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“If Josef kills Leon, is Leon dead?”

Horsey, Richard (2001) “If Josef kills Leon, is Leon dead?”. [Conference Paper] (Unpublished)

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Abstract

Fodor (1975) proposed that word meanings were atomic, and that meaning relations between words could be captured by inference rules, or 'meaning postulates', linking atomic concepts. In his recent work, however, Fodor has rejected meaning postulates as a way of capturing meaning relations, because he sees no principled way of distinguishing meaning postulates from empirical knowledge. In this paper, I argue that Fodor is wrong to reject meaning postulates.

Item Type:Conference Paper
Keywords:meaning postulates
Subjects:Linguistics > Semantics
Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy > Logic
Linguistics > Pragmatics
ID Code:3258
Deposited By:Horsey, Richard
Deposited On:29 Oct 2003
Last Modified:12 Sep 2007 17:49

References in Article

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Chomsky, N. 1988. Language and Problems of Knowledge. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Fodor, J. A. 1975. The Language of Thought. New York: Crowell.

Fodor, J. A. 1994. The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and its Semantics. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Fodor, J. A. 1998. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fodor, J. D., Fodor, J. A. & Garrett, M. F. (1975). The psychological unreality of semantic representations. Linguistic Inquiry, 4: 515–531.

Sperber, D. & D. Wilson 1995. Relevance, 2nd edition. Oxford: Blackwell.

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