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Contextuality: A Philosophical Paradigm, with Applications to Philosophy of Cognitive Science

Gershenson, C (2002) Contextuality: A Philosophical Paradigm, with Applications to Philosophy of Cognitive Science. [Departmental Technical Report] (Unpublished)

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Abstract

We develop on the idea that everything is related, inside, and therefore determined by a context. This stance, which at first might seem obvious, has several important consequences. This paper first presents ideas on Contextuality, for then applying them to problems in philosophy of cognitive science. Because of space limitations, for the second part we will assume that the reader is familiar with the literature of philosophy of cognitive science, but if this is not the case, it would not be a limitation for understanding the main ideas of this paper. We do not argue that Contextuality is a panaceic answer for explaining everything, but we do argue that everything is inside a context. And because this is always, we sometimes ignore it, but we believe that many problems are dissolved with a contextual approach, noticing things we ignore because of their obviousity. We first give a notion of context. We present the idea that errors are just incongruencies inside a context. We also present previous ideas of absolute being, relative being, and lessincompleteness. We state that all logics, and also truth judgements, are contextdependent, and we develop a “Context-dependant Logic”. We apply ideas of Contextuality to problems in semantics, the problem of “where is the mind”, and the study of consciousness.

Item Type:Departmental Technical Report
Subjects:Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
ID Code:2621
Deposited By:Gershenson, Carlos
Deposited On:23 Nov 2002
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:55

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