Velmans, Max (1990) Is the Mind Conscious, Functional or Both? [Journal (Paginated)]
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Abstract
What, in essence, characterizes the mind? According to Searle, the potential to be conscious provides the only definitive criterion. Thus, conscious states are unquestionably "mental"; "shallow unconscious" states are also "mental" by virtue of their capacity to be conscious (at least in principle); but there are no "deep unconscious mental states" - i.e. those rules and procedures without access to consciousness, inferred by cognitive science to characterize the operations of the unconscious mind are not mental at all. Indeed, according to Searle, they have no ontological status - they are simply ways of describing some interesting facets of purely physiological phenomena.
| Item Type: | Journal (Paginated) |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | Searle, connection principle, consciousness, functionalism, mind, first person, third person, aspectual shape, unconscious |
| Subjects: | Psychology > Cognitive Psychology Philosophy > Epistemology Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind |
| ID Code: | 245 |
| Deposited By: | Velmans, Professor Max, |
| Deposited On: | 13 Mar 1998 |
| Last Modified: | 12 Sep 2007 17:26 |
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