Cogprints

Confirmation and the Computational Paradigm (or: Why Do You Think They Call It Artifical Intelligence?)

Buller, David J. (1993) Confirmation and the Computational Paradigm (or: Why Do You Think They Call It Artifical Intelligence?). [Journal (Paginated)]

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Abstract

The idea that human cognitive capacities are explainable by computational modles is often conjoined with the idea that, while the states postulated by such models are in fact realized by brain states, there are no type- type correlations between the states postulated by computational models and brain states (a corollary of token physicalism). I argue that these ideas are not jointly tenable. I discuss the kinds of empirical evidence available to cognitive scientists for (dis)confirming computational models of cognition and argue that none of these kinds of evidence can be relevant to a choice among competing models unless there are in fact type-type correlations between the states postulated by computational models and brain states. Thus, I conclude, research into the computational procedures employed in human cognition must be conducted hand-in-hand with research into the brain processes which realize those procedures.

Item Type:Journal (Paginated)
Keywords:confirmation, computational models, weak/strong equivalence, token/type physicalism, relevant evidence, relative complexity evidence, processing time measures, verbal reports
Subjects:Psychology > Cognitive Psychology
Computer Science > Artificial Intelligence
Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy > Philosophy of Science
ID Code:327
Deposited By:Buller, David J.
Deposited On:18 Jun 1998
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:53

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