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Evolving cooperation in the non-iterated prisoner's dilemma: The importance of spatial organization

Oliphant, M. (1998) Evolving cooperation in the non-iterated prisoner's dilemma: The importance of spatial organization. [Conference Paper]

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Abstract

Most work on evolving cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma treats the non-iterated game as an undesirable simple case that should be risen above. It has been taken as a given that populations evolving to play the non-iterated game will always converge on defection. This paper questions this assumption, and demonstrates that organizing a population spatially dramatically changes the nature of the game and allows cooperation to emerge.

Item Type:Conference Paper
Keywords:prisoner's dilemma, evolution of altruism, genetic algorithm, spatial organization, game theory
Subjects:Biology > Animal Behavior
Biology > Animal Cognition
Biology > Ethology
Biology > Evolution
Biology > Population Biology
Biology > Sociobiology
Psychology > Social Psychology
ID Code:170
Deposited By:Oliphant, Michael
Deposited On:15 Jun 1998
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:53

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