Harnad, Stevan (1995) Why and How We Are Not Zombies. [Journal (Paginated)]
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Abstract
A robot that is functionally indistinguishable from us may or may not be a mindless Zombie. There will never be any way to know, yet its functional principles will be as close as we can ever get to explaining the mind.
| Item Type: | Journal (Paginated) |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | consciousness, reverse engineering, other-minds problem, bind/body problem, zombies, functionalism, epiphenomenalism, causality |
| Subjects: | Psychology > Cognitive Psychology Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind |
| ID Code: | 1601 |
| Deposited By: | Harnad, Stevan |
| Deposited On: | 19 Jun 2001 |
| Last Modified: | 19 Dec 2009 19:17 |
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