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On the relation between phenomenal and representational properties

Guzeldere, Guven and Aydede, Murat (1997) On the relation between phenomenal and representational properties. [Journal (Paginated)]

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Abstract

This is a commentary on Block' article article, "On a Confusion About a Concept of Consciousness," BBS (1995) 18:2. We argue that BlockÕs charge of fallacy remains ungrounded unless the existence of P-consciousness, as Block construes it, is independently established. How-ever, this depends on establishing the existence of "phenomenal properties" that, according to Block, are essentially not representational, cognitive, or functional. We argue that Block fails to make a case for the existence of P-consciousness so long as he fails to make a case for the existence of phenomenal properties so construed. We conclude by suggesting that phenomenal consciousness can be accounted for in terms of a hybrid set of representational and functional properties.

Commentary on:Block, Ned (1996) On A Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. [Preprint]
Item Type:Journal (Paginated)
Subjects:Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
ID Code:354
Deposited By:Aydede, Asoc Prof Murat
Deposited On:15 Jul 1998
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:53

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