Cogprints
Login | Create Account

Attributions as Behavior Explanations: Toward a New Theory

Malle, Bertram (2003) Attributions as Behavior Explanations: Toward a New Theory. [Preprint]

Full text available as:

[img]
Preview
PDF
442Kb

Abstract

Attribution theory has played a major role in social-psychological research. Unfortunately, the term attribution is ambiguous. According to one meaning, forming an attribution is making a dispositional (trait) inference from behavior; according to another meaning, forming an attribution is giving an explanation (especially of behavior). The focus of this paper is on the latter phenomenon of behavior explanations. In particular, I discuss a new theory of explanation that provides an alternative to classic attribution theory as it dominates the textbooks and handbooks—which is typically as a version of Kelley’s (1967) model of attribution as covariation detection. I begin with a brief critique of this theory and, out of this critique, develop a list of requirements that an improved theory has to meet. I then introduce the new theory, report empirical data in its support, and apply it to a number of psychological phenomena. I finally conclude with an assessment of how much progress we have made in understanding behavior explanations and what has yet to be learned.

Item Type:Preprint
Keywords:explanations, causality, intentionality, social cognition, theory of mind, folk psychology
Subjects:Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
Psychology > Social Psychology
ID Code:3314
Deposited By:Malle, Bertram F.
Deposited On:13 Dec 2003
Last Modified:12 Sep 2007 17:49

References in Article

Select the SEEK icon to attempt to find the referenced article. If it does not appear to be in cogprints you will be forwarded to the paracite service. Poorly formated references will probably not work.

Abelson, R. P., & Lalljee, M. (1988). Knowledge structures and causal explanations. In D. J. Hilton (Ed.), Contemporary science and natural explanation: Commonsense conceptions of causality (pp. 175-203). Brighton: Harvester.

Abramson, L. Y., Seligman, M. E. P., & Teasdale, J. D. (1978). Learned helplessness in humans: Critique and reformulation. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 87, 49-74.

Ahn, W., Kalish, C. W., Medin, D. L., & Gelman, S. A. (1995). The role of covariation versus mechanism information in causal attribution. Cognition, 54, 299-352.

Ahn, W., & Kalish, C. W. (2000). The role of mechanism beliefs in causal reasoning. In F. Keil & R. A. Wilson (Eds.), Explanation and cognition (pp. 199-226). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Ames, D. R. (2003). Mental state inference in person perception: Everyday solutions to the problem of other minds. Manuscript under review.

Anderson, C. A., Krull, D. S., & Weiner, B. (1996). Explanations: Processes and consequences. In E. T. Higgins, & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles (pp. 271-296). New York: Guilford Press.

Bartsch, K., & Wellman, H. M. (1995). Children talk about the mind. New York: Oxford University Press.

Brewer, W. F. (1994). Autobiographical memory and survey research. In N. Schwarz & S. Sudman (Ed.), Autobiographical memory and the validity of retrospective reports (pp. 11-20). New York: Springer.

Buss, A. R. (1978). Causes and reasons in attribution theory: A conceptual critique. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36, 1311-1321.

Cheng, P. W., & Novick, L. R. (1992). Covariation in natural causal induction. Psychological Review, 99, 365-382.

Cheng, P. W. (2000). Causality in the mind: Estimating contextual and conjunctive power. In F. C. Keil and R. A. Wilson (Eds.), Explanation and cognition (pp. 227-253). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Cowan, N. (1995). Attention and memory: An integrated framework. New York: Oxford University Press.

Davidson, D. (1963). Actions, reasons, and causes. Journal of Philosophy, 60, 685-700.

Donellan, K. S. (1967). Reasons and causes. In B. Edwards (Ed.), Encyclopedia of philosophy (Vol. 7, pp. 85-88). New York: Macmillan.

F.Ex (2002). Coding scheme for people’s folk explanations of behavior (Version 4.1). Retrieved April 20, 2003 from darkwing.uoregon.edu/~bfmalle/fex.html

Fletcher, G. J. O. (1983). The analysis of verbal explanations for marital separation: Implications for attribution theory. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 13, 245-258.

Försterling, F. (1989). Models of covariation and attribution: How do they relate to the analogy of analysis of variance? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 615-625.

Försterling, F. (1992). The Kelley model as an analysis of variance analogy: How far can it be taken? Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 28, 475-490.

Goldman, A. I. (1989). Interpretation psychologized. Mind and Language, 4, 161-185.

Goldman, A. I. (2001). Desire, intention, and the simulation theory. In B. F. Malle, L. J. Moses, & D. A. Baldwin (Eds.), Intentions and intentionality: Foundations of social cognition (pp. 207-225). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Gopnik, A., & Meltzoff, A. N. (1997). Words, thoughts, and theories. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Gordon, R. M. (1986). Folk psychology as simulation. Mind and Language, 1, 158-171.

Gordon, R. M. (1992). The simulation theory: Objections and misconceptions. Mind and Language, 7, 11-34.

Gordon, R. M. (2001). Simulation and reason explanation: The radical view. Philosophical Topics, 29, 175-192.

Hamilton, D. L. (1998). Dispositional and attributional inferences in person perception. In J. M. Darley & J. Cooper (Eds.), Attribution and social interaction: The legacy of Edward E. Jones (pp. 99-114). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Harris, P. (1992). From simulation to folk psychology: The case for development. Mind and Language, 7, 120-144.

Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley.

Hewstone, M., & Jaspars, J. (1987). Covariation and causal attribution: A logical model of the intuitive analysis of variance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 663-672.

Hilton, D. J., Smith, R. H., & Kin, S. H. (1995). Processes of causal explanation and dispositional attribution. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68, 377-387.

Hilton, D. J., & Slugoski, B. R. (1986). Knowledge-based causal attribution: The abnormal conditions focus model. Psychological Review, 93, 75-88.

Hilton, D. J. (1990). Conversational processes and causal explanation. Psychological Bulletin, 107, 65-81.

Hirschberg, N. (1978). A correct treatment of traits. In H. London (Ed.), Personality: A new look at metatheories (pp. 45-68). New York: Wiley.

Ickes, W. (1976). A conversation with Fritz Heider. In J. H. Harvey, W. Ickes, & R. F. Kidd (Eds.), New directions in attribution research (Vol. 1, pp. 3-18). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Jones, E. E., & Davis, K. E. (1965). From acts to dispositions: The attribution process in person perception. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 2, pp. 219-266). New York: Academic Press.

Jones, E. E., & Nisbett, R. E. (1972). The actor and the observer: Divergent perceptions of the causes of behavior. In E. E. Jones, D. Kanouse, H. H. Kelley, R. E. Nisbett, S. Valins, & B. Weiner (Eds.), Attribution: Perceiving the causes of behavior (pp. 79-94). Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press.

Jones, E. E., Kanouse, D., Kelley, H. H., Nisbett, R. E., Valins, S., & Weiner, B. (Eds.). (1972). Attribution: Perceiving the causes of behavior. Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press.

Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986). Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives. Psychological Review, 93, 136-153.

Kelley, H. H. (1967). Attribution theory in social psychology. In D. Levine (Ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation (Vol. 15, pp. 129-238). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Kidd, R. F., & Amabile, T. M. (1981). Causal explanations in social interaction: Some dialogues on dialogue. In J. H. Harvey, W. J. Ickes, & R. F. Kidd (Eds.), New directions in attribution research (Vol. 3, pp. 307-328). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Knobe, J., & Malle, B. F. (2002). Self and other in the explanation of behavior: 30 years later. Special issue on self-other asymmetries: Psychologica Belgica, 42, 113-130.

Krueger, J., & Clement, R. W. (1997). Estimates of social consensus by majorities and minorities: The case for social projection. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 1, 299-313.

Kruglanski, A. W. (1979). Causal explanation, teleological explanation: On radical particularism in attribution theory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 1447-1457.

Lalljee, M., & Abelson, R. P. (1983). The organization of explanations. In M. Hewstone (Eds.), Attribution theory : Social and functional extensions (pp. 65-80). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Lalljee, M., Lamb, R., Furnham, A. F., & Jaspars, J. (1984). Explanations and information search: Inductive and hypothesis-testing approaches to arriving at an explanation. British Journal of Social Psychology, 23, 201-212.

Lewin, K. (1936). Principles of topological psychology. (F. Heider & G. M. Heider, Trans.). New York: McGraw-Hill.

Lewis, P. T. (1995). A naturalistic test of two fundamental propositions: Correspondence bias and the actor-observer hypothesis. Journal of Personality, 63, 87-111.

Locke, D., & Pennington, D. (1982). Reasons and other causes: Their role in attribution processes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42, 212-223.

MacCionnaith, K. (2003). Accounting for actor-observer asymmetries in explanation: The role of impression management. Unpublished Senior Honors’ Thesis, University of Oregon.

Malle, B. F. (1994). Intentionality and explanation: A study in the folk theory of behavior. Doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.

Malle, B. F. (1999). How people explain behavior: A new theoretical framework. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3, 23-48.

Malle, B. F. (2001). Folk explanations of intentional action. In B. F. Malle, L. J. Moses, & D. A. Baldwin (Eds.), Intentions and intentionality: Foundations of social cognition (pp. 265-286). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Malle, B. F. (2004). How the mind explains behavior: Folk explanations, meaning, and social interaction. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Malle, B. F., & Ickes, W. (2000). Fritz Heider: Philosopher and psychologist. In G. A. Kimble & M. Wertheimer (Eds.), Portraits of Pioneers in Psychology (Vol. 4, pp. 193-214). Washington, DC and Mahwah, NJ: American Psychological Association and Erlbaum.

Malle, B. F., & Knobe, J. (1997). The folk concept of intentionality. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 33, 101-121.

Malle, B. F., & Knobe, J. (2001). The distinction between desire and intention: A folk-conceptual analysis. In B. F. Malle, L. J. Moses, & D. A. Baldwin (Eds.), Intentions and intentionality: Foundations of social cognition (pp. 45-67). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Malle, B. F., & Pearce, G. E. (2001). Attention to behavioral events during social interaction: Two actor-observer gaps and three attempts to close them. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 278-294.

Malle, B. F., Knobe, J., & Nelson, S. (2003). Actor-observer asymmetries in folk explanations of behavior: New answers to an old question. Manuscript under revision.

Malle, B. F., Knobe, J., O’Laughlin, M., Pearce, G. E., & Nelson, S. E. (2000). Conceptual structure and social functions of behavior explanations: Beyond person–situation attributions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 309-326.

McArthur, L. Z. (1972). The how and what of why: Some determinants and consequences of causal attribution. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 22, 171-193.

McClure, J., & Hilton, D. (1997). For you can’t always get what you want: When preconditions are better explanations than goals. British Journal of Social Psychology, 36, 223-240.

McClure, J., & Hilton, D. (1998). Are goals or preconditions better explanations? It depends on the question. European Journal of Social Psychology, 28, 897-911.

McClure, J., & Hilton, D. (1997). For you can’t always get what you want: When preconditions are better explanations than goals. British Journal of Social Psychology, 36, 223-240.

McClure, J., & Hilton, D. (1998). Are goals or preconditions better explanations? It depends on the question. European Journal of Social Psychology, 28, 897-911.

McGill, A. L. (1989). Context effects in judgments of causation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 189-200.

Mele, A. R. (1992). Springs of action: Understanding intentional behavior. New York: Oxford University Press.

Mischel, T. (1969). Human action: Conceptual and empirical issues. New York: Academic Press.

Nelson, S., & Malle, B. F. (2003). Self-serving biases in explanations of behavior. Manuscript in preparation.

Nelson, S. E. (2003). Setting the story straight: A study of discrepant accounts of conflict and their convergence. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of Oregon

Nisbett, R. E., Caputo, C., Legant, P., & Marecek, J. (1973). Behavior as seen by the actor and as seen by the observer. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 27, 154-164.

O’Laughlin, M. J., &. Malle, B. F. (2002). How people explain actions performed by groups and individuals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 33-48.

Passer, M. W., Kelley, H. H., & Michela, J. L. (1978). Multidimensional scaling of the causes for negative interpersonal behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36, 951-962.

Perner, J. (1991). Understanding the representational mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Quattrone, G. A. (1985). On the congruity between internal states and action. Psychological Bulletin, 98, 3-40.

Read, S. J. (1987). Constructing causal scenarios: A knowledge structure approach to causal reasoning. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 52, 288-302.

Russell, E. W., & d’Hollosy, M. E. (1992). Memory and attention. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 48, 530-538.

Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (1983). Mood, misattribution, and judgments of well-being: Informative and directive functions of affective states. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45, 513-523.

Searle, J. R. (1983). Intentionality: An essay in the philosophy of mind. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Slugoski, B. R., Lalljee, M., Lamb, R., & Ginsburg, G. P. (1993). Attribution in conversational context: Effect of mutual knowledge on explanation-giving. European Journal of Social Psychology, 23, 219-238.

Storms, M. D. (1973). Videotape and the attribution process: Reversing actors’ and observers’ points of view. Journal of Personality Social Psychology, 27, 165-175.

Tedeschi, J. T., & Reiss, M. (1981). Verbal strategies as impression management. In C. Antaki (Ed.), The psychology of ordinary social behaviour (pp. 271-309). London: Academic Press.

Turnbull, W., & Slugoski, B. (1988). Conversational and linguistic processes in causal attribution. In D. J. Hilton (Ed.), Contemporary science and natural explanation (pp. 66-93). Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press.

Van Boven, L., & Loewenstein, G. (2003). Social projection of transient drive states. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 1159-1168.

Van Kleeck, M. H., Hillger, L. A., & Brown, R. (1988). Pitting verbal schemas against information variables in attribution. Social Cognition, 6, 89-106.

Weiner, B. (1995). Judgments of responsibility: A foundation for a theory of social conduct. New York: Guilford.

Wellman, H. M., Hickling, A. K, & Schult, C. A. (1997). Young children’s psychological, physical, and biological explanations. In H. W. Wellman, & K. Inagaki (Eds.), The emergence of core domains of thought: Children’s reasoning about physical, psychological, and biological phenomena (pp. 7-25). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Wellman, H. M. (1990). The child’s theory of mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

White, P. A. (1991). Ambiguity in the internal/external distinction in causal attribution. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 27, 259-270.

Metadata

Repository Staff Only: item control page

Cogprints is powered by EPrints 3 which is developed by the School of Electronics and Computer Science at the University of Southampton. More information and software credits.