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Intentional Action in Folk Psychology: An Experimental Investigation

Knobe, Joshua (2003) Intentional Action in Folk Psychology: An Experimental Investigation. [Journal (On-line/Unpaginated)] (In Press)

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Abstract

Four experiments examined people’s folk-psychological concept of intentional action. The chief question was whether or not evaluative considerations — considerations of good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame — played any role in that concept. The results indicated that the moral qualities of a behavior strongly influence people’s judgements as to whether or not that behavior should be considered ‘intentional.’ After eliminating a number of alternative explanations, the author concludes that this effect is best explained by the hypothesis that evaluative considerations do play some role in people’s concept of intentional action.

Item Type:Journal (On-line/Unpaginated)
Keywords:Intentional Action, Action Theory, Folk Morality, Folk Psychology, Intention
Subjects:Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy > Ethics
Psychology > Social Psychology
ID Code:2922
Deposited By:Knobe, Joshua
Deposited On:06 May 2003
Last Modified:12 Sep 2007 17:47

References in Article

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