ideas and energy for the global Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) campaign have come from within civil society.” Government agencies see civil
society organizations as groups that are not of a government, and international organizations, such as the UN,
see civil society organizations as community or trans-community groups within a nation-state or within a
geographic region. Within Iraq, there are multiple definitions, each with its own usefulness in defining the
future of civilization in Iraq and how our research applies.

Perhaps civil society is defined best by what it is not (uncivil society), as conflict is defined by what
peace is not. If, as Abraham Herschel said, “The opposite of good is not evil, the opposite of good is
indifference”, then is the opposite of civil society, “apathetic society” or “anti-civility”? Anti-civility implies
consensus of opposition, but apathetic implies….nothing. No hope, no action other than survival, no corporate
or personal initiative.

We define color in the graphical terms of RGB (spectrums of light), an additive combination of three
colors, each with 256 or so levels of intensity, in layers or channels. The "color" we see as a social community
is also an additive combining of layers or channels of community members. And, the filters of time and
distance give us clearer or fuzzier perceptions. And what about the invisible spectrum? I am not sure what all
would fit here, but surely elements the members and viewers have of personal and group history, the perceived
spirit-world, ambition, and hatred. In this way, "civil society" must include norms and values of a given
community at a point in time. That is how "criminal behavior" might be tolerated in some communities more
than in others--because the costs of change might not be outweighed by the benefits to a larger community.
Time does not wait for social betterment to come, that prosperity may reduce anti-foreigner activity.

I use the term "Civil Society" in a multi-purpose sense to include behavior, attitudes, and social systems.
This relates also to the concepts in the field of social capital, "the features of the structure of social relations that
facilitate action."

Relevant topics in readings and conversations are found in the bibliography.

Historical Context of Iraq: The main thread of importance--Power against Outgroups

The history of Iraq shows considerable periods of constraints on the development of a non-democratic
form of government.
--The area known as Iraq was the birthplace of agriculture, domestic animals, the wheel, and writing. It was
also home to the mega-power centers of the Akkadian, Assyrian, Chaldean, and Babylonian empires, which
introduced and supported state-sponsored violence against minority populations.
--The Arab conquest in the 7th century AD magnified power struggles between Mesopotamian and Arab
cultures. Ali ibn abi Talib, son-in-law and cousin of the Prophet Mohammed who was murdered in Kufa, Iraq,
"appears to have been of a mild and kindly disposition, insufficiently ruthless to dominate so turbulent a
community". Loyal followers of Ali killed him because he was insufficiently ruthless?
--Mongol massacres in the 13th - 14th centuries left the land and peoples destitute of their famous irrigation
systems, their literature, and their organized social systems.
--Turkish occupation--16th century, reconstructed government systems for taxation and rule by decree and
power, not law.
--Britain & France drew the first political boundaries (the Sykes-Picot Agreement) deciding on the distribution
of Turkish/Ottoman Empire in 1916, with rule over Arabia, Palestine, and Mesopotamia given to the Saudi
Arabians. The new king was not considered as representing the best interests of the Iraqi people; his reign was
brief.
--In 1958, pan-Arab Baathists led to Saddam and his near kinsmen as being THE ingroup; everyone else was of
the absolute outgroup. There was little capacity to become a socialistic welfare state or democracy, because
under the Baath, party no sphere of life was without state control. There were NO civil or private affairs. Approximately four million Iraqis left the country to seek a better life elsewhere.

--The 2003 overthrow of the Baathists was not by popular elections, and rule by law is not yet the norm. Our Civil Society Iraq project represents the hope to regain rights and privileges taken away by the state.
Methodology Used to Test Assumptions Concerning Ingroup-Outgroup Perceptions

Assumptions and boundaries:
1. We expected limited interview time with any individual respondent due to the post-war instability, so we limited the survey to one page. Survey items included write-in answers for demographic items of age, years in residence at the location of survey, education, number of children at home.

2. The survey was designed to be self-answerable for individuals with a low level of literacy.

3. Opinion items were designed to be non-threatening and as non-hostile as possible, since we did not know exactly what would happen when we began asking questions about ethnic identity, religion, Saddam Hussein, Iran, and threat concepts. We chose to use a short survey instrument, with use of indirect questions (not attention-controlled) about intergroup relations so as to avoid "politically-correct answers" possible with direct-only questions.

4. The English version of the survey form was given to two professional translators, with an emphasis on quickly producing a simple format appropriate for marginally-literate respondents. Both translators returned the completed form on paper and disk within two days. Their translations were compared and combined into one final version. The ease and speed of translation was due to their skill and to the quality of the English original.

5. Research design (an "experimental guided assessment technique") was developed, tested, and validated in research on Russian Federation outgroup perceptions by Hagendoorn, Linssen & Tumanov (2000), then adapted, tested, and validated for Iraq and Europe situations in 2003.

6. Intergroup studies should have consistent explanation of variance.

7. Based on studies of ethnic relations in the Russian Federation, there were three versions of the survey instrument:
   -"primed" against the main ethnic outgroup,
   -"primed" against the main religious outgroup, and
   -a neutral version.
   This allowed implicit (indirect) and explicit (direct) measures of intergroup perception.

8. Our research process tested both our process (what could be done in an immediate post-war situation) and our theory (what might be the expressed perceptions of threat or bias against personal, group, and national identities). This may be considered as “inferential” data mining, but comes from specific approaches tested previously. Our intent was to explore a population sample, not to test a theory, nor to generalize to the larger population. We acknowledge that our set of variables is not comprehensive enough nor is our sample size large enough for generalization to the population.

9. Research questions to be explored were:
   a. Does location of respondent affect outgroup perceptions?
   b. Do ethnic and religious identities relate across locations, to outgroup perceptions?
   c. Do perceptions concerning repatriation and reintegration differ across survey locations?
   d. Do perceptions differ concerning threat or domination by foreign states (USA, Iran, Turkey, Russia) with interests (oil, religious, political domination) in Iraq?
10. We assumed the following for our process:
   a. Data would be from a "normally-distributed" population
   b. Variance of responses would be homogeneous
   c. Responses would be appropriate to the survey item contents
   d. Responses between respondents would be independent
   e. Data would have internal validity for explanation of intergroup relations, and for planning research in other contexts and domains of inquiry.
   The sample size would prohibit generalization to the population as a whole.
   f. Due to our understanding of the post-war environment, it would be inappropriate to ask questions concerning gender, personal identity, tribal affiliation, and political participation.
   g. Questions would be designed for quick response, with a 4-point Likert scale, choosing to give up potential data available through a 5 or 7-point scale, but gaining by not offering a no-answer or non-committal response.

**Surveying Process:**
To find surveyors I looked for groups of young Iraqi men in both Jordan and in Basra. In the groups, I found a few that would complete for me a survey on the “Social Community of Iraqis.” After we went through the survey together, I asked them if they would like to help interview others in the same way. They asked if I could pay. I agreed, negotiated a reasonable price, gave them an advance of half of the agreed price, and sent them out with a pile of survey forms, a number of pens, and large envelopes in which to carry the forms.
In Baghdad, I followed a similar process, except there I joined a food distribution project to meet a larger number of people. Through them I found two eager respondents and asked them to collect surveys for me.
Surveys were completed and returned to me quickly. There were few complaints about the content of the surveys. The difficulty was in the transport of collected surveys back to me from Iraq, as there was no reliable postal or courier service.
Data was collected, translated as necessary, and entered. Analysis began with data cleaning and standardization of entries for "other ethnic group," and "other religion," and to deal appropriately with incorrectly entered items. We created additional variables as composites or recodings of original items.

**Analysis Processes**
Our handling of the research process itself was reported onto the website, [http://CivilSocietyIraq.seedwiki.com](http://CivilSocietyIraq.seedwiki.com). The wiki contained several “pages” or areas: the basic review of literature, the current events that related to our research interests, links to other agencies and individuals with an interest in Iraq, and, most importantly, forums where visitors could participate in the writing and rewriting of the web content. We hosted our "wiki" at [http://www.seedwiki.com](http://www.seedwiki.com) under the management of Kenneth Tyler. Choosing content over high-bandwidth graphics, we opted for a text-only format after experimenting with a variety of graphics and other features that looked good but interfered with fast skimming for information. Several web designers and webpage hosters emailed comments about how bad the site looked without any graphics. They are correct, and I could have designed the pages to work better.

Our data analyses included:
   a. Frequencies. How many people in which group(s) provided which answers
   b. Other descriptive statistics:
      1. Means (averages) and ranges of responses.
2. Standardized (z-score) comparisons of skewness and kurtosis for normal distributions by Shapiro-Wilk tests of normal distribution for parametric data.
3. Levene’s Test of sphericity affirmed that equal variance can be assumed.
c. Descriptive Cross-tabs and Pearson's Chi-square
d. Factor and main effects analyses. How do answers relate to other answers?
Correlation and pattern matrixes helped to build multi-item constructs to attempt to build explanations.
e. ANOVA. This test allowed answers to specific question pairs concerning interaction
f. MANOVA. These provided more answers to questions about the variance and covariance of answers from the sample averages.
Results

Four Collection Locations (71% in Iraq and 38% outside of Iraq)
The data from 412 respondents (479 surveys) were collected in:
Baghdad (55%), Basra urban and rural areas (16%), Jordan (31%), and The Netherlands (7%).

Demographic Item Responses (% of Respondents by Location, N=412)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>Baghdad N=225, 55%</th>
<th>Basra (urban) N=13, 3.2%</th>
<th>Basra (rural) N=14, 3.4%</th>
<th>Jordan N=129, 31%</th>
<th>Netherlands N=31, 7%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Identity</td>
<td>Arab 59%, Kurd 6%, Other 35%*</td>
<td>Arab 100%, Kurd 0%, Other 0%</td>
<td>Arab 93%, Kurd 0%, Other 7%</td>
<td>Arab 73%, Kurd 14%, Other 13%*</td>
<td>Arab 80%, Kurd 20%, Other 0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Importance</td>
<td>Little 3%, Important 61%, Very 28%, Most 8%</td>
<td>Little 7.7%, Import. 31%, Very 54%, Most 7.7%</td>
<td>Little 0%, Import. 50%, Very 21%, Most 29%</td>
<td>Little 33%, Import. 44%, Very 18%, Most 5%</td>
<td>Little 10%, Import. 59%, Very 17%, Most 14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Identity</td>
<td>Shi’a 20.3%, Sunni 12.4%, Other 67.3%</td>
<td>Shi’a 76.9%, Sunni 15.4%, Other 7.7%</td>
<td>Shi’a 57.1%, Sunni 35.7%, Other 7.1%</td>
<td>Shi’a 43.4%, Sunni 41.1%, Other 15.5%</td>
<td>Shi’a 76.7%, Sunni 23.3%, Other 0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Importance</td>
<td>Little 5%, Important 15%, Very 36%, Most 44%</td>
<td>Little 8%, Import. 15%, Very 54%, Most 23%</td>
<td>Little 0%, Import. 14%, Very 36%, Most 50%</td>
<td>Little 23%, Import. 39%, Very 24%, Most 14%</td>
<td>Little 6%, Import. 32%, Very 30%, Most 23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (Years)</td>
<td>Mean 31.5, Std. Dev 11.2</td>
<td>Mean 35.8, Std. Dev 5.2</td>
<td>Mean 35.9, Std. Dev 9.0</td>
<td>Mean 32.4, Std. Dev 9.28</td>
<td>Mean 31.5, Std. Dev 9.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number Dependent Children</td>
<td>Mean 2.8, Std. Dev 3.5</td>
<td>Mean 6.1, Std. Dev 4.2</td>
<td>Mean 4, Std. Dev 3.4</td>
<td>Mean 7.5, Std. Dev 3.5</td>
<td>Mean 3.1, Std. Dev 2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years at this location</td>
<td>Mean 24.4, Std. Dev 10.8</td>
<td>Mean 33.8, Std. Dev 5.4</td>
<td>Mean 34.9, Std. Dev 10.9</td>
<td>Mean 3.7, Std. Dev 2.2</td>
<td>Mean 10.5, Std. Dev 4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability of another Saddam-like regime</td>
<td>Never 46%, Unlikely 37%, Likely 13%, Absolute 4%</td>
<td>Never 54%, Unlikely 23%, Likely 23%, Absolute 0%</td>
<td>Never 43%, Unlikely 43%, Likely 14%, Absolute 0%</td>
<td>Never 56%, Unlikely 29%, Likely 14%, Absolute 1%</td>
<td>Never 73%, Unlikely 23%, Likely 4%, Absolute 0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division of Country Good/Bad</td>
<td>Very good 8%, Good 22%, Bad 44%, Very bad 26%</td>
<td>Very good 0%, Good 0%, Bad 61%, Very bad 39%</td>
<td>Very good 7%, Good 7%, Bad 22%, Very bad 64%</td>
<td>Very good 1%, Good 2%, Bad 40%, Very bad 57%</td>
<td>Very good 16%, Good 13%, Bad 39%, Very bad 32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return of Expatriate Iraqis</td>
<td>Help 45%, Allow 33%, Must Ask 17%, Deny 5%</td>
<td>Help 31%, Allow 69%, Must Ask 0%, Deny 0%</td>
<td>Help 100%, Allow 0%, Must Ask 0%, Deny 0%</td>
<td>Help 62%, Allow 29%, Must Ask 9%, Deny 0%</td>
<td>Help 32%, Allow 52%, Must Ask 16%, Deny 0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Collinearity.

From linear regression collinearity diagnostics, we found that all (predictor) demographic variables affected our model (all showed VIF >1.0); that is, there is a strong relation between the independent variables as predictors in the model of relationships with dependent variables. Collinearity refers to the amount of response variance present in multiple variables.

In our search for predictive ability of one independent variable to influence a dependent variable, the close connection between the independent variables makes it difficult, or impossible to predict some other outcomes.

For example, the variables of age, income, number of children, etc., relate similarly to changes in the strength of importance of religion and ethnicity. We cannot, therefore, find any special predictive characteristic to any one of the independent variables on the strength of religious or ethnic importance or of other opinion items, as in simple main effects analyses. And, while we may attempt to break apart the influence of each of these independent variables on the overall dependent variable values through factor analysis, we find that it seems more straightforward to state that, based on our current sample data, the model does not seem reliable enough to predict strength of religious or ethnic identity, or any other of the opinion items based on demographics (according to the VIF collinearity diagnostics).

I recognize that there are other procedures which can yield different interpretations, but our interest was in the descriptive value of our set of independent variables on the perceptions of threat. However, we did use factor analysis and component analysis in an attempt to build a more comprehensive framework of predictors.
from which to conduct future studies on social systems and how they may influence capacity for reintegration of expatriates into former communities.

**Inter-relationships**

Cross-tabulations, Pearson correlations, and regressions showed the relationships between respondent opinions. To explore details of apparent relationships, simple main effect analyses were performed. In a factorial design, a main effect for each independent variable is considered. The analysis of the main effects involves considering a single independent variable, ignoring affect of other independent variables. That is, the main effect of an independent variable is the effect of that single variable averaged over all responses of other variables. We are unable to state that one response to one of these independent variables always produces a certain effect, regardless of the response to a second independent variable, there is an interaction between the variables. That is, the effect of one of the variables differs depending on the level of the other variable. Because of the inseparable factors of ethnicity (Arab) and religion (Islam) for most respondents, the most important details were found through interaction analysis among the independent variables, not simple main effects of any one single independent variable. ANOVA was chosen to build an explanation of the variances.

---Religion and Ethnicity

Religion and importance of religion showed correlation with ethnicity (.568 and .424 at p<.001, respectively) and with importance of ethnicity (.138 and .215 at p<.001). Religious identification showed a strong relationship with importance of religion (.272 at p<.001). Cross-Tabs screened for significant associations between categorical variables.

Those who identified themselves as Shi'a expressed less trust in the government.

---Location Factors

*Division of the country. In Baghdad and The Netherlands, division of the country was seen as bad by fewer respondents.

*Those in Baghdad expressed more often that there could again be a regime similar to Saddam's.

*Expatriate Iraqis expressed full confidence that Iraqi people would profit from return migration, but those in southern Iraq and Baghdad were more opposed to the return of migrants.

*100% of those in urban Basra expressed that all Iraqis have a duty to defend Iraq. This was not the case in other places.

*Expatriate Iraqis were confident that “the new government of Iraq will be able to give peace and safety”, and that "all Iraqis will support the new government", more than were Iraqis living inside Iraq.

*Those in southern Iraq did not express confidence in the government.

*Those in Baghdad and Jordan did express confidence in the new government.

---External Threats

*Those who expressed that foreign countries were expected to help protect Iraq's natural resources also expressed more support for division of Iraq, but those who expected the USA to protect Iraq's natural resources did not support the division of Iraq.

*Those who expressed that Iran, Turkey or Russia were expected to support creation of an Islamic Republic also expressed greater support for division of Iraq.

*Russia was not seen as seeking to either dominate Iraqi people or to promote an Islamic Republic.

*Turkey was seen in southern Iraq and among expatriate Iraqis as almost identical to Russia in perceived threat of domination and exploitation. The small number of Kurdish respondents, none of whom lived in the north of Iraq, would limit the extent to which our findings would be representative of Kurdish people living elsewhere.
*Iran was seen to promote an Islamic Republic and to seek to dominate Iraqi people. More perception of this threat was expressed in non-Basra locations, which relates directly to ethnic and religious backgrounds of respondents.

*The USA was expected to dominate Iraqi people but also to protect Iraqi oil (against other foreigners).

*In southern Iraq, the USA was expected to dominate the Iraqi people but NOT to support an Islamic republic.
Figure 1.

**Pattern Matrix** (KMO .643, N=466)\(^{14}\)
(Principal Component Analysis, Rotated Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization, converged in 14 iterations)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Item</th>
<th>Component (B-values)</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Importance Ethnic Origin</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>2.28(^{a})</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration in this location</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>17.54 Years</td>
<td>13.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of Religion</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>2.87(^{a})</td>
<td>.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey Aggression</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>2.86(^{a})</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Aggression</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>3.27(^{a})</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran Aggression</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>2.30(^{a})</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hope in new government</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>1.92(^{a})</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for new gov't</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>2.13(^{a})</td>
<td>.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duty to defend Iraq</td>
<td>-.80</td>
<td>1.51(^{a})</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expats should return</td>
<td>-.66</td>
<td>1.87(^{a})</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Aggression</td>
<td>-.69</td>
<td>1.89(^{a})</td>
<td>.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probable Saddam-regime</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>1.67(^{a})</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{a}\) Items except for Duration in this location were on a 4-point Likert scale.

The value of a pattern matrix, like that above, is that it allows grouping of variables into groups of elements to compare with each other, and for development of future survey items that can focus on expanding understanding of how the social systems in Iraq are structured and how to use those structures for peaceful communication and social capital development. I chose a Pattern Matrix instead of a Structure Matrix because a Structure Matrix includes elements with shared variance, and my interest is in the unique variance, not shared variance. This gives it different usefulness for interpretation of unique clusters of variables in order to build a better survey instrument for future work. In this particular situation, the elements in the two matrixes are the same, but the factor loading sizes show differences.

This standardized pattern matrix with oblique rotation shows five main clusters of factors, grouping together factors that reveal common correlations to each other and to other factors. Variables, and factors, are not completely independent of each other, so the oblique rotation is preferable to orthogonal. Factor loadings <0.5 were suppressed to build a tighter set of fewer variables. 64% of the expressed variance was contained in these six components.

**Interpretation of the factor component groupings.**

The first three items, under Component 1 appear related in Religion & Origin.

The second component may be considered as general perception of threat from non-USA foreign states.

The third construct relates hope for benefit from the “new” government.

The fourth component deals with nationalism, with both a duty to defend Iraq, and opposition towards those who left (abandoned?) Iraq in the past.

The fifth item combined a negative view towards the USA (seen as having intentions of domination and exploitation) and little probability of a future regime like that of Saddam’s. (This is similar to findings of the Gallup Organization, 2003 and 2004, that while Iraqis were glad that Saddam was finished, they were not
pleased that the USA retained power and control over internal Iraqi affairs. See *The Gallup Poll of Iraq* by Richard Burkholder.

**Total Variance Explained** (Figure 2, below) describes how the deviation from the mean responses can be explained in terms of each of the components defined in the Pattern Matrix (Figure 1, above). Thus, 21.6% of the total variance (deviation from the mean) of relations between items can be explained by Component 1, 12.9% of the total variance can be explained by Component 2, etc. Not reported here are component percentages (constructs) that are less than 5.0% of the total variance.

![Figure 2](image_url)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings</th>
<th>% of SS Variance</th>
<th>Cumulative SS %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance.
Further analysis and data collection:
1. Future surveys need to look for concepts connected in any way to foreign domination and exploitation, especially with respect to the USA as a "high-exploiter" and Russia (non-western, non-neighbor?) as a "low exploiter." If we can confirm the reputation of Russia as a strong "non-exploiter", then we may suggest that Russian personnel be used for peace-making and for in-depth social impact projects in place of western fieldworkers. There are correlations between years of residence and age and factors of exploitation/domination. Perhaps we could emphasize certain age and residential-length people as agents of peace, change, and moderation for Russians to build relationships with. This needs exploration through analyses of social capital and social networks to define underlying causes and possible benefits.

2. We need comparisons with samples of known community leaders (merchant/middle class) and with opponents of the current government. Support of the government and profit from the return of expatriate Iraqis were related in our component matrix. This indicates that opinions concerning economic stability and return migration are linked. This is where a study of economic factors may introduce new understanding of the responses to social stability questions.

3. We need to collect detailed information on education and vocational background and test it for relationship to outgroup stereotyping and perceptions of threat. Responses to "Years of Education" in this survey were not standard. Some respondents answered with years of school, while some answered with how old they were when they stopped attending school. This needs clarification in training by data collectors so that answers will be standard.

4. We need information on social networks to assess degrees of separation between families, clans, tribes, and communities, especially among the merchant class. We need to map the social networks to include estimations of hub person/resource node connectedness in the merchant/middle class.

   The merchant class has been singled out for attention as it may be a social group with the most to lose by radical change in the marketplace and governance systems of Iraq, especially in the Sunni and Christian communities. Since we did not find strong evidence of anti-foreign and anti-change opinion among those Iraqis expressing either strong religious attachment or poverty, we have adequate justification to focus future research on those social participants with less attachment to religious identity.

   I estimate that the merchant class suffered severe economic loss during the post-war riots in 2003. The merchants lost buildings to squatters, property to thieves and vandals, and then they lost income because of the massive distributions of aid that bypassed the marketplace system to distribute food, clothing, and shelter.

   Some tribes demonstrated more solidarity in opposition to the previous ruling regimes than did others. What is the traditional relation of tribes towards central power systems?

5. With some four million expatriate Iraqis and many thousands considering returning to Iraq, we need to consider their needs in the repatriation and reintegration process. Social network analysis can help define the boundaries and strategies for successful building new lives in the old communities. Theoretical fields may need to include social capital, social networks, social conformity, and nationalism, with a research ethos of "appreciative inquiry".

6. Researching issues of social systems is the logical next step. For example, why is there unresolved unrest in Falluja and among the tribes of Jumailia, Albu Issa, Shumar, and Azzawi? And what do we do about the "spoilers?" Leonard Wantchekon states "Spoilers are factions that believe that the emerging peace threatens their power, world view, and interests, and who use violence to achieve it."

   Adler and Kwon propose that a guiding principle in social capital research is that "actors' resources are a function of their location in the social
The "spoilers" of the new, more civil society must have resources. Those resources are found in their social networks and are related to the social connections that both facilitate and limit the behavior of the spoilers. Since the spoilers are not defined by national, ethnic, or religious identity alone, they must then find identity in other groups. Because the few captured "spoilers" seem to have no common megagroup identity, and they come from small, unknown groups, then the "bridging connectors" between those groups are a serious problem. These bridgers have power because of their role in linking groups together, and their role in many "weak links" and fewer "strong links" puts them into the category of Marwan Al-Shehhi and Mohamed Atta, the strongest nodes of the September 11, 2001, attacks.

What does that mean for academics? It means that social systems, social networks, and the movement of social capital must be in the forefront of social stabilization project research. Future work should include aspects of both behavior from underlying norms and values and a structural support for collective identity and function. Social capacity building is important, and it does require time and scholarly pursuit.

7. The work done must not be left in isolation. Findings must be discussed and debated with those better acquainted with social systems research and especially with social systems in Iraq. This wiki could serve better in this role if I invested time in developing this characteristic and/or one of the other more traditional forum approaches could be nurtured.

8. Some of the significant interaction effects are not easily explained, and there is a level of skewedness in responses to many items that cannot be explained. This appears as a Pareto or fat-tail or power-curve, but these terms in this context are descriptive, not explanatory.

   I have a new survey proposed to expand questions of identity and group membership in traditional social network analysis protocol.

9. There is need for intensive research among expatriate Iraqis to address some of the particular concerns of repatriating Iraqis. A new survey has been developed, but there is need also to include levels and intensity of integration of expatriates into other cultures, as the amount of personal change will affect the ability to reintegrate into their (or their parents') home communities in Iraq.

10. Since social networks relate to ongoing instability in Iraq, there must be analysis of how information, norms, and values are communicated among Iraqis, and how some specific locations may have acquired approaches to governance and conflict resolution that do work.

   The new survey form includes elements of social capital and social networking that may open new sets of questions for conflict resolution approaches. Adler mentions that social ties of one kind have influence in other social contexts, and therefore, "appropriability" is a concept foundational to our own view of civil society in Iraq. This includes theory-based investigation on acculturation and integration of expatriate Iraqis in foreign cultures and how that might affect their reintegration into home communities. It may be that a probability factor for successful integration into other cultures will relate to the probability of successful reintegration into home communities.

11. During the course of this project, there has been little, very little, involvement by Iraqi scientists or philosophers. I initiated contacts with Iraqi scientists, academics, journalists, and web forums, yet with very little response to my request to learn of other social science work in and among Iraqis. Even personal visits with Iraqis yielded no contributions or opportunities for collaboration. This is a deficiency that needs to be rectified if localized, longitudinal research is to be accomplished. There has been recent contact with the Iraqi Center for Research and Strategic Studies (http://bridgesconsortium.org). This is welcome.
For changes in the structural systems of Iraq's social networks, local ownership and leadership must emerge. I want to serve that process if possible, within a framework of "Appreciative Inquiry". There are many agencies with intentions of social engineering in Iraq. To separate the honorable from the others, there must be a discriminate consideration of norms and values which promote healthy intergroup relations.

Conclusions

The findings from our study of perceptions of outgroups in Iraq include the following outcomes with respect to the hypotheses.

a. Ethnic and religious identities will relate strongly and consistently, across locations, to outgroup perception. --Ethnic and religious identities did not relate directly to outgroup perception. We reject hypothesis a.
b. Differences between Iraq and non-Iraq locations will reveal perceptions of repatriation and reintegration --Different survey locations did reveal differing perceptions towards the repatriation of foreign-living Iraqis, and towards other outgroup elements. We accept hypothesis b.
c. There will be differences in perceptions by Iraqis of threat or domination by the principle foreign states with interests in Iraq --There were differences in perceptions of threat or domination by foreign states, with homogeneity of variance found in many specific items. We accept hypothesis c.
d. The presence of Saddam Hussein (out of the presidency, but assumed to still be in Iraq) will give diverse opinions about the return of a Saddam-like government.
--There was considerable difference in opinion about the return of a Saddam-like government. We accept hypothesis d.

Our data relates well to domains of civil society, social identity & conformity, social networks, and intergroup relations. We established that rapid data collection in an immediate post-war environment could provide a useful foundation for deeper analyses of social systems and schisms between ethnic and religious groups.

We tested survey elements for useful content and format, data collection approaches, and combinations of survey instruments for use in Iraq and among Iraqi expatriates.

We used a web wiki for viewers to read, add comments, and add links to other sites; we put the theory, background information, and results on the wiki, giving us connections to the international academic and field decision-maker communities and yielded new co-thinkers and publications.
End Notes

1. I, Jon, wish to thank Hub Linssen, Lead Statistician and Research Methods Consultant in the Faculty of Social Sciences at University of Utrecht for his patient remedial tutoring in quantitative research, without which this project would never have come about. Success in this work is due to Hub (and to his Alena), but faults are due only to myself.


8. ibid, p. 113.


12. In Basra, we tested a repeated measures effect in combination with the priming effect. There were three versions of the survey form (ethnic primed, religious primed, and neutral). We administered the three versions of the survey to the same respondents, at one sitting, to assess if they would respond to the priming, if they would differ in their responses to the primed versus neutral versions of the surveys. In other locations, each respondent completed only one survey form, with one of the three versions only.


14. The KMO (0.622) and Bartlett’s (.000) tests were highly significant, allowing us to assume that a factor analysis is appropriate for this dataset. Kaiser's normalization was used because all communalities are >0.6 and our sample size was >250.


17 ibid, p.20.

18 ibid, p. 37.
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