Cogprints

Conceptual Role Semantics, the Theory Theory, and Conceptual Change

Brigandt, Ingo (2004) Conceptual Role Semantics, the Theory Theory, and Conceptual Change. [Conference Paper] (Unpublished)

Full text available as:

[img]
Preview
PDF
157Kb

Abstract

The purpose of the paper is twofold. I first outline a philosophical theory of concepts based on conceptual role semantics. This approach is explicitly intended as a framework for the study and explanation of conceptual change in science. Then I point to the close similarities between this philosophical framework and the theory theory of concepts, suggesting that a convergence between psychological and philosophical approaches to concepts is possible. An underlying theme is to stress that using a non-atomist account of concepts is crucial for the successful study of conceptual development and change—both for the explanation of individual cognitive development and for the study of conceptual change in science.

Item Type:Conference Paper
Keywords:conceptual change, conceptual role semantics, theory theory of concepts
Subjects:Philosophy > Philosophy of Language
Psychology > Cognitive Psychology
Philosophy > Philosophy of Science
ID Code:3576
Deposited By:Brigandt, Ingo
Deposited On:28 Apr 2004
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:55

References in Article

Select the SEEK icon to attempt to find the referenced article. If it does not appear to be in cogprints you will be forwarded to the paracite service. Poorly formated references will probably not work.

Andersen, H. (2001). Reference and resemblance. Philosophy of Science 68 (Proceedings), S50–S61.

Becker, K. (1998). On the perfectly general nature of instability in meaning holism. Journal of Philosophy 95, 635–640.

Bilgrami, A. (1992). Belief and Meaning: The Unity and Locality of Mental Content. Oxford: Blackwell.

Block, N. (1986). Advertisement for a semantics for psychology. In P. A. French, T. E. Uehling, Jr., and H. K. Wettstein (Eds.), Studies in the Philosophy of Mind, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 10, pp. 615–678. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Boghossian, P. A. (1993). Does an inferential role semantics rest upon a mistake? Mind and Language 8, 27–40.

Brandom, R. B. (1994). Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Brigandt, I. (2003). Homology in comparative, molecular, and evolutionary developmental biology: The radiation of a concept. Journal of Experimental Zoology (Part B: Molecular and Developmental Evolution) 299B, 9–17.

Brigandt, I. (n.d.a). A critique of Kitcher’s theory of conceptual progress and his account of the change of the gene concept. Manuscript, www.pitt.edu/~inb1/genes.pdf.

Brigandt, I. (n.d.b). The role a concept plays in science: The case of homology. Manuscript, www.pitt.edu/~inb1/role.pdf.

Carey, S. (1985). Conceptual Change in Childhood. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Carey, S. (1988). Conceptual differences between children and adults. Mind and Language 3, 167–181.

Devitt, M. (1979). Against incommensurability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57, 29–50.

Downes, S. M. (1999a). Can scientific development and children’s cognitive development be the same process? Philosophy of Science 66, 565–578.

Downes, S. M. (1999b). Ontogeny, phylogeny, and scientific development. In V. G. Hardcastle (Ed.), Where Biology Meets Psychology: Philosophical Essays, pp. 273–285. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Evans, J. S. B. T. (1989). Bias in Human Reasoning: Causes and Consequences. Brighton: Erlbaum.

Field, H. (1977). Logic, meaning, and conceptual role. Journal of Philosophy 69, 379–408.

Fodor, J. A. (1998). Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fodor, J. A. (2000). Replies to critics. Mind and Language 15, 350–374.

Fodor, J. A. (2001). Language, thought and compositionality. Mind and Language 16, 1–15.

Fodor, J. A. and E. LePore (1992). Holism: A Shoppers’ Guide. Oxford: Blackwell.

Gelman, S. A. and H. M. Wellman (1991). Insides and essences: Early understandings of the non-obvious. Cognition 38, 213–244.

Goldstone, R. L. and B. J. Rogosky (2002). Using relations within conceptual systems to translate across conceptual systems. Cognition 84, 295–320.

Gopnik, A. (1988). Conceptual and semantic development as theory change: The case of object permanence. Mind and Language 3, 197–216.

Gopnik, A. and A. N. Meltzoff (1997). Words, Thoughts, and Theories. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Gopnik, A., A. N. Meltzoff, and P. K. Kuhl (1999). The Scientist in the Crib: Minds, Brains, and How Children Learn. New York: William Morrow.

Hacking, I. (1983). Representing and Intervening. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Harman, G. (1973). Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Hirschfeld, L. A. (1996). Race in the Making: Cognition, Culture, and the Child’s Construction of Human Kinds. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Horwich, P. (1998). Meaning. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Jackman, H. (1999). Moderate holism and the instability thesis. American Philosophical Quarterly 36, 361–369.

Jackson, F. and P. Pettit (1995). Moral foundationalism and moral motivation. Philosophical Quarterly 45, 20–40.

Johnson, C. and F. C. Keil (2000). Explanatory understanding and conceptual combination. In F. C. Keil and R. A. Wilson (Eds.), Explanation and Cognition, pp. 328–359. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1983). Mental Models. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Karmillof-Smith, A. (1988). The child is a theoretician, not an inductivist. Mind and Language 3, 185–195.

Keil, F. C. (1989a). Concepts, Kinds, and Cognitive Development. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Keil, F. C. (1989b). Spiders in the web of belief: The tangles relations between concepts and theories. Mind and Language 4, 43–50.

Keil, F. C. and R. A. Wilson (2000). The concept concept: The wayward path of cognitive science. Mind and Language 15, 308–318.

Khalidi, M. A. (1995). Two concepts of concept. Mind and Language 10, 402–422.

Kitcher, P. (1978). Theories, theorists, and theoretical change. The Philosophical Review 87, 519–547.

Kitcher, P. (1982). Genes. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 33, 337–359.

Kitcher, P. (1988). The child as parent of the scientist. Mind and Language 3, 217–228.

Kitcher, P. (1993). The Advancement of Science: Science without Legend, Objectivity without Illusions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Leplin, J. (1979). Reference and scientific realism. Sudies in History and Philosophy of Science 10, 265–284.

Levin, M. (1979). On theory-change and meaning-change. Philosophy of Science 46, 407–424.

Loar, B. (1981). Mind and Meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lycan, W. G. (1988). Judgement and Justification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McGinn, C. (1982). The structure of content. In A. Woodfield (Ed.), Thought and Object: Essays on Intentionality, pp. 207–258. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

McLauglin, B. P. (1993). On punctuate content and on conceptual role. Philsophy and Phenomenological Research 53, 653–666.

Miller, G. A. and P. N. Johnson-Laird (1976). Language and Perception. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Murphy, G. L. (2002). The Big Book of Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Murphy, G. L. and D. Medin (1985). The role of theories in conceptual coherence. Psychological Review 92, 289–316.

Newton-Smith, W. H. (1981). The Rationality of Science. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Pagin, P. (1997). Is compositionality compatible with holism? Mind and Language 12, 11–33.

Peacocke, C. (1992). A Study of Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Putnam, H. (1973). Explanation and reference. In G. Pearce and P. Maynard (Eds.), Conceptual Change, pp. 199–221. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Robbins, P. (2002). How to blunt the sword of compositionality. Nous 36, 313–334.

Sankey, H. (1994). The Incommensurability Thesis. Brookfield: Avebury.

Sankey, H. (1997). Incommensurability: The current state of play. Theoria 12, 425–445.

Schiffer, S. (1981). Truth and the theory of content. In H. Parret and J. Bouveresse (Eds.), Meaning and Understanding, pp. 204–222. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Segal, G. (2000). A Slim Book About Narrow Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Senor, T. D. (1992). Two-factor theories, meaning holism, and intentionality: A reply to Fodor. Philosophical Psychology 5, 133–151.

Sinatra, G. M. and P. R. Pintrich (Eds.) (2003). Intentional Conceptual Change. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Wedgwood, R. (2001). Conceptual role semantics for moral terms. Philosophical Review 110, 1–30.

Woods, W. A. (1981). Procedural semantics as theory of meaning. In A. K. Joshi, B. L. Webber, and I. A. Sag (Eds.), Elements of Discourse Understanding, pp. 300–334. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Metadata

Repository Staff Only: item control page