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Putting Content into a Vehicle Theory of Consciousness

O'Brien, Gerard and Opie, Jon (1999) Putting Content into a Vehicle Theory of Consciousness. [Journal (Paginated)]

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Abstract

The connectionist vehicle theory of phenomenal experience in the target article identifies consciousness with the brain’s explicit representation of information in the form of stable patterns of neural activity. Commentators raise concerns about both the conceptual and empirical adequacy of this proposal. On the former front they worry about our reliance on vehicles, on representation, on stable patterns of activity, and on our identity claim. On the latter front their concerns range from the general plausibility of a vehicle theory to our specific attempts to deal with the dissociation studies. We address these concerns, and then finish by considering whether the vehicle theory we have defended has a coherent story to tell about the active, unified subject to whom conscious experiences belong.

Commentary on:O'Brien, Gerard and Opie, Jon (1999) A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience. [Journal (Paginated)]
Item Type:Journal (Paginated)
Keywords:connectionism, phenomenal experience, classicism, vehicle theory of consciousness, process theory of consciousness, philosophy of mind, dissociation, mental representation
Subjects:Neuroscience > Computational Neuroscience
Psychology > Cognitive Psychology
Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
JOURNALS > Behavioral & Brain Sciences
ID Code:1466
Deposited By:Opie, Jon
Deposited On:30 Apr 2001
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:54

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