Velmans, Max (1998) Goodbye to Reductionism. [Book Chapter]
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Abstract
To understand consciousness we must first describe what we experience accurately. But oddly, current dualist vs reductionist debates characterise experience in ways which do not correspond to ordinary experience. Indeed, there is no other area of enquiry where the phenomenon to be studied has been so systematically misdescribed. Given this, it is hardly surprising that progress towards understanding the nature of consciousness has been limited.
| Item Type: | Book Chapter |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | consciousness, dualism, reductionism, phenomenology, identity theory, perception, reflexive, projection, pain, body-image, Searle, Place, Churchland |
| Subjects: | Psychology > Cognitive Psychology Philosophy > Metaphysics Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind Philosophy > Philosophy of Science Psychology > Physiological Psychology |
| ID Code: | 244 |
| Deposited By: | Velmans, Professor Max, |
| Deposited On: | 13 Mar 1998 |
| Last Modified: | 12 Sep 2007 17:26 |
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