On the relation between phenomenal and representational properties

Abstract

This is a commentary on Block' article article, "On a Confusion About a Concept of Consciousness," BBS (1995) 18:2. We argue that BlockÕs charge of fallacy remains ungrounded unless the existence of P-consciousness, as Block construes it, is independently established. How-ever, this depends on establishing the existence of "phenomenal properties" that, according to Block, are essentially not representational, cognitive, or functional. We argue that Block fails to make a case for the existence of P-consciousness so long as he fails to make a case for the existence of phenomenal properties so construed. We conclude by suggesting that phenomenal consciousness can be accounted for in terms of a hybrid set of representational and functional properties.

Commentary/Response Threads

• Block, Ned On A Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. (deposited 08 Dec 1997)
  • Guzeldere, Guven and Aydede, Murat On the relation between phenomenal and representational properties. (deposited 15 Jul 1998) [Currently Displayed]
  • Atkinson, Anthony P. and Davies, Martin Consciousness without conflation. (deposited 24 Jun 1998)