Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness

Abstract

To make progress on the problem of consciousness, we have to confront it directly. In this paper, I first isolate the truly hard part of the problem, separating it from more tractable parts and giving an account of why it is so difficult to explain. I critique some recent work that uses reductive methods to address consciousness, and argue that such methods inevitably fail to come to grips with the hardest part of the problem. Once this failure is recognized, the door to further progress is opened. In the second half of the paper, I argue that if we move to a new kind of nonreductive explanation, a naturalistic account of consciousness can be given. I put forward my own candidate for such an account: a nonreductive theory based on principles of structural coherence and organizational invariance, and a double-aspect theory of information.

Commentary/Response Threads

• Chalmers, David J. Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness. (deposited 15 Jun 1998) [Currently Displayed]
  • Velmans, Max Is my unconscious somebody else's consciousness?: A review of D.Chalmers (1996) The Conscious Mind: in search of a fundamental theory, Oxford University Press. (deposited 05 Jul 1999)
  • Harnad, Stevan The Hardships of Cognitive Science. (deposited 19 Jun 2001)
  • Georgiev, Danko Chalmers' principle of organizational invariance makes consciousness fundamental but meaningless spectator of its own drama. (deposited 06 Apr 2004)