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Correlation vs. Causality: How/Why the Mind/Body Problem Is Hard

Harnad, Stevan (2000) Correlation vs. Causality: How/Why the Mind/Body Problem Is Hard. [Journal (Paginated)]

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Abstract

The Mind/Body Problem (M/BP) is about causation not correlation. And its solution (if there is one) will require a mechanism in which the mental component somehow manages to play a causal role of its own, rather than just supervening superflously on other, nonmental components that look, for all the world, as if they can do the full causal job perfectly well without it. Correlations confirm that M does indeed "supervene" on B, but causality is needed to show how/why M is not supererogatory; and that's the hard part.

Commentary on:Humphrey, Nicholas (2000) How to solve the mind-body problem. [Journal (Paginated)]
Item Type:Journal (Paginated)
Keywords:mind/body problem, feeling, functionalism, qualia, computationalism, consciousness, other-minds problem, causality, dualism, epiphenomenalism
Subjects:Psychology > Cognitive Psychology
Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
ID Code:1617
Deposited By:Harnad, Stevan
Deposited On:19 Jun 2001
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:54

References in Article

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