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Syntax, content and functionalism: What is wrong with the syntactic theory of mind

Aydede, Murat (1996) Syntax, content and functionalism: What is wrong with the syntactic theory of mind. [Preprint] (Unpublished)

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Abstract

I argue that Stich's Syntactic Theory of Mind (STM) and a naturalistic narrow content functionalism run on a Language of Though story have the same exact structure. I elaborate on the argument that narrow content functionalism is either irremediably holistic in a rather destructive sense, or else doesn't have the resources for individuating contents interpersonally. So I show that, contrary to his own advertisement, Stich's STM has exactly the same problems (like holism, vagueness, observer-relativity, etc.) that he claims plague content-based psychologies. So STM can't be any better than the Representational Theory of Mind (RTM) in its prospects for forming the foundations of a scientifically respectable psychology, whether or not RTM has the problems that Stich claims it does.

Item Type:Preprint
Keywords:Thinking, naturalism, functionalism, syntax, individutation of Mentalese symbols.
Subjects:Psychology > Cognitive Psychology
Computer Science > Artificial Intelligence
Philosophy > Philosophy of Language
Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
ID Code:352
Deposited By:Aydede, Asoc Prof Murat
Deposited On:14 Jul 1998
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:53

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