Let’s face it
A review
of Keenan’s book “The Face in the Mirror”
Alain
MORIN
I have mixed
feelings toward Julian Paul Keenan’s book (written in collaboration with Gordon
G. Gallup, Jr. and Dean Falk) The face in the mirror: The Search for the origins of
consciousness
(2003, Haper Collins Publishers). The book presents exciting new research
results that improve our understanding of consciousness and its relation to the
brain. It proposes that self-awareness is dominantly associated with areas of
the right hemisphere. Using sophisticated neuroimaging experiments and case
studies of patients suffering from brain injury, Keenan reports compelling
evidence supporting the view that self-recognition, Theory of Mind, and other
self-related processes are mainly the result of right prefrontal activity.
However, while intriguing, I believe that this conclusion is both inflated and
premature. It most likely applies only to specific—and fairly primitive—forms
of self-awareness; and recent studies (some of which are mentioned by Keenan)
also suggest left hemispheric participation in the emergence of a sense of
self.
One overall concern
is that throughout the book there is a lack of conceptual distinction
established between the key notions of self-awareness, mirror self-recognition
(MSR), and Theory-of-Mind (TOM). Let me first clearly define self-awareness to
adequately contrast it with MSR and TOM. The general consensus in the
literature is that self-awareness represents a complex, multifaceted
neuro-socio-cognitive process (Morin, 2003). It is the capacity to become the
object of one’s own attention (Duval & Wicklund, 1972) and to actively
identify, process, and store information about the self. It consists in an
awareness of one’s own private self-aspects such as mental states (e.g.,
perceptions, sensations, attitudes, intentions, emotions) and public
self-characteristics (e.g., one’s body, behaviors, general physical
appearance). Self-awareness also includes knowing that we are the same person
across time, that we are the author of our thoughts and actions, and that we
are distinct from the environment (Kircher & David, 2003). Thus
self-awareness leads to the realization that one exists as an independent and
unique entity in the world, and that this existence will eventually cease.
Numerous self-referential processes are involved in self-awareness; some are
integral parts of the global activity of being self-aware (e.g.,
autobiographical memory [remembering one’s past], self-description, self-evaluation,
self-regulation, self-talk), while others correspond to consequences, or
by-products, of self-reflection (MSR and TOM of course, but also self-esteem,
sense of identity, self-actualization, self-disclosure, etc.) (See Leary
& Tangney, 2002, for
an extended list of self-processes.)
Seen as such, it is
readily apparent that one can’t reduce self-awareness to MSR and/or TOM. Yet,
Keenan has the tendency to equate these terms—especially MRS and self-awareness
(that he narrowly defines as “the ability to reflect on one’s own mental state
and the capacity to regard the self as a different entity from others” [p. 5]).
For example, a section on MSR in primates (pp. 35-41) is entitled “Finding
self-awareness in chimpanzees”; the author portrays animal MSR research in
terms of “fascinating self-awareness studies” (p. 41); or when Keenan describes
the content of the book, he states that “We’ll look at research performed using
a mirror with nonhuman primates… in an effort to determine which species may be
self-aware and which species may not” (pp. xi-xii). As will be seen below, such
conceptual confusion can lead to potentially flawed conclusions.
As I see it, the
book’s key claims can be summarized as follows. (A1) MSR in human and non-human
primates indicates the presence of self-awareness, i.e., introspective access
to one’s own mental states. Recognizing oneself in a mirror means that one can
become the object of one’s attention; it also presupposes a self-concept
because one first has to know who one is in order to self-recognize. (A2)
Because MSR appears to be dependent on right hemispheric activity, then
self-awareness too is linked to this same activity. (See chapters 1 and 6.)
(B1) Self-awareness makes it possible to infer mental states in others—to develop
a Theory of Mind. That is, once one becomes aware of one’s own private
psychological events, one can then imagine how it is for others to experience
similar states. Empathy, deception, and altruism for instance, would represent
by-products of TOM. (B2) Since self-awareness and TOM are very closely related,
and because TOM has been shown so far to mainly involve right hemisphere
activation, then it means that self-awareness too resides in this structure.
(See chapters 4 and 8.) (C) Organisms capable of MSR, because they are
self-aware, can engage in TOM. (See chapter 4.) (D1) Besides MSR and TOM, other
various aspects of self-awareness (e.g., autobiographical memory,
self-conscious emotions, use of personal pronouns) developmentally correlate;
furthermore (D2), a host of self-related disorders (e.g., anosognosia,
dissociation, depersonalization) follow disruption of normal right hemispheric
functioning. This represents additional support to the notion that all these
processes are linked and that the right hemisphere is dominant in the
construction of the self. (See chapters 3 and 7.) All the preceding suggests
that self-related processes are located in the right hemisphere; thus (E)
language, which is associated with left hemispheric functions, is neither
necessary nor sufficient for self-awareness to take place. (See preface and
chapter 9.)
Statement A1 above
(MSR implies self-awareness) has been critically assessed on a number of
occasions in the past. The conclusion at this point is that it is far from obvious
that MSR requires self-awareness of the introspective type (i.e., access to
mental events).[1]
Mitchell (e.g., 1993, 1997, 2002), probably the most vocal detractor of a
self-awareness explanation of MSR, proposes that all that is needed for an
organism to recognize itself in a mirror is a kinesthetic representation of its
own body. In support to this assertion, recent research indeed indicates that
the body schema contributes to MSR (Knoblich, 2002). The organism “matches”
what it sees in the mirror with an internal image of its own body and concludes
that the secular image is the self—hence the term “kinesthetic-visual matching
hypothesis.” But the organism doesn’t need to have any awareness of its mental
experiences. In other words, MSR seems to represent an ability only
superficially related to genuine, fully mature human self-awareness.
Interestingly, Keenan himself comes close to this conclusion when he writes
that “while [MSR] indicates self-awareness, a full understanding of self is not
yet complete” (p. 96). Possessing a somatic representation of one’s body does
count as a basic, primitive form of self-knowledge, but this is a far cry from
awareness of one’s sensations, emotions, intentions, values, attitudes,
etc.—i.e., one’s mental states. One problem is that Keenan does not explain how
purely introspective self-awareness could lead to MSR. As Mitchell indicates
(1997, p. 23), “it is unclear which mental states must be monitored for the
animal to recognize itself in the mirror.” There is no apparent connection
between being aware that one is happy, or tired, or Atheist, and recognizing
oneself in a mirror. However, as proposed by Mitchell, there is a link
between having an internal kinesthetic representation of one’s body (that one
can compare to what one sees on the reflecting surface) and MSR.
Heyes (1998), De
Weer and Van Den Bos (1999), Seyfarth and Cheney (2000), Wynne (2001), and
Meeks (2003), to name a few, all perceive analogous interpretation problems
with MSR, as examplified by Statement A1. And Swartz (1997) raises a number of
pertinent methodological concerns about the “mark test” used by Gallup (1970)
and others to operationalize MSR in primates. Keenan acknowledges
this last point, but
none of these other authors are mentioned in the book.
The above analysis
shows that the idea of MSR involving self-awareness is far from being
universally acclaimed. Therefore self-awareness and MSR should not be
equated, and consequently, Statement A2 is likely to be incorrect. Because
self-recognition takes place in the right hemisphere hardly means that
self-awareness itself is located in that hemisphere (Morin, 2002). Furthermore,
and although there is strong empirical evidence linking MSR to right
hemispheric activation, some studies have also found left hemispheric
activation. Keenan concedes this, and statements such as “there are a number of
other regions, including those in the left hemisphere, that may be involved in
self-face recognition” (p. 154) can be repeatedly found in chapter 6. Yet the
author keeps pushing the notion of right hemisphere advantage for
self-recognition. At one point Keenan examines a series of experiments
conducted by Kircher et al. (2001; also see Kircher
et al., 2000) and concludes that “This research supported our data on
self-faces and the right hemisphere” (p. 152). However, careful analysis of
this source shows that “recognition of the own face activated right limbic and
left prefrontal regions…”; “the left prefrontal cortex… was only activated by
self-faces…” (Kircher et al., 2001, pp. B10-B11). This clearly does not
corroborate Keenan’s position, and one is left wondering if he engages in such
seemingly biased reading of others’ work elsewhere in the book.
Probably the most
plausible hypothesis put forward by Keenan is Statement B1, which suggests that
self-awareness leads to TOM, or “the ability to reflect on the thoughts of
others” (p. 78). It is indeed intuitively appealing to say that in order for me
to imagine how it is for you to experience a headache, I first have to
experience one myself and to reflect on it, long enough at least to form a
conception of the nature and “quality” of such pain. However, three
qualifications are in order here. First, and although improbable in my opinion,
it should be noted that other authors have proposed that TOM might precede
self-awareness (instead of being its by-product), or could result from an
unknown mechanism also underlying self-awareness (see Frith & Happe, 1999;
Raffman, 1999). In other words, maybe one becomes self-aware once one has
developed an awareness of others’ mental states, or perhaps one can engage in
TOM not because one is self-aware, but because something else that also fosters
TOM has sufficiently evolved. Second, a specific form of self-awareness in humans
actually precludes thinking about others’ mental states. Self-awareness
does not represent a unitary construct. Trapnell and Campbell (1999)
have shown that people can “self-reflect” or “self-ruminate”. Self-reflection
is a genuine curiosity about the self, where the person is intrigued and
interested in learning more about his or her emotions, values, thought
processes, attitudes,
etc. Self-rumination consists in anxious attention paid to the self, where the
individual is afraid to fail and keeps wondering about his or her self-worth.
Whereas self-reflection is positively correlated with empathy—one
possible manifestation of TOM—, self-rumination is not, because being
obsessively self-aware (“self-absorbed”)
impedes thinking about others (Joireman, Parrott & Hammersla, 2002). And third, by definition, when one is actively
engaged in TOM one is focusing attention outward toward others’
potential mental events; although there might be a rapid “back and forth”
movement from self to other during TOM, technically one is not exclusively
directing attention inward toward the self—one is not “purely”
self-aware. Actually, it seems plausible to propose that self-awareness would
constitute a prerequisite for the establishment of TOM, but once fully developed
it would stop directly involving self-awareness and would take a life of its
own. In other words, one would first need to be aware of one’s mental processes
in order to conceive that others might be experiencing comparable processes;
once one would know that others probably experience mental events, there would
be no need anymore to constantly self-reflect in order to better understand
these mental experiences.
The preceding
observations clearly suggest that TOM and self-awareness, although possibly
related, represent two relatively independent activities. As a result, the
argument used to critically assess Statement A2 can be applied to Statement B2.
Self-awareness and TOM should not be equated, and so it would be
misleading to claim that because
TOM has been associated with right hemisphere activation, then it means that
the same hemisphere is responsible for self-awareness. There
is solid empirical evidence presented in Keenan’s book associating TOM to the
right hemisphere. But
as we have seen for MSR, we also have evidence that the left hemisphere
participates in TOM. Keenan himself acknowledges the
existence of studies that show “no clear evidence of laterality” in TOM (p.
218), and one very recent review of literature supports this as well. Gallagher
and Frith (2003) examined neuroimaging and lesion studies of TOM and conclude
that one region is consistently and significantly associated to “mentalizing”:
the anterior paracingulate cortex bilaterally. In one specific event-related potential experiment (not mentioned by Keenan and Gallagher & Frith), participants were asked to read stories and answer
questions about them (Sabbagh & Taylor, 2000). One set of narratives dealt
with beliefs of another person (TOM task) while the other had to do with non-mentalistic
information. Results indicated greater left frontal activity during the
TOM task. My goal here is obviously not to question the existence of right
hemispheric activity related to TOM; it is simply to emphasize the fact that
TOM seems to implicate bilateral brain areas—not
uniquely right hemispheric structures, as claimed by Keenan.
We saw previously
that MSR is unlikely to be associated with introspective self-awareness.
Consequently it comes as no surprise that organisms capable of MSR nonetheless
don’t seem to be able to engage in TOM, presumably because they lack access to
their own internal states. In a sense this represents additional evidence
indicating that Statement A1 (MSR presupposes self-awareness) is inaccurate.
Recall that Statement C proposes that organisms capable of MSR can infer mental
states in others. Yet in his careful and sobering analysis, Heyes (1998) makes
it clear that after 20 years of extensive research, evidence of TOM in
non-human primates successfully tested for MSR (chimpanzees and orangutans) is
still inconclusive. Data is almost exclusively anecdotical, and when animals do
seem to show signs of deception, role-taking, perspective-talking, or empathy
in the wild, alternative interpretations (e.g., chance, associative learning,
and imitation) are more plausible. To date, and to my knowledge, controlled
studies also fail to show authentic TOM in primates (see Povinelli,
1995, 1998).
Povinelli & Vonk (2003) assess that even when animals seem to infer
mental states in carefully designed experiments, another more parcimonious
explanation, called the “behavioral-abstraction hypothesis”, is available. For
example, if a subordinate chimpanzee avoids approaching food because it saw a
dominant one getting visual access to the baiting of food by the
experimentator, it could be tempting to anthropomorphize and believe that the
subordinate is (non-verbally) thinking “the dominant saw where the food
was placed so it knows where it is… It will go for it so I should stay
still.” Povinelli and Vonk’s interpretation however, is that the subordinate
simply thinks “the dominant was present and oriented (when the food was
baited); based on past experience, it will probably go get it so I should stay
still.” In other words, for the subordinate to act the way it does in such
experiments, it doesn’t need to make mentalistic abstractions (inferences)
about the dominant’s visual experience and knowledge (seeing the food and
knowing where it is)—it just has to form abstractions about statistical regularities
in behavior (i.e., a present and oriented dominant most likely will go after
food). In his book, Keenan presents numerous natural and experimental examples
of TOM in animals; while he seems to vigorously support Statement C, he also
admits that “both chimps and orangutans have a basic Theory of Mind, though not
at the level of adult humans” (p. 89).
Statement D2 suggests
that some disorders of the self can be linked to right hemisphere damage,
adding convergent evidence for the crucial role this hemisphere plays in
self-awareness. Keenan examines four such neurological conditions: the mirror
sign (loss of self-face recognition), asomatognosia (failure to recognize
specific body parts—e.g., one’s left arm), anosognosia (lack of knowledge or
denial of the existence of a disease), and dissociation, which includes
derealization (the experience of feeling outside of one’s body). With the
possible exception of anosognosia, it seems to me that these disorders all
share one common element: a distortion or absence of a body representation. One
can assume that this deficit of body schema would lead to problems with MSR, as
well as various forms of deformation of body awareness. Apparently then, the
mirror sign, asomatognosia, and dissociation have nothing to do with access to
one’s mental events (Keenan’s definition of self-awareness), and instead are
related to one’s mental conception of one’s body—or lack thereof. While, as
stated previously, awareness of one’s body contributes to self-awareness, it
certainly represents a fairly crude aspect of self-awareness. Thus, as was the
case with MSR, Keenan again seems to be trying to support his model of right
hemispheric dominance with lower manifestations of self-awareness. This reduces
the credibility of his overall thesis.
Another aspect of
self-awareness discussed in the book is self memory. Here Keenan readily confesses that “not all research indicates that the right hemisphere or right
frontal regions are critical for autobiographical memory…” (p. 192). As a matter
of fact, a growing number of researchers are proposing the existence of a
“self-memory system” (SMS) predominantly involving the left hemisphere.
The SMS would comprise “people’s autobiographical knowledge, personal beliefs,
currently active goal states and conceptions of self (both idealized and
veridical)” (Turk et al., 2002, p. 2). Recent studies conducted by Conway
(e.g., Conway & Turk, 1999; Conway, Pleydell-Pearce & Whitecross, 2001) indeed support the
notion that the left hemisphere plays an important role in autobiographical memory retrieval.
Massive left frontal activation has been observed using PET and EEG in
participants asked to recall specific personal events following the
presentation of cue words.
An important dimension
of self-awareness (not systematically considered by Keenan) is the capacity to
describe the self. Like autobiographical memory (and most probably MSR and
TOM), self-description has been shown to involve both hemispheres of the brain.
In a typical experiment, brain activity is being
measured while participants are invited to judge how well personality traits,
abilities, attitudes, or physical attributes describe them. A variation
consists in asking volunteers to orally describe themselves. Results of such
studies reliably indicate bilateral activation with no
right hemispheric bias (e.g., Gusnard et al.,
2001; Johnson et al, 2002; Kircher et al., 2000, 2002; Kjaer,
Nowak & Lou, 2002). That
diverse right and left brain areas participate in self-awareness and related
activities should hardly be surprising. After all, given the complex nature of
this phenomenon, it would be naďve to expect finding only one single brain
area—or hemisphere, for that matter—connected to self-awareness. As Kircher et
al. (2002, p. 690) put it, “there is no unique center in the brain for
self-relevant processing.” Interestingly, Keenan seems to get close to this realization when he
claims that “complex cognitive phenomena such as memory, planning, or self-awareness
will not be found in a single area or region” (pp. 139-140). Recent studies of
autobiographical memory and self-description, together with this last point,
cast further doubts on the notion of a right hemispheric dominance for
self-awareness.
Statement E, which
proposes that language is neither necessary nor sufficient for self-awareness
to develop, is too strong, if not simply false. In their impressive
review of literature, Garfield, Peterson and Perry
(2001) clearly demonstrate that TOM abilities and language development go hand
in hand. An
increasing number of researchers remain convinced that more sophisticated forms
of self-reflection require language, and more specifically, inner speech (e.g.,
Briscoe, 2003; Burns & Engdahl, 1998; Carruthers, 1998; Morin & Everett, 1992; Morin, 1993,
2003; Stamenov, 2003;
Steels, 2003). Self-talk can reproduce and
extend social mechanisms leading to self-awareness; furthermore, when one talks to oneself one can verbally identify,
process and store information about one’s current physical and mental states as
well as past or present behaviors. While direct neuroanatomical evidence linking inner speech to
self-awareness is nonexistent at this point, correlational studies suggest that
the more one focuses on the
self the more one talks to oneself, and vice-versa (see Schneider, 2002;
Siegrist, 1995).
Thus Keenan’s claim that “The idea that the highest from of consciousness must exist
in the left hemisphere because it possesses language is no longer tenable” (p.
xxiii)” itself is not defensible. The ultimate indication that language and the
left hemisphere do participate in self-awareness can be found in case
studies of split-brain patients. “… Conscious function in the disconnected
left, language dominant hemisphere is relatively easy to determine through
direct verbal communication (Sperry, Zaidel & Zaidel, 1979, p. 153). In
other words, it is obvious that the left
hemisphere of split-brain patients is fully self-aware because the
experimenter can ask verbal questions to this part of the patient’s brain and
it will provide answers that clearly indicate that it has a comprehensive sense
of self – e.g., the name it collectively shares with the right hemisphere, its
current feelings, future goals, aspirations, etc.
So what kind of
general assessment of Keenan’s book should we be left with? The book has
already been described by reviewers and editors as being “insightful”, “witty”,
and “accessible”; “engaging”, “compelling”, and “exciting”. All these terms
apply. Overall, it presents valid information on a number of interesting topics
such as MSR in primates and other animals, and TOM in children. The last
chapter on the evolution and functions of self-awareness is particularly captivating.
One general contribution made by the book is that it provides the reader with a
more balanced view of hemispheric specialization. It makes it clear that
the right, “minor” hemisphere plays an
important role in a host of cognitive functions, including self-awareness. Thus
the old assumption that the left hemisphere is the “dominant” one has to be
rejected. But as have been seen, the main thesis put forward by Keenan suffers
from quite a few serious problems. The review of literature has a tendency to
be selective and in accordance with the thesis of right hemisphere dominance
for self-awareness. Keenan conceptually equates self-awareness with two
relatively inadequate manifestations of it: MSR and TOM. And by denying
participation of both language and the left hemisphere to self-awareness,
Keenan finds himself in an awkward and impossible situation where he has to
adhere to the view that the left speaking hemisphere is unconscious. All this
could be avoided by presenting a watered-down version of the thesis, which
would still be consistent with the evidence presented in the book: both
hemispheres of the brain are involved in self-awareness.
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[1] One can confidently assume here
that face recognition [i.e., looking at a picture of one’s face on a photograph
or computer screen] represents a natural extension of, or is based on, previous
experiences with MSR. Note that Keenan also examines voice and name recognition
in his book.