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In Defense of Extreme (Fallibilistic) Apriorism

Smith, B. (1996) In Defense of Extreme (Fallibilistic) Apriorism. [Journal (Paginated)]

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Abstract

I shall presuppose as undefended background to what follows a position of scientific realism, a doctrine to the effect (i) that the world exists and (ii) that through the working out of ever more sophisticated theories our scientific picture of reality will approximate ever more closely to the world as it really is. Against this background consider, now, the following question: 1. Do the empirical theories with the help of which we seek to approximate a good or true picture of reality rest on any non-empirical presuppositions? One can answer this question with either a 'yes' or a 'no'. 'No' is the preferred answer of most contemporary methodologists -- Murray Rothbard is one distinguished counterexample to this trend -- who maintain that empirical theories are completely free of non-empirical ('a priori') admixtures and who see science as a matter of the gathering of pure 'data' obtained through simple observation. From such data scientific propositions are then supposed to be somehow capable of being established.

Item Type:Journal (Paginated)
Subjects:Philosophy > Epistemology
Philosophy > Metaphysics
ID Code:302
Deposited By:Smith, Barry
Deposited On:08 Jun 1998
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:53

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